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ABSTRACT
Chapter 1: Does Community Inclusion in Protected Areas’ Governance Re-
duce Threat to Biodiversity? A Cross Country Analysis
To what extent community inclusion in protected areas’ governance affect bio-
diversity outcomes is the main question that we attempt to answer in chapter
1 using the extra-ordinary datasets of the World Database on Protected Areas
(WDPAs) and the Redlist of International Union for the Conservation of Nature
(IUCN). We exploit variation in cumulative size of designated protected areas
differentiated by IUCN governance types and estimate the threat to mammals
and birds in Sub-Saharan African countries. We find stronger effect of commu-
nity inclusion in protected areas’ decision making on the reduction of threat to
mammals while no significant effect on the threat level to birds. Our findings
provide evidence in support of positive response of community participation to-
wards common goods that carry potential economic incentives. This chapter
contributes to the idea of inclusive environmental policies that yield environ-
mental gains not at the cost of social exclusion.
Chapter 2: A Model of Collaborative Governance for Community-based
Trophy-Hunting Programs in Developing Countries
We frame the governance structure of community-based trophy hunting(CBTH)
programs as a form of collaborative governance that involve multiple stake-
holders in the management of common pool resources. By conducting a mata-
analysis on 80 published case studies, we develop contingency propositions that
help practitioners and governments to understand and implement programs that
seek environmental conservation in collaboration with local communities. We
identify factors that may interplay to affect the incentive to participate in com-
munity based conservation programs particularly CBTH. We also argue that,
despite the uncertainty of effectiveness of community-based conservation from
i
the beginning, due to the pre-history of conflicts, governments tend to rely upon
bottom-up approach that utilize the effort of local communities in conserving
wildlife rather than ineffective command-and-control policies. On the other
hand, local communities cooperate and participate in CBTHdue to power-imbalance
between strong governments andweak communities who live closelywithwildlife.
We finally elaborate the process of CBTH and identify factors that determine the
outcomes of CBTH programs in developing countries.
Chapter 3: Teachers’Monitoring and Schools’ Performance: Evidence from
Public Schools in Pakistan
We examine the effect of a large scale innovative smart-phone-aided monitoring
program implemented in over 28000 government schools for improving teacher’s
attendance and school performance in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province,
Pakistan. We find ideal conditions for a natural experiment by utilizing nation-
ally representative survey that enables us to create treatment and control areas.
Our findings suggest that the program has improved teacher’s attendance by
nearly 8% in the year immediately following the program. However, this ef-
fect decreases by nearly half after two years of the program introduction. We
also find the program’s direct effect on the enrolled children’s test performance
at home. Enrolled children’s standardized Reading, Math and English ability
in monitored schools has improved significantly by 0.07, 0.13 and 0.11 stan-
dard deviation points respectively at the lower (0-5) grades. There is slight im-
provement in the standardized test performance of higher grade children. The
program also increases the probability of children enrollment into government
schools. Our results are robust on different specifications and sub-samples of
schools and districts clusters.
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CHAPTER 1
DOES COMMUNITY INCLUSION IN PROTECTED
AREAS’ GOVERNANCE REDUCE THREAT TO
BIODIVERSITY? A CROSS COUNTRY ANALYSIS
1.1 Introduction
The trade-off between economic growth, social well-being and ecological via-
bility has been a challenge in achieving sustainable development goals (SDGs)
adopted by themember states of theUnitedNations(UN) (Barrett, Bulte, Ferraro,
& Wunder, 2013; Bromley & Paavola, 2008; Mills & Waite, 2009). Proponents
of sustainable development suggest ‘win–win’ strategies that generate both eco-
nomic and environmental benefits, preventing environmental damage through
inclusion of local communities and adjustment of economic policies that help
avoid environmental loss (Baldus, 2009; Gupta & Vegelin, 2016; McIntosh &
Renard, 2010; Munasinghe, 1993; Munasinghe et al., 2009; Sachs et al., 2009;
UNEP, 2011). Sustainable development is therefore seen as achieving environ-
mental, social and economic objectives not at the cost of each other.
One of the key sustainable development goals is the conservation of bio-
logical diversity that seeks to protect, restore and promote sustainable use of
ecosystem services and reduce threat to biodiversity. On one hand, the expand-
ing global economy coupled with increased human population pose a continuous
threat to biodiversity (Cohen, 1995), on the other hand, countries facing poor
governance find it a challenge to conserve natural resource stock particularly
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wildlife and forests (Gibson, McKean, & Ostrom, 2000; Smith, Muir, Walpole,
Balmford, & Leader-Williams, 2003).
Given the important of biodiversity, there have been growing efforts in build-
ing conservation capacity of developing countries that inhabit most of theworld’s
biodiversity. One of these efforts is the designation of Protected Areas(PAs) by
the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) through vari-
ous donor support programs. However, there are rising concerns in developing
countries that increasing protected areas lead to the exclusion of local commu-
nities from natural resource use and corruption in the use of natural resources
that in turn results into the failure of conservation projects (Smith et al., 2003).
We attempt to address this concern by analyzing the effectiveness of community
involvement in (rather than exclusion from) protected areas in less developed
countries. In this paper, we investigate the relationship between governance of
designated protected areas and threat to biodiversity using panel data for 32 Sub-
Saharan African countries. We exploit the difference in governance systems of
designated protected areas to estimate the effect on Redlist threat level reported
by the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN).
The following section underlines the key findings in the previous literature
and linking it with the basic research questions in the third section followed
by a short description of the need for research in this area. The fifth section
describes methods, specification and data respectively. Section 6 reports the
mains findings while the last section concludes.
1.2 Review of Existing Literature
The concept of sustainability demands maintenance of the stock of both human-
made and natural capital over time. B. Adams (2008) further divides sustainabil-
ity into two types; strong sustainability and weak sustainability. Strong sustain-
ability emphasizes more on the conservation of natural capital while requiring
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enough stock of both natural and human capital. However, practically, achieve-
ment of strong sustainability is difficult given the diverse nature of societies,
their standards of living and geographic conditions. As evident by recent studies,
the overwhelming emphasis on ecological or environmental goals has marginal-
ized the less privileged communities in terms of their livelihood sources (Baldus,
2009; Gibson et al., 2000; Hayes, 2006; A. Hoole & Berkes, 2010). For example
the designation of conservation areas in developing countries has resulted into
significant concerns of communities living near or inside protected areas due to
their dependency on the local natural resource (W. B. Adams, 2013). On the
other hand, weak sustainability allows a trade-off between natural and human-
mad capital. Economists however, are increasingly concerned about imbalance
in priorities of sustainable development objectives suggesting more careful in-
vestigation of environmental policies.
One of the key environmental strategies to overcome the environmental degra-
dation is the establishment of protected areas and reserves around biodiversity
hotspots that can help protect the ecosystem services. In the following texts,
we explain the history and system of protected areas and its relationship with
conservation outcomes in the light of previous studies.
1.2.1 Establishment of Protected Areas and Conservation
The uncontrolled degradation of biodiversity and ecosystem services in the nine-
teenth century resulted into the establishment of protected areas (PAs) (Andrade
& Rhodes, 2012). Since then, the designation of protected areas has been in-
creasing exponentially with a current total of 161,000 protected sites, over a
32 million km2 area, or nearly 13% of the earth’s land area (See Appendix fig-
ure A.1). The purpose of PAs designation generally depends on various objec-
tives and criteria, at the heart of which is the preservation of constituent species
and ecosystem services (Child, 2013; Dudley, 2008; Hayes, 2006). Understand-
ing of the conditions under which protected areas are designated and how they
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deliver their conservation outcomes is therefore important for policy makers and
conservation specialists to adopt sustainable courses of actions.
Despite being considered a key conservation strategy for forests and wildlife
conservation (Brooks et al., 2004), a recent meta-analytical study on 76 papers
evaluating impact of protected areas on habitat cover and 42 studies evaluating
impact on species population finds positive impact of PAs on habitat cover with
inconclusive evidence on PAs effectiveness in species conservation (Geldmann
et al., 2013). The World Database on Protected Areas1 (WDPAs) is the organi-
zation that collects, compiles and reports data on marine and terrestrial protected
areas in collaboration with various governmental and non-governmental organi-
zations, academia and industry. Its aim is to develop and maintain an accurate
and freely available up-to-date database on protected areas status around the
world to be used as a global standard by all relevant stakeholders (Brooks et al.,
2004).
Protected areas are further divided into many categories by WDPAs. These
include protected areas established by governments, areas established under the
regional and international conventions, privately owned conservation areas and
areas conserved by indigenous people and local communities. The IUCN of-
ficially defines protected area as “a clearly defined geographical space, recog-
nized, dedicated andmanaged, through legal or other effective means, to achieve
the long-term conservation of nature with associated ecosystem services and cul-
tural values” (Dudley, 2008)[p.30].
The IUCN has further two broad types of classifications; (1) Management
Categories and; (2) Governance Types. The Protected Area Management Cate-
gories help us classify protected areas based on their primarymanagement objec-
tives (Dudley, 2008), while the IUCN Governance Types classify protected ar-
eas according to who holds authority, responsibility and accountability for them
1WDPA is a joint initiative between the United Nations Environment Programme
(UNEP), the World Conservation Monitoring Centre (UNEP-WCMC), the IUCN and
the World Commission on Protected Areas (WCPA). The latest version is available at
https://www.protectedplanet.net/
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(Borrini-Feyerabend & Hill, 2015) . Currently about 65% of protected areas in
the WDPA have IUCN Management categorization, and 88% have governance
types (Juffe-Bignoli et al., 2014). In this paper, we use the latter classification
because it sufficiently tells us the extent to which authority, responsibility and
accountability is devolved to the lower level in terms of resource use.
1.2.2 Governance of Protected Areas
Governance refers to the process of decision making and exercising of authority
in an organization. Graham, Amos, and Plumptre (2003) define governance of
protected areas as an interactions among structures, processes and traditions that
determine the extent to which power is exercised, responsibility is shared, the
way decisions are taken and how citizens or other stakeholders participate in the
process. Achievement of protected areas’ objectives is closely associated with
the extent of power and decision-making capacity, responsibility sharing, rights
to use and the way financial, political or communal support is generated around
protect areas (Andrade & Rhodes, 2012).
Ever since protected areas and conservation existed, decisions about how
to protect, conserve and use the natural resource inside or around the protected
areas have been done by either the state (central or local government), interna-
tional organizations, private owner or local communities. Recently, there has
been increasing attention on understanding the nature of governance in terms of
appropriateness to the specific context, effectiveness in delivering lasting results
and livelihood benefits under different governance regimes (Borrini-Feyerabend
& Hill, 2015; Smith et al., 2003). Although, an ideal governance setting does
not exist for all protected areas, however, IUCN suggests a set of “good gover-
nance” principles(indicators) that can provide insights about the way different
governance settings contribute in protecting livelihood, rights and values of the
indigenous people in or around these areas (Graham et al., 2003). The key com-
ponents of IUCN governance categorization include, participation, innovation,
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benefits sharing, respect and informed approval of the stakeholders. The pur-
pose of this categorization is to measure the extent to which full and effective
participation of relevant stakeholders including local people are ensured, and the
proportion of benefits shared equitably.
There are diverse forms of governance regimes for protected areas around
the world. However, IUCN (and CBD) has grouped them into four broad gover-
nance types, on the basis of who holds authority, responsibility and management
decisions. For example, who establish the protected area and who determine
its management objectives and demarcating plans etc. These four types are:
governance by states, joint governance, governance by private sector organiza-
tions; and governance by local communities(figure-1) (Borrini-Feyerabend &
Hill, 2015). In the following text, the main types of governance are discussed.
 
Figure 1.1: Protected Areas’Governance: A Continuum(Borrini-Feyerabend & Hill,
2015)
A. State Protected Areas and Conservation
The state protected areas are characterized by strict government control over des-
ignated areas in terms of authority, responsibility and accountability in decisions
and determination of its conservation objectives (Dudley, 2008) . Usually a min-
istry or protected areas agency under the national or sub-national governments is
responsible for the management and development of enforcement plans for the
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protected areas. In most of the cases, the central governments take overall con-
trol of the protected area and take all major decisions with a little or no say from
the local people in or around protected areas (Andrade & Rhodes, 2012; Geld-
mann et al., 2013). Historically, state-protected areas were the dominant type of
governance, however, recently, there have been increasing efforts in delegating
authority to the sub-national level or local level (Andrade & Rhodes, 2012; Li,
2002; Nelson & Agrawal, 2008).
Although the establishment of PAs is considered a great achievement per se,
many environmentalists and social scientists believe that only state PAs alone
cannot safeguard preservation of biodiversity due to multiple reasons (Borrini-
Feyerabend & Hill, 2015; Hayes, 2006; A. Hoole & Berkes, 2010; Virtanen,
2005). For example, many state protected areas have been established under the
top-down approach of the nineteenth century (Gibson et al., 2000; Hayes, 2006).
Such protected areas have failed to consider social, cultural, and political values
that are important for indigenous communities (Hayes, 2006). Governments fre-
quently deprive communities from extracting resources that are essential for their
livelihoods, and in some cases, local people are pushed out from their lands with
no consultation or appropriate compensation (Vodouhê, Coulibaly, Adégbidi, &
Sinsin, 2010). This often results into adverse social impact on local communities
that include disruption of their traditional way of living, lack of cooperation with
PAs authorities and hostile attitude towards nature (Abidi-Habib & Lawrence,
2007; W. M. Adams & Hulme, 2001; Baldus, 2009). Also, conflicts emerge
between state authorities and local people that reduce the effectiveness of pro-
tected areas in conservation outcomes (Gupta & Vegelin, 2016; A. F. Hoole,
2010; Khan, 2012). For example, in Uganda, local people burnt 5% of for-
est after the national park was gazetted (Hamilton, Cunningham, Byarugaba, &
Kayanja, 2000). Similarly, in retaliation to the strictly top-down policies, illegal
activities including hunting and poaching were started in South Africa (Watts
& Faasen, 2009). Moreover, no cooperation with park authorities in conserva-
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tion is an inevitable outcome of strictly controlled protected areas (B. Adams,
2008; W. B. Adams, 2013). Recently, there has been increasing focus on find-
ing alternative governance forms in which governance of protected areas could
be delegated to the local authorities and local people might be involved in deci-
sion making (Abidi-Habib & Lawrence, 2007; W. M. Adams & Hulme, 2001;
Bunge-Vivier & Martínez-Ballesté, 2017; Frost & Bond, 2008; Goldman, 2003;
Hayes, 2006; A. Hoole & Berkes, 2010). These include collaborative gover-
nance, delegated governance and governance by local communities. Since, the
second largest type of governance in the WDPA database is governance by local
communities, therefore the next section discusses this type in more details.
B. Community-Governed PAs and Conservation Outcomes
The effect of inappropriate protected area’s management on the livelihood of
local people is well documented (W. M. Adams & Hulme, 2001; Bouwen &
Taillieu, 2004; Child, 2013; Hayes, 2006; Ostrom, 1999; Rosser Jr & Rosser,
2006). The main concern of local communities about strictly protected areas
is their deprivation from getting benefits of the local natural resources such as
forests, wildlife and vegetation etc (Abidi-Habib & Lawrence, 2007; Frost &
Bond, 2008; Khan, 2012; Marshall, 2008).
Local communities in many countries particularly developing ones depend
on the natural resources that protected areas seek to preserve, as part of their
livelihoods. For example, people living in or around a forest reserve might de-
pend on forests use for fuel, plants and vegetation for their livestock and agri-
culture and wildlife for proteins etc. Therefore, their interest in protected ar-
eas’ management and negotiating their share of the cost and benefits related
with conservation policies is understandable (Child, 2013; Hayes, 2006; Rai,
Neupane, & Dhakal, 2016). In most cases, local communities seek access to
local resources, overcome human-wildlife conflicts and share in financial ben-
efits arising from the natural resources such as trophy payments, employment,
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tourism ventures andmarket for local products (Abidi-Habib & Lawrence, 2007;
LeaderWilliams, Kayera,&Overton, 1996; Virtanen, 2005). Besides livelihood-
attachment, , local people also possess knowledge and practical traditions about
biodiversity conservation that they have developed historically (Imran, Alam, &
Beaumont, 2014). As a result, the recent decades have seen increasing interven-
tions in developing countries that encourage governments to devolve authority
to local communities and adopt inclusive strategies in identifying priorities for
natural resource management particularly in protected areas.
Local communities’ compliance with conservation policies in protected ar-
eas is closely associated with their involvement in decision making (Baldus,
2009; Bassi&Carestiato, 2016; Bunge-Vivier&Martínez-Ballesté, 2017; DiMinin
et al., 2013; A. Hoole & Berkes, 2010). However, what motivates local com-
munities to cooperate and comply with conservation policies, is not clear. Al-
though community preferences vary across countries, the so-far literature on
Sub-Saharan African countries show two main drivers of community compli-
ance with conservation policies that include, economic incentives for the local
people (e.g through community-based trophy hunting (CBTH) or ecotourism
benefits etc) and reduced conflicts between state authorities and local people.
The simple theory behind CBTH success is that the perceived future eco-
nomic benefits from trophy hunting will incentivize local communities to be
engaged as key partners with policymakers and practitioners to make efforts to
conserve endangered species. Thus communitymemberswill do better than gov-
ernment due to their proximity to and knowledge of wildlife and their ability to
detect, report, and help preventing illegal wildlife trafficking (Baldus, 2009; Li,
2002; Shackleton, 2001). In this context, the expectations to reap tangible bene-
fits from collaboration in CBTH may strongly affect the incentive to participate
in collaboration.
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C. Other forms of PAs Governance
The other two forms of PAs governance are collaborative or joint governance and
the governance by private owners. The terms Joint governance, shared gover-
nance, co-management and collaborative management are sometimes used inter-
changeably. Collaborative governance is usually characterized by a form of gov-
ernance in which decision-making authority and responsibility is vested to one
agency which is required to inform or consult other stakeholders when planning
or implementing a specific plan (Borrini-Feyerabend & Hill, 2015). The Private
governance of protected areas includes protected areas governed by individu-
als, NGOs or corporate entities called “private protected areas” such as private
ranches etc. This form of governance is more common in developed countries.
Since this study’s main focus is the Sub-Saharan African countries (more dis-
cussion in methodology section), therefore, private owners’ governance is not
discussed in much detail here.
1.2.3 Economic Incentives and Community Involvement in
PAs
A large number of country-specific case studies have individually attempted to
find major factors that lead to community participation in conservation plans
(Damm, 2008; Frost & Bond, 2008; A. F. Hoole, 2010; Jachmann, 2008; Klein,
Reau, Kalland, & Edwards, 2007; Natcher & Hickey, 2002; Newig & Fritsch,
2009; Seixas & Berkes, 2010). Community-based conservation programs are
based on the premise of perceived financial incentives from regulated hunting of
endangered animals for local communities who are committed to conserve those
animals in developing countries particularly Sub-Sahran Africa (W. M. Adams
& Hulme, 2001; Mayaka, Hendricks, Wesseler, & Prins, 2005; Rosser Jr &
Rosser, 2006). The expectations of direct and indirect benefits (e.g, hunting,
ecotourism), can make them interested in being engaged in conservation pro-
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grams. Studies show highmotivation and interest in participation in community-
based conservation programs in general where the potential for these incentives
is higher (Frost & Bond, 2008; S. IUCN, 2012; Khan, 2012)
Conventional conservation policies, such as establishing national parks, of-
ten lead to conflicts between government and local communities by restricting
local communities from using natural resources including wildlife animals in
protected areas and even displacing them forcibly out of the protected areas
(A. Hoole & Berkes, 2010; Khan, 2012; Murombedzi, 1999; Watts & Faasen,
2009) . Such conflicts might arise because economically poor local communi-
ties who live on subsistence agriculture in their traditional lands perceivewildlife
mainly as a threat to their livelihoods. For example, in Uganda, stampedes of
active wild animals on farmlands at the edge of the Kibale National Park re-
duced crop production dramatically (Naughton-Treves, 1997). Thus, they tend
to poach wild animals illegally and harm their habitats for their survival and are
often tempted to illegal wildlife trafficking for economic reason, which have
limited the effectiveness of conservation policies. In Mozambique for example,
the colonial rules prevented local communities in reserved forests from using
natural resources; consequently, local communities were united against the gov-
ernment and consumed all local forest resources (Virtanen, 2005).
Various studies have documented the effect of community-based natural re-
source conservation on income (Andam, Ferraro, Sims, Healy, & Holland, 2010;
Lewis, Hunt, & Plantinga, 2003). An empirical study on a large-scale house-
hold survey using an index of village associational life in Tanzania finds a pos-
itive correlation between social inclusiveness and household income (Narayan
& Pritchett, 2000). Lewis et al. (2003) observe no significant negative effect of
land preservation and share in different regimes in the northern US regions on the
growth rate and further suggest the possibility of positive shift in employment
due to conservation policy. Also,community involvement is often associated
with reduced inequality in rural areas that positively affect the local institutions
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for natural resource management (Hayes, 2006; Holland, Peterson, & Gonza-
lez, 2009). A study for example on community forestry in Mexico finds that
a village with an unequal economic structure was associated with poor forest
management due to small groups of power elites who manipulated the logging
industry for their own benefits (Klooster, 2000). In villages with effective com-
munity institutions, forest management was better with less biodiversity loss.
There is also evidence that economic inequality in poor countries may hinder
conservation efforts through avoiding collective actions (Chabwela & Haller,
2010; Hwang, Chi, & Lee, 2016; Hwang et al., 2016).
Literature on the common property management also highlight the role of
group actions in solving problems associated with local “commons” property
that ultimately lead to higher productivity and income generation (Gibson et
al., 2000). The Elinor Ostrom’s work on common property management sug-
gests that the cooperative ability of local groups(villages) plays important role
in avoiding the adverse consequence of resource exploitation (Ostrom, 1999; Os-
trom, Gardner, Walker, & Walker, 1994). In common property regimes cases,
Ostrom argues cooperative actions’ stronger effect on productivity and sustain-
able use of the property. In a comparative study on comparison of strictly ex-
clusionary top-down approaches in developing countries, Narayan and Pritch-
ett (2000) argue that greater associational activities reflected by community in-
volvement may lead to less “imperfect information” and hence lower transaction
costs which further lead to greater market transactions in output such as agri-
culture products, land use and labor related outcomes as well as other enhanced
market activities. Other evidence suggest that local communities are more likely
to commit to long-term conservation policies when they realize that their knowl-
edge and opinions are incorporated into protected areas’ decision-making pro-
cess (Goldman, 2003; A. Hoole & Berkes, 2010; Marshall, 2008; Vodouhê et
al., 2010). However, compliance with conservation strategies without potential
economic incentives practically doesn’t exist in developing countries owing to
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higher dependency of local people on natural resource.
In Sub-Saharan Africa, leading sources of economic incentives for local
communities include, natural resource extraction (e.g forest products, wildlife
products such as trophy exports etc.), agriculture products (including livestock
etc) and wildlife tourism. The following sections focuses on the role of wildlife
(trophy hunting industry) and other factors affecting economic incentives vis-à-
vis conservation policies.
A. The Role of Trophy Hunting Industry
Awidely recognized area of revenue generation in Sub-Saharan Africa is the tro-
phy hunting industry which has been promoted as an effective strategy for con-
servation of endangered animals since 1980s. Several studies attribute the effec-
tiveness of trophy hunting industry in community participation and involvement
in decision-making in and around protected areas (B. Adams, 2008;W.M.Adams
&Hulme, 2001; Baldus, 2009; Gibson et al., 2000; Khan, 2012; Lindsey, Roulet,
&Romanach, 2007;Mayaka et al., 2005;McIntosh&Renard, 2010; Shackleton,
2001).
Trophy hunting by early settlers to Africa was mainly uncontrolled and had
negative impact on wildlife population especially large body species (Lindsey et
al., 2007). Following this negative impact, in the late 19th century, some hunters
recognized the need to protect the remaining game species (W. B. Adams, 2013).
Consequently, in the early 20th century, hunters played a key role in establishing
protected areas in various African countries. The tourist trophy hunting indus-
try grew in those African countries where wealthy Europeans and Americans
used to visit and guided by local farmers. Later this led to the development of
trophy hunting industry which is generally run by operators who promote and
sell trophies to their clients, purchase hunting sites, and employ the requisite staff
(e.g hunting professionals, chasers, transporters, skinners and campmanagement
staff etc.). In Kenya for example, tourism operators have signed agreements with
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Group Ranch committees (organized by local communities), to set aside land as
a conservancy in exchange for payments to local people, based on percentage of
gross or net revenues (Roe, Nelson, & Sandbrook, 2009). The Kimana Group
Ranch in Kajiado District which was established in 1996 resulted into other sim-
ilar local conservancies in areas such as Laikipia, Samburu, Kajiado, and Narok
Districts that have positively affected conservation of wildlife.
One argument is that the income from trophy hunting activities can empower
local communities to protect biodiversity through employment of more anti-
poaching rangers (Di Minin et al., 2013). If revenue cannot be generated from
trophy hunting, the communities might transform the natural habitats to other
forms of land use that provide higher returns on investment compared to conser-
vation but will have negative impacts on biodiversity. Generally, trophy hunting
involves low off-takes with high prices and is consideredmore sustainable where
conservancies are community governed (Frost & Bond, 2008). Trophy hunters
pay higher fee per trophy than conventional tourists which results in higher rev-
enue generation from lower quantity of wildlife use (Lindsey et al., 2007).
Literature on the individual case studies of community-based trophy hunting
programs reflect both successful and unsuccessful cases in developing coun-
tries (Baldus, 2009; Goldman, 2003). Most of the successful cases reflect a
significantly positive effect on the livelihood of local community along with
conservation outcomes. For example Di Minin et al. (2013) argue that hunt-
ing in Sub-Saharan Africa has strongly contributed to the conservation efforts in
those conservancies of important terrestrial biodiversity where trophy hunting
is practiced (Table 1.1). According to Lindsey et al. (2007), in parts of Zam-
bia, Botswana, Namibia, Tanzania and Zimbabwe, improvement in conserva-
tion attitude among local communities has resulted in increasing revenues from
trophy hunting. Also in these countries, communities are increasingly involved
in community-based natural resource management programs and attempt to in-
clude their lands in wildlife management projects (Baldus, 2009; Child, 2013).
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Similarly, in Namibia, revenues from trophy hunting are considered a primary
stimulus for development of wildlife conservancies on more than 70,000 km2 of
communally owned areas (Weaver & Skyer, 2003). Also in Tanzania, incentives
from trophy hunting have resulted into the creation of Wildlife Management Ar-
eas where sustainable wildlife utilization is the primary land use (Lindsey et al.,
2007).
Table 1.1: Trophy Hunting Contribution to National Economies in SS Countries
Country Area Covered by Game 
Ranches (% of Total 
Land Area) 
Protected Areas (% of 
Total Land Area) 





South Africa 13.1 6.2 impala, warthog, kudu 68.0 
Tanzania 26.4 32.2 leopard, hippopotamus, elephant 56.3 
Botswana 23.0 37.2 elephant, leopard, lechwe 40.0 
Namibia 11.4 43.2 zebra, chacma baboon, leopard 28.5 
Zimbabwe 16.6 27.2 elephant, leopard, chacma baboon 15.8 
Mozambique 10.5 17.6 Nile crocodile, elephant, hippopo 5.0 
Zambia 21.3 37.8 lechwe, hippopotamus, leopard 3.6 
Total  - - - 217.2 
 
Source: (Di Minin et al., 2016)
B. Other Sources of Revenues from Protected Areas
Other than trophy hunting, tourism to conservancies and game reserves have
significant impact on the national economies in Sub-Saharan African countries.
According to the World Travel and Tourism Council, in 2016, the direct and
induced contribution of travel and tourism to these countries was US $108 billion
(7.1% of GDP) and is forecasted to rise by over 4.8% to US $ 178.5 billion (7.3%
of GDP) in the next ten years (WTTC, 2016). Similarly, the total contribution
of travel and tourism to employment, including indirect jobs by industries (such
as hotels, construction and services etc.) was estimated to be 6% of the total
employment in Sub-Saharan Africa and is expected to rise by 3.2% p.a in the
next ten years. Figure 1.2 shows the link between community participation and
conservation vis-a-vis economic benefits.
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Figure 1.2: CBNRM, Income and Conservation Relationship
1.3 Basic Research Questions
From the literature on governance of protected areas, the central question arises
that to what extent the holding of authority, responsibility and accountability in
making key decisions for protected areas affect the conservation outcomes. To
understand this, it is important to identify the channel through which such an
effect might take place. Considering the number of studies that find economic
incentives as a tool for conservation of threatened species specially mammals
(Di Minin et al., 2016; Heinmiller, 2009; S. IUCN, 2012; Lindsey et al., 2007;
McIntosh &Renard, 2010; Sethi &Khan, 2001; Shackleton, 2001), two assump-
tions are important to be held before hypothesizing any effect of community
participation on conservation outcomes. First, people in poor countries are pri-
marily not concerned with conservation objectives that global forces such IUCN
seek, owing to their livelihood constraints, dependencies on local resources and
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lack of education. Secondly, in the past two decades, the market value of wildlife
products has increased significantly due to regulations and limitations imposed
by the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES). In
other words, if there is no potential economic benefit of the target resource, lo-
cal people are less likely to affect conservation outcomes. Moreover, a recent
meta-analysis on 42 studies from 35 papers by by Geldmann et al. (2013) mea-
suring the effectiveness of protected areas on species population, finds no direct
impact of protected areas establishment on species population. Thus, we hy-
pothesize that:
Community inclusion in environmental decision making positively affect conser-
vation outcomes if the common good within protected areas provide economic
incentives for local people
More specifically, we divided this hypothesis into two questions:
1. Does community involvement in protected areas’ decision making affect
the population of threatened species?
2. Whether impact of community involvement in protected areas’ decision
making vary by the type of common good(mammals and birds)?
1.4 Methodology
Three features make this research distinct from previous studies. First, we use
IUCN Redlist (the outcome variable) as a measure of environmental degrada-
tion to examine the effect of protected areas ‘governance on the population of
threatened species. We do this because IUCNRedlist is themost comprehensive,
complete and globally recognized measure of threat to biodiversity. Second, we
utilize the World Database on Protected Areas (WDPAs) to separate protected
areas based on their governance across Sub-Saharan countries. WDPA gover-
nance specify governance characteristics within designated areas (not outside)
and therefore community governed PAs are clearly separable from the state gov-
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ernance PAs-something missing in current empirical literature on conservation.
We use this difference in the governance system within these designated areas as
a key variable to estimate the effect on threatened species. Third, we use strongly
balanced panel data from 2000 to 2016 that enables us to apply country FE and
year fixed effect to overcome any omitted time invariant country-specific bias.
1.4.1 Data and Variables Description
The IUCN Red List is globally recognized approach for assessing and monitor-
ing the status of biodiversity (Baillie, Hilton-Taylor, & Stuart, 2004). The scien-
tific objectivity of the IUCNRed List is assessed through the Red List Categories
and Criteria developed in 1994 and revised in 2001 (IUCN, 2001). According to
this criterion, there are nine categories: Extinct, Extinct in the Wild, Critically
Endangered, Endangered, Vulnerable, Near Threatened, Least Concern, Data
Deficient, and Not Evaluated. Every surveyed species falls into one of these
categories. So far, the IUCN has developed quantitative criteria for three cate-
gories; Critically Endangered, Endangered andVulnerable. Species listed within
each of these categories are believed to share a similar probability of extinction
risk (Baillie et al., 2004). Species falling into the categories of Critically En-
dangered, Endangered and Vulnerable are collectively described as ‘threatened’
and are generally used as a measure of threat to biodiversity. Consistent with
IUCN classification, our measure of biodiversity loss in a country is the num-
ber of mammals and bird’s species known to be threatened from 2000 to 2016.
These two taxonomic groups have been comprehensively assessed since 2000.
Previous studies that have used this measure include Mikkelson, Gonzalez, and
Peterson (2007) and Naidoo and Adamowicz (2001).
To measure each country’s biodiversity related governance policy, theWorld
Database on Protected Areas (WDPA-IUCN), offers a range of variables that
cover the nature of governance and management objectives within protected ar-
eas in each country around the world. The management objective categorization
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helps us classify PAs based on primary management objectives (such as wilder-
ness area, habitat reserve, natural parks etc), while governance category segre-
gate PAs according to “who holds authority, responsibility and accountability
for the PAs resources” (Borrini-Feyerabend & Hill, 2015).
We use the “IUCN Protected Area Management Category and Governance
Type Matrix” developed by Borrini-Feyerabend and Hill (2015) to classify PAs
categories that qualify two broad governance criteria; State-governed PA and
Community-governed PA.We use variables on the reported size of the conserved
area, governance type and year of designation to measure the difference between
state-protected conserved areas and community-based conserved areas. Since
the focus of this study is terrestrial protected areas, therefore we exclude ma-
rine protected areas from our data. Further we also exclude designated areas
which come under the category of natural monuments. We assume the owner-
ship of protected areas to be independent of the relationship of government and
management structures of protected areas. Due to the long history of PAs es-
tablishment and multiple designation in each year, we collapse (sum) the size of
designated protected areas (in km2) by year and cumulate since 1980s. To match
each country’s protected areas’ status with IUCN Redlist, we keep the cumula-
tive protected areas (in three different governance types i.e state-governed, com-
munity governed and not-reported) from 2000 to 2016. The cumulated status of
PAs in each country in a year captures the size of the protected areas separated
with different governance levels. Due to increased interventions in most of the
Sub-Saharan African countries, there is considerable variation in the size of des-
ignated areas in each subsequent year since 2000. We utilize this variation to
measure the country’s ability to devolve power, authority and accountability of
PAs to the local community.
We implicitly control for the gross wildlife exports value by using the CITES
data on the exports of endangered species from Sub-Saharan African countries.
The CITES database offers data on the number and size of wildlife products
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including trophies, live and dead bodies, skins and others with clear geneses
and taxonomic classifications. We use the data on CITES reported by importing
countries. We do this because of the weak reporting standards of the exporting
countries mostly in Sub-Saharan Africa. The variable of gross exports is ex-
pected to be positively correlated with the IUCN threat level due to the trade
sanctions on endangered mammals and birds listed by CITES.
Tomeasure the level of economic development, we use GDP per capita (con-
stant 2010 US$) from the World Bank Archives (2000-2016). Previous studies
have used GDP per capita as an important determinant of threat to biodiversity
(Asafu-Adjaye, 2003; Naidoo&Adamowicz, 2001). To account for the country-
specific differences in habitat we use forest area as a percentage of total land area
that may have a direct effect on the number of species threatened. We also con-
trol for other observable characteristics that might affect biodiversity including
rule of law and political stability. Data on forest cover, income, rule of law
and political stability are obtained from World Bank Tables Archives. Table 1.2
shows the summary statistics of the variables used in this work.
Table 1.2: Summary Statistics of the Main Variables
 
VARIABLES N Mean SD Min Max 
Number of Mammals Threatened 543 18.24 14.35 2 120 
Number of Birds Threatened 543 14.54 10.83 0 50 
Community Governed Protected Area(km2) 544 18164.34 37609.64 0 195062 
State Governed Protected Area (km2) 544 51435.37 62440.15 0 257734 
Protected Area Not-Reported(km2) 544 19237.89 45541.91 0 251281 
Total Protected Area (km2) 544 88837.60 99286.12 108 468819 
CG ratio to Total Protected Area 544 0.21 0.24 0 1 
SG ratio to Total Protected Area  544 0.59 0.32 0 1 
NR ratio to Total Protected Area  544 0.20 0.28 0 1 
Forest Area(% of Land Area)  512 30.91 23.47 1 89 
Forest area (sq. km) 512 155271.75 282226.16 382 1572490 
GDP Per Capita(constant 2010 US$) 544 2124.97 3388.72 194 20334 
Population Density(People/km2) 448 84.91 118.20 2 622 
Government Effectiveness(WB ets) 512 -0.71 0.61 -2 1 
Political Stability(WB ets) 512 -0.51 0.90 -3 1 
Rule of Law(WB est) 512 -0.66 0.64 -2 1 
Total Natural Resource Rents (% of GDP) 508 14.01 11.96 0 89 
Illegal Export Quantity  562 47.22 183.53 0 2090 
Illegal Export Value 562 14700447.90 79861348.51 0 1.09e+09 
Notes: Table A shows the panel data on 32 Sub-Saharan Countries from year 2000 to 2016. Data on the number of mammals and birds threatened are obtained from the IUCN Redlist. 
Data on the governance of protected areas are taken from the IUCN World Database on Protected Areas-the only database that record the statistics of IUCN designated protected areas. 
Data on the number of trophies exported (or imported) are obtained from the Conventional on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) Database. Corresponding prices of each 
genus of exported trophies are obtained from each country concerned ministries. Data on all other variables are taken from the World Bank Tables archives  
1.4.2 Identification
We estimate the effect of protected areas’ governance on the proportion of threat-
ened mammals and birds using Ordinary Least Square(OLS) regressions. We
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apply country fixed effect that loosen up the assumption of commonality across
countries by estimating a separate constant for each country (Koop & Tole,
1999). We also add year fixed effect to control for any potential time trend.
To capture the inclusion of local communities in PAs governance, we use the
IUCN World Database on Protected Areas (WDPA) to differentiate between
community-based conserved areas and state protected areas for a panel of Sub-
Saharan African Countries over the period 2000-2016. In doing so, we divide to-
tal protected areas into three types; state strictly governed, community-governed
and protected areas-not-reported. Since habitat size may directly affect biodi-
versity as suggested by previous studies e.g Asafu-Adjaye (2003), we take into
account the size of strictly state protected areas as control variable to isolate the
only variation in the size of protected areas governed by local communities. We
further assume that protected areas about which the governance structure is not
reported, are randomly distributed across countries, and that there is no system-
atic relationship with the outcome variables.
We adopt the following model to estimate the effect of protected areas gov-
ernance on the population of threatened species.
Threatit = α0 + α1CGit + α2SGit + α3GDPit + α4lnTEit + α5lnFRit+ α6RLit
+α7PSit+ pii + γt + ϵit (1.1)
Where
(a) Threat =
(Threatened X in yeart − Threatened X in year 2000)
Threatened X in year 2000
The threat rate is calculated as percentage change in the number of X (taxo-
nomic group e.g. Mammals and Birds) relative to base year 2000 in country i in
year t. The threshold is 0 which means that if a country’ endangered mammals
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population remains the same, it’s the least positive indication. The negative sign
of threat signifies country’s positive performance towards biodiversity conser-
vation. We also adopt first difference specification for measuring the threat to
biodiversity over time in the following form:
(b) Threat =
(Threatened X in yeart − Threatened X in yeart−1)
Threatened X in yeart−1
Variables CG and SG represent a country’s protected areas’ governance by com-
munity and state respectively measured as cumulative size (in km2). The log of
GDP per capita represents income per capita in country i in year t. Variables
TE is the gross value of trophy exports from country i in year t, FR is the for-
est area as a percent of total land area in country i in year t, RL and PS are a
country’s score on rule of law and political stability respectively measured in
units of standard deviations (- 2.5 to 2.5) in year t. Country fixed effect and year
fixed effects are represented by pi and γ respectively while ϵ is standard errors
clustered at country level.
1.4.3 Sample Selection
We choose the sample of 32 countries(see Appendix table A.1) in Sub-Saharan
Africa for three reasons. First, potential biodiversity loss (specially mammals
and birds) coincides with higher poverty rate in Sub-Saharan countries (Sachs
et al., 2009). Second, over the last twenty years, community-based natural re-
source management (CBNRM) has been adopted widely in Sub-Saharan Africa
as a mechanism to combine rural development and conservation efforts (Lind-
sey et al., 2007; Nelson & Agrawal, 2008; Roe et al., 2009). Third, Sub-Saharan




Table A.1 shows results of OLS panel fixed effect estimates on equations (1)
using panel data from 2000 to 2016. A negative relationship can be observed
between the ratio of community-governed protected areas and threat to mam-
mals measured using specification (a). After controlling for all observed factors
affecting biodiversity and country and time fixed effects, the effect is significant
at 10%. Increasing community-governed PAs by one more percent of the total
protected areas, would roughly increase the proportion of threatened mammals
in Sub-Saharan countries by 37% after controlling for state-governed PAs ratio.
Table 1.3: Community-Governed Protected Areas(Ratio) and Threat to Mammals
 
Dep. Var: Threat to Mammals (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
Community-Governed PAs -0.117 -0.225 -0.242 -0.249 -0.235 -0.378* -0.369* 
 (0.0946) (0.200) (0.207) (0.202) (0.195) (0.198) (0.194) 
State-Governed PAs 0.0327 0.0936 0.0550 0.0417 0.132 0.146 0.137 
 (0.110) (0.168) (0.153) (0.145) (0.185) (0.176) (0.176) 
Log of GDP Per Capita   -0.256 -0.247 -0.218 -0.213 -0.212 
   (0.195) (0.193) (0.198) (0.203) (0.202) 
Log of Illegal Trophy Exports    0.00502** 0.00504* 0.00549** 0.00545** 
    (0.00242) (0.00252) (0.00238) (0.00238) 
Log of Forest Area     -0.228 -0.209 -0.197 
     (0.337) (0.316) (0.314) 
Rule of Law      -0.0682 -0.0419 
      (0.130) (0.147) 
Political Stability       -0.0242 
       (0.0434) 
        
Country FE NO YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE NO YES YES YES YES YES YES 
        
Constant 0.0360 -0.0608 1.683 1.605 2.043 2.038 1.997 
 (0.0668) (0.136) (1.325) (1.317) (1.673) (1.771) (1.738) 
        
Observations 543 543 543 543 511 479 479 
Adj. R-squared 0.013 0.155 0.172 0.178 0.134 0.145 0.146 
Number of countries  32 32 32 32 32 32 
Notes: The outcome variable is the percentage of threatened mammals to the base years 2000 calculated as Threat Rate = [(Tt – T2000)/T2000]. 
Community-Governed PAs and State-Protected Areas are the ratio of the size (in km2) of protected area governed by community and state to 
the total protected area respectively in each country. The reference is the protected areas not reported. Column (1) reports the pooled OLS while 
country and year fixed effect applied in the remaining columns. Log of illegal trophy exports represents exports in current USD from the sub-
Saharan countries. Log of forest area is the log of the forest area as a percent of total land area. Controls for rule of law and political stability 
are included in column (6) and (7) respectively.   
Although not statistically significant, the variable for state-governed pro-
tected areas size reflect a continuously positive coefficient indicating harmful
effect for biodiversity outcomes. Since variables of community and state gover-
nance in table 1.3 represent the ratio to the total protected area in each country,
therefore the coefficients of these variables are interpreted as marginal change in
the fraction of the total protected area. It is however difficult to clearly specify
the magnitude of change in the size of protected areas due to disproportionate
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size of protected areas across different countries.
Table 1.4 shows the same regressionmodel using the absolute variation in the
size of community-governed protected areas and the proportion of threat tomam-
mals. Our interest in table 1.4 is to see the direct effect of community-governed
protected areas size on threatened mammals that appears to be significant at 10
percent indicating a negative impact of community-inclusion in governance on
threat to mammals. This is in line with studies that finds evidence on positive
effect of community participation on the conservation of species population and
suggest further institutional understanding of the conditions under which PAs
succeed or fail to deliver conservation outcomes (Geldmann et al., 2013).
Table 1.4: Community-Governed Protected Areas(size in km2) and Threat to Mammals
 
Dep. Var: Threat to Mammals (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
Community-Governed PAs 0.00584* -0.0195** -0.0161* -0.0164** -0.0180** -0.0178** -0.0171* 
 (0.00338) (0.00749) (0.00798) (0.00786) (0.00767) (0.00804) (0.00856) 
State-Governed PAs -0.00109 -0.0108 -0.0112 -0.0114 -0.0111 -0.00978 -0.0106 
 (0.00436) (0.0101) (0.00966) (0.00953) (0.0102) (0.00943) (0.00933) 
Log of GDP Per Capita   -0.217 -0.205 -0.173 -0.167 -0.167 
   (0.206) (0.204) (0.208) (0.214) (0.214) 
Log of Illegal Trophy Exports    0.00528** 0.00555** 0.00633** 0.00628** 
    (0.00256) (0.00259) (0.00252) (0.00253) 
Log of Forest Area     -0.0729 -0.0629 -0.0566 
     (0.298) (0.282) (0.281) 
Rule of Law      -0.0850 -0.0585 
      (0.133) (0.150) 
Political Stability       -0.0242 
       (0.0468) 
        
Country FE NO YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE NO YES YES YES YES YES YES 
        
Constant 0.0256 0.0390 1.494 1.389 1.395 1.255 1.246 
 (0.0556) (0.0492) (1.367) (1.361) (1.830) (1.910) (1.898) 
        
Observations 543 543 543 543 511 479 479 
Adj. R-squared 0.005 0.166 0.178 0.185 0.141 0.151 0.152 
Number of country1  32 32 32 32 32 32 
Notes: The outcome variable is the percentage of threatened mammals to the base years 2000 calculated as Threat Rate = [(Tt – T2000)/T2000]. Community-and 
State-Governed PAs are the size of protected area (per 10,000 km2) governed by community and the state respectively in each country. Column (1) reports 
pooled OLS while Country FE and Year FE is applied in all remaining columns. Log of illegal trophy exports represent exports in current USD from the sub-
Saharan countries. Log of forest area is the log of the forest area as a percent of total land area. Controls for rule of law and political stability give the country's 
score on the aggregate indicator, in units of a standard normal distribution, i.e. ranging from approximately -2.5 to 2.5.  
Table 1.4 suggests that increase in the size of community-governed protected
area by 10,000 km2 would decrease the threat to mammals by .017 percent-
age points. In other words, given the small mean value of the outcome vari-
able(.030), an increase of 10,000 km2 in the community-governed protected ar-
eas will decrease the proportion of threat to mammals by nearly 10% compared
to base year 2000. Relevant tests2 (Hausman, and wald test) were conducted
2Hausman test was conducted without clustering the standard errors both for mammals and
birds threat level
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to decide whether to use country fixed effect, random effect and year fixed ef-
fect. These tests favored using country fixed effect and year fixed effect esti-
mations. To be more conservative in determining the statistical significance of
the effects,standard errors in all regressions are clustered at country level. We
use xtreg command from column (2) to (7) which automatically deals with both
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation using clustered standard errors.
Both table 1.3 and 1.4 show positive association (at 5% significance) be-
tween the log of the trophy exports value3 and the IUCN threat level. The posi-
tive coefficient of trophy exports value suggests weak implementation of CITES
regulation in exporting countries. Moreover, this is in line with previous stud-
ies e.g Dietz and Adger (2003), that report correlation of country’s government
enforcement level of CITES and threat to biodiversity.
Table 1.5: Protected Areas Governance and Conservation[Comparison of effect]
 
 Mammals  Birds  
(1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A:   Ratio of the Total Protected Area        
Community-Governed PAs -0.117 -0.225 -0.378*  0.355 0.167 0.139 
 (0.0946) (0.200) (0.198)  (0.239) (0.321) (0.319) 
State-Governed PAs  0.0327 0.0936 0.146  -0.149 0.192 0.530 
 (0.110) (0.168) (0.176)  (0.225) (0.395) (0.387) 
        
Controls NO NO YES  NO NO YES 
Country FE NO YES YES  NO YES YES 
Year FE  NO  YES YES  NO  YES YES 
        
Observations 543 543 479  543 543 479 
Adj. R-squared 0.013 0.155 0.145  0.037 0.472 0.517 
No. of Countries   32 32   32 32 
Panel B:   Cum. Size in 10K km2        
Community-Governed PAs 0.00584* -0.0195** -0.0178**  0.0131 -0.00528 -0.00348 
 (0.00338) (0.00749) (0.00804)  (0.0113) (0.0141) (0.0120) 
State-Governed PAs  -0.00109 -0.0108 -0.00978  -0.00857 -0.0183 -0.0173 
 (0.00436) (0.0101) (0.00943)  (0.00926) (0.0167) (0.0131) 
Controls NO NO YES  NO NO YES 
Country FE NO YES YES  NO YES YES 
Year FE  NO  YES YES  NO  YES YES 
        
Observations 543 543 479  543 543 479 
Adj. R-squared 0.005 0.166 0.151  0.011 0.473 0.510 
No. of Countries   32 32   32 32 
Mean of the Dep. Variable:  .0306 .0306 .0306  .065 .065 .065 
Notes: The outcome variable is the percentage of threatened mammals and birds to the base years 2000 calculated as Threat Rate = [(Tt – T2000)/T2000].  
Panel A use Community-Governed PAs and State-Governed PAs size as a ratio of the total protected areas in each country while Panel B use the variation 
in the cumulative size of Community-Governed PAs and State-Governed PAs (in 10,000 km2). The reference is Areas Not-Reported for governance. 
Column (1) and (4) use pooled OLS regression while column (2) and (5) applies Country and Year FE respectively. Controls added in column (3) and (6) 
include the log of GDP per capita, log of Illegal trophy exports(in USD), Forest Area as a percentage of total land area, and the Rule of Law.  
Table 1.5 compares the effect of community and state governed protected
areas using the same regression on two different outcome variables; threat to
mammals and threat to birds. After controlling for factors affecting threat to
mammals and birds in Sub-Saharan countries and country fixed and year fixed
effect, the coefficient of community-governed PAs is negative and significant
3Data taken on this variable is reported by importing countries rather than exporting countries
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for mammals in both panel A and Panel B. On the other hand, the effect of
the community-governed protected areas on the threat to birds is not significant
rather positive, indicating no effect of governance type on the threatened birds
proportion in Sub-Saharan African countries. This no-effect has interesting im-
plications. First, as expected, community does not respond to the conservation
of birds due to lack potential economic incentives as compared to mammals.
Secondly, there is possibility of increasing threat to bird’s species due to in-
creased community involvement. Other unobserved factors such as pollution or
other human factors might cause extinction of birds from protected areas. The
state-governed protected areas’ effect is not significant both for mammals and
birds indicating less effectiveness of strictly state-protected areas compared to
community-governed protected areas. In both panel A and Panel B, the reference
PAs’ governance type is the ratio and size(in km2) of protected areas not reported
respectively. These results are suggestive of the importance of protected ar-
eas governance mechanism in achieving biodiversity outcomes, consistent with
previous country-specific studies that find different results of community-based
conservation programs (Lindsey et al., 2007; Mayaka et al., 2005; Murombedzi,
1999; Stone, 2015; Taylor, 2009).
Table 1.6 shows results on the first-differenced variables of threatened taxo-
nomic groups and protected areas’ governance. We do this to take into account
the one year lagged effect in variables of threatened taxonomic groups and size
of protected areas’ governance. The results show similar trend for mammals and
birds. The coefficient of community-governed protected areas is negative and
significant at 5% while positive (not significant) after controlling for country
and year fixed effects. The coefficient of state-protected areas is not significant
as expected, indicating the less effectiveness of any increase in state-strictly pro-
tected areas. Since any decrease in the threat level below threshold is considered
substantially important for country’s performance towards conservation of en-
dangered species, therefore, the overall magnitude of these results is crucial for
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sustainable development goals.
Table 1.6: Protected Areas Governance and Conservation[First-Differencing]
Dep. Variable: Time Differenced Threat* Threat to Mammals   Threat to Birds  
(1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
      
Community-Governed PAs -0.00560** -0.00724** -0.0223**  0.0106 0.0508* 0.00170 
 (0.00206) (0.00327) (0.00966)  (0.00971) (0.0278) (0.0175) 
State-Governed PAs  -0.00300 0.00443 -0.0218  -0.00288 0.0762**
* 
-0.0206 
 (0.00216) (0.00439) (0.0155)  (0.00667) (0.0264) (0.0387) 
        
Controls NO NO YES  NO NO YES 
Country FE NO YES YES  NO YES YES 
Year FE  NO  YES YES  NO  YES YES 
        
Observations 511 511 454  505 505 448 
Adj. R-squared 0.051 0.035 0.072  0.042 0.035 0.300 
No. of Countries   32 32   32 32 
Mean of the Dependent Variable  .058 .058 .058  .153 .153 .153 
*Notes: Time Differenced Threat and Size of Protected Areas Governance is calculated as the following.   
Threat Rate =   [(Tt – Tt-1)/Tt-1 ]----(Threatened Taxonomic Group) 
CG = [(CGt – CGt-1)/CGt-1 ]----(Community-Governed PAs in 10K km
2)  
SG = [(SGt – SGt-1)/SGt-1 ]------( State-Governed Area in 10K  km
2 ,)  
The Reference group is the Size of Protected Areas Not-Reported. Standard errors clustered at country level. Column (1) and (4) use pooled OLS 
regression while column (2) and (5) applies Country and Year FE respectively. Controls added in column (3) and (6) include the log of GDP per 
capita, log of Illegal trophy exports(in USD), Forest Area as a percentage of total land area, and the Rule of Law. In constructing the time-differenced 
variables, those countries, where the number of threatened mammals or birds remain zero or where protected areas’ governance size does not change 
for more than one consecutive years, the above formula assigns missing values which reduces the observations in column (3) and (4).   
 
Three important implications can be derived from table 1.4, 1.5 and 1.6.
First, governance of protected areas matter. As suggested by previous stud-
ies, we find variation in conservation outcomes of protected areas with different
governance regimes. Several reasons can be associated for this difference. For
example, the level of threat to species depends on the community-compliance
with conservation policies of governments. In cases, where, protected areas
are strictly protected by states, communities often do not cooperate with state-
authorities due to the perception that they are excluded from exploiting natu-
ral resources. The closer the livelihood attachment with the protected areas re-
sources is, the stronger would be the response of community-compliance.
Secondly, community-compliance also depends on the nature of the resource
that is conserved. For common pool resources that carry potential economic in-
centives, community tends to conserve if they are given authority, responsibil-
ity and control over financial benefits. In community-governed PAs, generally,
the governments and international organizations agree on the distribution of the
share of economic benefits generated as a result of activities within or around
protected areas to the local community. In Sub-Saharan Africa, mammals are
the most dominant source of revenues for community (if given their fair share)
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such as in trophy hunting industry. The flagship Communal Areas Manage-
ment Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) in Zimbabwe is the
best example to explain how community involvement in protected areas man-
agement positively affect conservation outcomes. To establish this link between
local community, income and mammals conservation, Taylor (2009) for exam-
ple documents that between 1989 and 2006, the CAMPFIRE income from high
valued safari hunting totaled nearly US$ 30 million of which 52% was allo-
cated to sub-districts wards and villages for community projects and household
benefits. The same study finds significant positive trend in mammals’ conser-
vation including elephants and buffalos’ population. A number of other studies
have documented the positive effect of devolving responsibility, authority and
accountability of natural resource management on the attitude of local people to-
wards conservation (Frost & Bond, 2008; Goldman, 2003; A. Hoole & Berkes,
2010; Lindsey et al., 2007; Mayaka et al., 2005).
Finally, state protected areas do not achieve conservation goals due to con-
flicts with local people. Conservation of endangered species needs a holistic ap-
proach in which local people play key role in protecting the resources. State ma-
chinery may not be capable of safeguarding a large biodiversity hotspot which is
surrounded by people whose activities directly and indirectly affect the wildlife.
For example, mammals are more vulnerable to illegal activities such as poach-
ing and illegal hunting in areas where community compliance with conservation
strategies is low. Previous studies have documented increase in endangerment of
mammals in countries with relatively centralized management and governance
structures (Jachmann, 2008; Mayaka et al., 2005; Shackleton, 2001). The pos-
itive coefficient of variable state-governed PAs in table 1.3 also shows the po-
tential drawback of strictly state protected areas for mammal’s conservation.
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1.6 Conclusion
Community inclusion in the governance of protected areas can be considered
an effective reforms initiative that enables countries to achieve conservation
outcomes not at the cost of social exclusion. In this paper we provide empir-
ical support for the argument that decentralization and devolution of authority,
responsibility and accountability of natural resource management help reduce
threat to biodiversity. This paper contributes to the existing literature on the
dilemma of sustainability in the following ways:
(1) Community inclusion in the governance of protected areas strongly in-
fluence conservation outcomes of protected areas in Sub-Saharan African coun-
tries. Considering wildlife as a common good, community is more responsive
in conservation of mammals than birds due to higher economic incentives.
(2) Our results suggest that governance policy that devolve authority, re-
sponsibility and accountability of natural resource management (particularly in
Protected Areas) to the local communities can address the challenge of conserva-
tion as well as poverty by giving fair share of the benefits to local people. Merely
establishment of (state) protected areas might negatively affect the conservation
objectives if local communities are excluded from the benefits of natural re-
sources in designated areas. Addressing social concerns of communities at risk
can ameliorate the potential conflict between state authorities and local people.
In a broader context, achieving social and environmental (biodiversity) ob-
jectives is possible through inclusion of local communities in environmental de-
cision making particularly in developing countries.
1.7 Limitations and Future Research Directions
This study is subject to some limitations that should be considered while in-
terpreting its findings. First, the biodiversity measure adopted in this study is
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the IUCN Redlist of threatened mammals and Birds. There are other genesis of
species such as amphibians, etc which are also important in defining the overall
status of biodiversity. Hence our results are only limited to mammals and birds
identified as threatened from 2000 to 2016. Taking into consideration all species
in measuring biodiversity might be more comprehensive in analyzing the effec-
tiveness of protected areas’ governance. Secondly, our sample is composed of
32 Sub-Saharan African countries for which the data on all variables was avail-
able. Our results only apply to countries in the Sub-Saharan Africa or those
that share similar socio-economic characteristics. Thirdly, we aggregate the
types of governance of protected areas into three broad categories; community-
governed, state-governed and protected areas about which governance status is
not reported. Our findings take a general classification of governance rather than
each specific sub-classification of governance such as partially-devolved gover-
nance or governance by private owners. Protected areas in Sub-Saharan Africa
do not have identical enforcement authorities, e.g. the range of community in-
volvement varies, hence, further analysis of each sub-type of governance might
be useful in explaining the extent of conservation success in protected areas.
Lastly, although IUCN is the only organization around the world that records
data on protected areas management and governance, there might still be pro-
tected areas which are not designated yet contributing to the national statistics
on Redlist. Nevertheless, our assumption is that if such protected areas exist,
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Figure A.1: Existing Protected Areas and growth
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Table A.1: List of Sub-Saharan Countries Used in the Study
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CHAPTER 2




Community-Based Trophy Hunting (CBTH) has been promoted as an effective
tool for conservation of endangered mammals in developing countries4 since
1980s (B. Adams, 2008; W. M. Adams & Hulme, 2001; Baldus, 2009; Khan,
2012; Lichtenstein, 2010; Lindsey, Roulet, & Romanach, 2007; Mayaka, Hen-
dricks, Wesseler, & Prins, 2005; McIntosh & Renard, 2010; Mir, 2006; Schu-
mann, 2001; Shackleton, 2001; Twyman, 2000). Following successful experi-
ments in African countries, Asian countries where some species were declared
endangered due to overwhelming hunting practices in 1990, also adopted community-
based conservation. These countries include Pakistan, Afghanistan, India and
Tajikistan (R. M. Adams, Bergland, Musser, Johnson, & Musser, 1989; Damm,
2008; Shackleton, 2001). The simple theory behind CBTH is that economic
benefits from trophy hunting will incentivize local communities to be engaged
as key partners with policymakers and practitioners to make efforts to conserve
endangered species, and community members will do better than government
4The Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) in
Zimbabwe was the first program that recognized wildlife as renewable natural resource, while
addressing the allocation of its ownership to indigenous peoples in and around protected areas for
conservation (Taylor, 2009). The Southern Luangwa Valley Integrated Resource Development
Project (LIRDEP) in Zambia and the Selous Conservation Programme (SCP) in Tanzania are
among those initiated in the late 80s. Similar programmese initiated in Namibia in the late 90s
followed by multiple attempts in South Africa (Baldus, 2009)
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since, by virtue of their proximity to and knowledge of wildlife, they are well
placed to participate in conservation efforts by detecting, reporting on, and help-
ing preventing illegal wildlife trafficking (Baldus, 2009; Biggs et al., 2017; Li,
2002; Shackleton, 2001; Twyman, 2000). Despite several successful cases of
CBTH around the world5, successful CBTH still remains more theory than real-
ity in many countries (Baldus, 2009; Goldman, 2003; Shackleton, 2001).
Many commentators ascribe failures of CBTH to bad governance in and
around protected areas and suggest better governance for successful CBTH (Balint
&Mashinya, 2006; Bunge-Vivier&Martínez-Ballesté, 2017; Chabwela&Haller,
2010; Damm, 2008; Lichtenstein, 2010; Newig & Fritsch, 2009; Paudyal, Baral,
Lowell, & Keenan, 2017). Factors related to bad governance include inade-
quate legislation in enforcing community participation (Baldus, 2009; Lichten-
stein, 2010) , conflict among stakeholders on the level of participation (Balint &
Mashinya, 2006), state’s influence in selecting participants (Lebel, Daniel, Bade-
noch, Garden,& Imamura, 2008), power imbalance among communitymembers
(Twyman, 2000), lack of reliable information on the economic significance and
ecological impact of the hunting industry (Lindsey et al., 2007), and corrup-
tion leading to inequitable distribution of revenues from trophies (Baldus, 2009;
Khan, 2012; Lindsey et al., 2007; Nagendra & Ostrom, 2012).
Thus, good and collaborative governancematters for successful CBTHwhere
power is transferred from state to local community and empowered community
members participate actively and collaborate with various stakeholders includ-
ing government agencies, donor institutions, private corporations and experts.
Such a collaborative setting enables participants to build trust and own decision-
making processes, and ultimately manage the stock of endangered wildlife in
5Some successful cases of CBTH are reported in African and Asian countries such as Zam-
bia, Zimbabwe, Bostswana, Namibai, Tanzania, Pakistan and Tajikistan. In these countries,
communities’ participation in conservation related decision making and management of endan-
gered mammals within their localities where trophy hunting with low off-take and high prices
has been practiced, the number of target mammals has increased (Baldus, 2009; Damm, 2008;
Frost & Bond, 2008; Lindsey et al., 2007; Mayaka et al., 2005; Shackleton, 2001; Zafar et al.,
2014).
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a sustainable way (W. M. Adams & Hulme, 2001; Bunge-Vivier & Martínez-
Ballesté, 2017; Chabwela & Haller, 2010; Folke, Hahn, Olsson, & Norberg,
2005; Goldman, 2003; Mackenzie, 2010; Mayaka et al., 2005; Newig & Fritsch,
2009; Paudyal et al., 2017; Seixas & Berkes, 2010; Taylor, 2009).
Despitemuch literature on governance components of community-based pro-
grams, however, a clear comprehensive framework to guide, monitor, and assess
CBTH is lacking. Such a framework is essential to facilitate appropriate prepa-
ration and implementation of CBTH on the ground. Thus, to address this gap,
this paper intends to elaborate a general governance model of CBTH by fram-
ing CBTH as a form of collaborative governance and by conducting a meta-
analytical study of the exiting literature on common-pool resource management
(CPRM), community-based conservation (CPC), and CBTH programs. Ulti-
mately, this study contributes the existing literature by developing a contingency
approach to collaborative governance of CBTH that identify conditions for de-
termining the effectiveness of CBTH programs.
In this study, we refer to Ansell and Gash (2008) model which defines collab-
orative governance as “a governing arrangement where one or more public agen-
cies directly engage non-state stakeholders in a collective decision-making pro-
cess that is formal, consensus-oriented, and deliberative and that aims to make
or implement public policy or manage public programs or assets.” Many char-
acteristics of CBTHmatch with the components of collaborative governance de-
fined above. In a CBTH, public agencies engage various non-state actors such
as International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN), in formal and collec-
tive decision-making processes where participants deliberate and negotiate for
consensus agreement to conserve endangered mammals through trophy hunting
mechanism, and implement the agreement jointly.
The core system components of collaborative governance model by Ansell
and Gash (2008) include starting conditions, institutional design, facilitative
leadership, collaborative process and outcomes (figure 2.1). In the following
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sections, we explain research method briefly, discuss what we found in litera-
ture on CPRM, CPC, and CBTH in conjunction with the model of Ansell and
Gash (2008), and try to tailor the model to the context of CBTH.
 
Figure 2.1: A Model of Collaborative Governance (Ansell and Gash,2008)
2.2 Methodology
Weadopt the ElinorOstrom’s institutional analysis and development(IAD) frame-
work to identifymajor types of structural variables that are present in community-
based conservation programs in general and CBTH in particular (Ostrom, 2011).
We prefer IAD framework because it enables us to fit multiple theories such
as economic theory, game theory, social choice theory and the theory of com-
mon pool resources into institutional analysis of community-based conservation
programs. It also helps in accumulating knowledge from empirical studies in
assessment of existing or past community-based conservation programs. We
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identify major elements and relationships that are important for analyzing and
framing CBTH arrangements. We then adopt the model of collaborative gover-
nance by Ansell and Gash (2008) to make precise assumptions about variables
and parameters that enable us to predict the outcomes of CBTH programs.
To understand the initial structure of CBTH programs, in line with Kiser and
Ostrom (2000), we conduct a meta-theoretical synthesis by digging deeper and
exploring the factors that affect the structure of natural resource conservation
programs particularly from participation view point. In analyzing the environ-
ment of community-based natural resource management programs, we identify
conceptual unit called an action situation that enables us to describe, analyze,
predict and explain behaviors of stakeholders within institutional arrangements.
According to Ostrom (2011), an action situation is a social space where individ-
uals interact, solve problems, try to dominate one another or attempt to conflict.
The context of community-based conservation programs in general and CBTH
in particular resembles the action situation specified in figure 2.2. We try to
isolate the given structure of CBTH programs called institutional design that af-
fect the process of conservation programs in order to explain the behaviors of
stakeholders during the process of collaboration and implementation.
 
Figure 2.2: A Framework for Institutional Analysis(Ostrom,2005)
We illustrate the Ostrom’s institutional analysis components by matching
themwith key components and processes of community-based conservation pro-
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grams in the following way.
• Actors: Actors in the context of CBTH are those individuals or group
of people whose actions are directly associated with resources inside pro-
tected areas. In our analysis, we assume that local community members
make their decisions to participate in collaborative conservation program
on the basis of what type of resources they may have access to, how much
value they attach to it, how much knowledge they have about, what they
believe they own andwhat internal mechanism they use to decide upon co-
operation with other stakeholders of community-based conservation pro-
grams. Similarly, hunters who seek to hunt trophies are also actors and
their actions are directly associated with potential outcomes of the pro-
grams.
• Set of allowable actions: The set of allowable actions include what type
of method is allowed to utilize the resource. For example, in CBTH pro-
grams, participants decide on hunting method and age of animals, season
for allowing hunting practices in protected area and limit or quota for hunt-
ing. Hunters on the other hand decide on amount of trophy fee that they
are willing to pay.
• Potential outcomes: In CBTH contexts, potential outcomes of actions
include, limit of the geographic region which might be affected as a results
of actions by local people, and how alternate actions affect the livelihood
of local people.
• Level of control over choice: Do members of community take their ac-
tions on their own initiatives? For hunters, before hunting the animals, do
they obtain permit?
• Availability of information: How much information community mem-
bers have about the existing population in protected areas, their character-
istics, and about the market price of the trophy animals.
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• Cost and benefits of actions and outcomes: How costly it might be for
local community members to participate in CBTH programs and if not,
then what are the likely consequences of their actions. Also, what type of
benefits they might receive as a result of collaboration with state authori-
ties or international organizations?
Following Ostrom (2009, 2011) and Cox, Ostrom, Walker, et al. (2010), we
adopt a systematic methodology of literature search to review existing stock of
knowledge on common-pool resource management and community-based con-
servation in general and CBTH in particular. Academic journals, book chapters,
and reports across a wide range of disciplines, such as ecology, conservation,
economics, governance, environment and development, were searched for the-
ories and empirical studies on conservation and development through participa-
tion of local communities. In our search, we used multiple key words, such as
conservation and development, community-based trophy hunting, collaborative
governance, sustainable conservation and participatory governance for sustain-
able development etc. Although, our main interest is CBTH, we expand the
scope of our case studies to wildlife conservation where economic benefits of
natural resource stock are strongly associated with local people’s livelihood.
2.3 CoreComponents ofCollaborativeGovernance
for CBTH
2.3.1 Starting Conditions of CBTH Programs
Ansell and Gash (2008) argue that incentives of stakeholders to participate in
collaborative governance hinge upon power (and resource) balance6 and certain
level of trust among participants as initial background conditions at the outset of
6Power of stakeholders manifests in terms of status, organizational infrastructure to be rep-
resented (English, 2000), financial or human resources, skills and expertise (to engage in dis-
cussions about highly technical problem), and the time, energy, or liberty (to engage in time-
intensive collaborative processes (Yaffee & Wondolleck, 2003)
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collaborative governance (See figure 2.1). Power imbalance, or the prehistory
of antagonism among stakeholders is likely to express itself in distrust, strate-
gies of manipulation, and dishonest communications, and weaken the incentive
to participate (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Schuckman, 2001; Warner, 2006). Thus,
they posit that positive strategies of empowerment and representation of weaker
stakeholders or/and steps to remediate the low levels of trust among the stake-
holders should be taken to initiate collaborative governance effectively (Ansell
& Gash, 2008).
Also, the incentive to participate in collaborative governance depends partly
upon expectations of stakeholders about concrete, tangible, effectual policy out-
comes or benefits against the balance of time and energy that collaboration re-
quires (Brown, 2002; IUCN, 2012; Naidoo, Weaver, Stuart-Hill, & Tagg, 2011)
and lack of alternative means through which stakeholders can achieve their in-
terests unilaterally (W. B. Adams, 2013; Balint & Mashinya, 2006; Bouwen &
Taillieu, 2004). Thus, four factors may interplay to affect the incentives to par-
ticipate in collaborative governance in general: interdependence of stakeholders,
power imbalance, prehistory of antagonism (level of distrust) and potential tan-
gible benefits.
When it comes to conservation of wildlife through CBTH in developing
countries, those four background factors may also work to affect the incentives
to participate in CBTH. First, for CBTH to be considered by government as an
alternative mechanism to conventional top-down, command-and-control conser-
vation policy, such as protected areas, and proposed to local communities, inter-
dependence between government and local communities should exit. In other
words, government should have an incentive to capitalize on energy, ideal, and
effort of local communities to conserve endangered wildlife and propose CBTH
to local communities in the first place. Such incentive might come from the re-
alization that previous government policies have failed to achieve conservation
of wildlife, often with the help or advice of international conservation organiza-
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tions (Khan, 2012).
Failure of community-based conservation programs in many cases often has
something to do with the second factor, the prehistory of conflict between strong
government and relatively weak local communities that may limit participation
in collaboration in general. Conventional conservation policies, such as estab-
lishing national parks as protected areas, often lead to conflicts between govern-
ment and local communities by restricting local communities from using natu-
ral resources including wildlife animals in protected areas and even displacing
them forcibly out of the protected areas (Biggs et al., 2017; Frost & Bond, 2008;
Mombeshora & Le Bel, 2009; Ribot, 2002).
Economically poor local communities who live on subsistence agriculture
in their traditional lands perceive wildlife mainly as a threat to their livelihoods
(Dickman, 2010). For example, in Uganda, stampedes of active wildlife animals
on farmlands at the edge of the Kibale National Park actually reduced crop pro-
duction dramatically (Naughton-Treves, 1997). Thus, they tend to poach wild
animals illegally and harm their habitats for their survival and are often tempted
to illegal wild animals trafficking for economic reason, which have limited the
effectiveness of conservation policy (Jachmann, 2008; Treves &Karanth, 2003).
InMozambique, the colonial rules prevented local communities in reserved forests
from using natural resources, consequently local communities were united against
the government and consumed all the local forest resources (Virtanen, 2005).
Despite the uncertainty of effectiveness of community-based conservation
from the beginning, government cannot but rely upon bottom-up approach that
utilize the effort of local communities in conserving wildlife rather than ineffec-
tive command-and-control policies. In Pakistan’s mountain regions of Karako-
ram, Hindukush and the Himalayas, protected Areas, usually established by the
state, created conflicts with local livelihoods (Khan, 2012; Shackleton, 2001;
Virk, Sheikh, & Marwat, 2003). Similarly, in Namibia, after the establishment
of protected areas, Herero communities were disconnected from their forest re-
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sources (A. F. Hoole, 2010). Taking these dynamics into consideration, the first
contingency proposition is proposed as follows:
(1) If government realizes the failure of conventional conservation poli-
cies, then the government is more likely to consider and propose CBTH to local
communities
The dependency of local communities on CBTH may come from power im-
balances between strong government and weak local communities who neighbor
or live closely with wildlife animals (Bouwen&Taillieu, 2004; Seixas&Berkes,
2010; Twyman, 2000). Considering economic survival and rights to use natural
resources independently as the main interests of economically poor and politi-
cally weak local communities, it is less likely to have many alternatives to satisfy
their interests than illegal poaching or reckless consumption of natural resources.
In this context, the expectations to reap tangible benefits from collaboration in
CBTH may affect strongly the incentive to participate in collaboration.
CBTH programs are based on the premise of financial incentives from regu-
lated hunting of wildlife for local communities who are committed to conserve
those animals (W.M. Adams&Hulme, 2001; Mayaka et al., 2005; Taylor, 2009;
Virk et al., 2003; Wijnstekers, 2011). The expectations of direct benefits such as
hunting and indirect benefits such as ecotourism for the local people can make
them interested in being engaged in CBTH programs. Studies have shown high
motivation and interest in participation in community based conservation pro-
grams in general where the potential for these incentives is higher (Frost &Bond,
2008; IUCN, 2012; Khan, 2012). CBTH is likely to be more attractive to local
communities who live in remote and inaccessible areas or politically instable ar-
eas where alternative ways to make revenue, such as photographic ecotourism,
may not be viable. According to Lindsey et al. (2007), trophy hunting has sev-
eral advantages over photographic tourism in areas where infrastructure is not
available, weather is not friendly for large public to visit, or high density of view-
able wildlife is not available. Also, hunting industry is relatively more resilient
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to political instability than usual tourism (Damm, 2008). Thus, the second con-
tingency proposition is:
(2) Despite prehistory of conflicts and power imbalance as usual back-
ground conditions in many developing countries, if local communities perceive
possibility to acquire necessary rights to manage their natural resources, as well
as potential economic benefits from trophy hunting, they are more likely to come
to the table for collaboration with the government.
One interesting case that may test the first and second propositions is ob-
served in Zimbabwe (Baker, 1997). When the establishment of a national park,
called ‘Gonarezhou National Park’ that had evicted the local community, called
‘the Shangaan,’ from their traditional lands in the 1960s did not bear fruit of con-
serving wildlife, the government suggested community-based conservation that
would give the Shangaan people responsibility for wildlife in their areas. How-
ever, the Shangann community did not collaborate with the government proposal
due to bad relations with the government and increased poaching in and around
the park. In the early 1980s, the Shangaan agreed to work with government on
the condition that the community would have the authority to manage wildlife in
their areas and they would derive economic returns from safari hunting. Since
the community started selling the right to kill two elephants for US 3,000 dol-
lars over a 5 years period, the community could build a school, a grinding mill,
and a clinic with the revenues from regulated hunting. With the tangible eco-
nomic benefits from Safari hunting, the community’s attitude toward wildlife
animals changed dramatically enough to protect them as a valuable community
asset (Andrade & Rhodes, 2012; Balint & Mashinya, 2006). Also, in Northern
Pakistan, local communities who experienced conflicts with the government due
to protected area policy, later participated in CBTH with their expectation of po-
tential economic incentives (80% of the hunting revenues) from trophy hunting
(Khan, 2012).
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However, mere participation of local communities in initiating CBTH does
not always guarantee successful outcomes in the end. Sneaky and pervasive
power imbalances or lack of trust due to previous conflicts may lurk and pre-
vent collaboration even after stakeholders start CBTH. Thus, we need to un-
derstand how internal process of CBTH deals with those problems of power
imbalance, lack of trust, and poor governance. For example, in Kilosa district
in Tanzania where two groups of communities experienced conflicts in com-
petition for scarce resources, the government established Wildlife Management
Areas (WMAs) in 1998 aimed at wildlife conservation and rural development at
the same time. Although local community representatives actively participated
in decision-making process from the beginning, however, during the implemen-
tation, conflicts occurred and were intensified further that caused the projects to
fail in the end (Nilsen, 2009).
2.3.2 Facilitative Leadership
In order for successful collaboration from start of negotiation to structure pro-
cess to the achievement of ultimate outcome, there should be actors with leader-
ship ability of bringing broad range stakeholders to one platform, engaging them
with collaborative spirit, setting clear ground rules, building trust, facilitating
dialogue, explore creative solutions for common goals, maintaining technical
credibility, empowering weaker stakeholders, and ensuring the integrity of col-
laborative process (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Bunge-Vivier & Martínez-Ballesté,
2017; Lasker, Weiss, & Miller, 2001; Yaffee & Wondolleck, 2003). In those
contexts where power imbalances exist among stakeholders who distrust each
other, leadership becomes more critical (Ansell & Gash, 2008). Also, schol-
ars overwhelmingly argue that leadership should be facilitative rather than au-
thoritative (Bouwen & Taillieu, 2004; Kaner, 2014; Nalbandian, 1999; Ozawa,
1993) Ansell and Gash (2008) propose that the types of facilitative leader may
hinge upon the context of power distribution and incentive to participate. The
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third-party actors whom stakeholders acknowledge and trustmay provide neutral
and facilitative services in high-conflict and low-trust situations, where power is
balanced with stakeholders willing to participate. However, the context where
power imbalances exist or incentives to participate are weak may requires strong
“organic” leaders who might belong to community of stakeholders and have the
ability to gain trust of various stakeholders at the start of the negotiation process.
Thus, availability of such organic leaders might seriously limit the effectiveness
of collaborative process (Ansell & Gash, 2008)
Literature on community-based conservation and CBTH also finds facili-
tative leadership crucial for success of programs (Bunge-Vivier & Martínez-
Ballesté, 2017; German & Keeler, 2009; Jachmann, 2008; Paudyal et al., 2017;
Shackleton, 2001). Considering general context of endangered species manage-
ment in developing countries, such as prehistory of conflict and lack of trust, and
building upon the second proposition in the previous section about economic-
benefit-driven incentive to participate, facilitative third party actors, such as lo-
cal and international conservation NGOsmay be very helpful even in the context
of power imbalance.
For CBNRM and CBTH to be initiated, there should be some actors who can
help stakeholders to link social involvement and development with conserva-
tion objectives. Local, or international conservation NGOs can be instrumental
in orchestrating relevant actors to buy that idea (Cash & Moser, 2000; Folke et
al., 2005). For example, in Namibia, Garth Owen-Smith and Margaret Jacob-
sohn as leaders in local conservation pioneered the community-based conser-
vation program called ‘the Integrated Rural Development and Nature Conser-
vation (IRDNC)’ where they worked with local community, called ‘Herero,’ in
order to link social and economic development to the conservation of region’s
wildlife and other natural resources (A. F. Hoole, 2010). The program was quite
successful in controlling rampant illegal hunting of black rhinos and elephants
and increasing most wild species with major contributions from community-
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appointed game guards in the northeast of Namibia (Roe, Pathak, & Gutier-
rez, 2000). IRDNC’s leadership was facilitative in fact-finding by engaging the
Namibian government in conducting community surveys and setting up com-
munity game guard program. In Belize, a leader of NGO was instrumental in
creating Port Honduras Marine Reserve by persuading the Belize Government
and surrounding communities to adopt the Reserve and by linking international
concerns on marine ecosystems with local economic needs (Fernandes, 2005;
Seixas & Berkes, 2010). Also, in the Guyana’s Community-based Arapaima
Conservation, a local NGO played a role in finding funding for project, estab-
lishing links between local community and government authorities, and building
their capacities (Fernandes, 2004). Also, International Union for Conservation
of Nature (IUCN) played critical roles as a facilitator for conservation program
in Northern Pakistan in educating local people, providing technical training for
community wildlife guards and government field officers, creating an environ-
ment for mutual trust and commitment between the government agencies and
community and safeguarding the whole process (Khan, 2012; Mir, 2006; Zafar
et al., 2014).
Leadership may come from community side (Folke et al., 2005; A. F. Hoole,
2010;McIntosh&Renard, 2010) aswell as government side (Balint&Mashinya,
2006). Once a community decides to participate in CBNRM or CBTH, ‘or-
ganic’ leadership of community representative become very important in in-
forming community members about potential economic benefits from their own
conservation efforts, and sharing their own knowledge with government and in-
ternational organizations (Bunge-Vivier &Martínez-Ballesté, 2017; Folke et al.,
2005; Seixas & Berkes, 2010). In CBTH, community leaders may lead the pro-
cess of surveying wildlife, deciding on quotas, monitoring on illegal activities
and poaching, and imposing penalties on community members who violate the
rules (Taylor, 2009). Leadership roles of government officials in CBTH and CB-
NRM are also important in showing stable and transparent commitment during
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collaboration process since abrupt change in government leadership often leads
to the failure of the project . For example, in the CAMPFIRE program in Zim-
babwe, community members lost their trust in the government after change of
leadership in the government designated committee caused malpractices in the
distribution of revenues of trophy hunting (Balint & Mashinya, 2006).
Considering all factors of facilitative leadership affecting CBTH, the third
and fourth contingency propositions are formulated as bellows:
(3) Even if there is prehistory of conflict, lack of trust, and power im-
balance between community and government, facilitative third parties, such as
local or international conservation NGOs can play critical roles in initiating and
maintaining CBTH.
(4) If “organic” leadership from community is instrumental in implement-
ing conservation efforts as CBTH programs indicate, and government leadership
provides stable and transparent commitments during the process, CBTH will be
more likely to succeed.
2.3.3 Institutional Design
Institutional design in the model of collaborative governance refers to the ba-
sic protocols and ground rules for collaboration that are designed to secure the
procedural legitimacy of the collaborative process (Ansell & Gash, 2008)(fig-
ure 2.1. Literature on community-based conservation programs suggests sev-
eral design features for successful collaboration that include open and inclusive
representation of important stakeholders (Bouwen & Taillieu, 2004; Mayaka
et al., 2005; Newig & Fritsch, 2009), clear ground rules (Usongo & Nkanje,
2004), process transparency (Brunet & Aubry, 2016; Dudley, 2008), clear defi-
nition of roles (Baldus, 2009; Taylor, 2009), formalization of governance struc-
tures (DiMinin, Leader-Williams, & Bradshaw, 2016; Hayes, 2006), consensus-
oriented decision-making and the use of realistic deadlines (W. B. Adams, 2013;
Ansell & Gash, 2008). Exclusion of important stakeholders undermines the le-
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gitimacy of collaborative outcomes (Ansell & Gash, 2008). Clear ground rules
work to reassure stakeholders, who may have skeptical frame of mind and be
sensitive to issues of equity and power imbalance, that process is fair, open, and
transparent. Formal acknowledgment of transparent governance structure helps
stakeholder to feel confident that the public negotiation is real rather than win-
dow dressing.
For sustainable management of common pool resources, Ostrom (2008) sug-
gests critical principles of a governing institution that resemble some of the insti-
tutional design of collaborative governance. For example, the governing institu-
tion should define clear group boundaries, ensure that community gets the right
to participate in rule-making, and make sure that community has the the right
to modify these rules in case they affect the interests of local community (Os-
trom, 2008; Schumann, 2001). Identification of the affected community in local
natural resource management is often made on the criteria of geographical prox-
imity to the resource (B. Adams, 2008; Lebel et al., 2008). However, the number
and the scope of stakeholders in wildlife conservation are often larger since some
wild animals’ habitats go beyond conserved areas (Child, 2013; Pietersen, 2011).
Thus, representation of stakeholders in collaborative governance in wildlife con-
servation, such as CBTH, needs to be flexible and adaptable enough to accom-
modate both complex and diverse stakeholder interests.
When it comes to CBTH, literature identify local communities as key stake-
holders who can be affected negatively by the wildlife movement (e.g., dam-
age to farmlands or threat to human safety), positively by the wildlife use (e.g.,
revenues generated by trophy hunting and/or wildlife tourism), and who can
contribute indigenous knowledge to making and implementing a conservation
decision, and external groups, such as government organizations, international
agencies, and NGOs, who bring expertise to collaboration (Balint & Mashinya,
2006; Bouwen & Taillieu, 2004; Damm, 2008; Graham, Notter, Adams, Lee, &
Ochieng, 2010; Imran, Alam, & Beaumont, 2014; Stone, 2015).
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Participation of broad spectrum of stakeholders in a rule-setting negotiation
for CBTH is critical since CBTH requires a redefinition of forest, land, and
wildlife use by different stakeholders, such as farmers, hunters, tourists, ecol-
ogists, or local authorities (Bouwen & Taillieu, 2004). When the attachment of
one stakeholder such as farmers is stronger with farming practice, negotiating to
redefine land use becomes conflictual but significant in achieving consensus at
the end of the process. Bouwen and Taillieu (2004) suggest that, for sustainable
natural resource management, agreeing upon the ground rules, such as roles of
participants, scope of participants, and processes to convene multi-stakeholder
meetings is important. Making choices about how to set bounds on a particular
community or a set of communities in formulating a CBTHmay be controversial
and sabotage the negotiating process (Lebel et al., 2008).
2.4 Collaborative Process
The community-based trophy hunting is a collaborative process which evolve
in multiple inter-dependent stages (W. M. Adams & Hulme, 2001; IUCN, 2012;
Khan, 2012; Krug, 2001; Lebel et al., 2008; Mayaka et al., 2005; Paudyal et al.,
2017; Taylor, 2009). These stages can be further classified into distinct steps
which are generic in nature but each of them are specific to different circum-
stances depending on the nature of the case. In figure 2.3, we explain the com-
ponents of the community-based conservation programs characterized by trophy
hunting initiatives in line with the Ansell and Gash model in light of the existing
literature.
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Figure 2.3: Collaborative Governance Model for CBTH (Adopted from Ansell and
Gash, 2008)
2.4.1 Face-to-Face Dialogue among stakeholders
All collaborative governance types require face-to-face dialogue among stake-
holders. However, Ansell and Gash (2008) argue that face-to-face dialogue it-
self does not always lead to collaboration. It can reinforce stereotypes or in-
crease antagonism. In most of the community based conservation programs,
face-to-face communication and dialogue between the local people, government
authorities and the private partners plays significantly important role however,
it does not necessarily guarantee successful conservation outcomes (Balint &
Mashinya, 2006; Bunge-Vivier & Martínez-Ballesté, 2017; Chabwela & Haller,
2010; Damm, 2008; Frost & Bond, 2008; German & Keeler, 2009; Lindsey et
al., 2007; Newig & Fritsch, 2009; Ostrom, 2008). Since, differences of opinions
and perception about the ways in which conservation and development strate-
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gies are formulated and adopted, exist in common pool related problem, there-
fore, sitting together around one table increase the chances of consensus (Khan,
2012). Although not sufficient condition, face-to-face dialogue improves better
communication and decision making environment such as between government
authorities, local community representatives and actors as well as private agency
or partner particularly in contexts where the prehistory is dominated by conflicts
(Ansell & Gash, 2008; Ostrom, 2008). According to Frost and Bond (2008),
participation and the sense of ownership of marginal groups within community
was highly enhanced when face-to-face dialogue and discussions held at multi-
ple decision making occasions. Not only mere participation, studies also show
discussion with local people and their representatives help build confidence and
skills which are critical for the success of the negotiation process. However,
the success of such discussion again depends on the available leadership as well
as commitment to the process which are equally important for the collaborative
process.
The decline of a promising CBNRM in Mahenye, Zimbabwe reflects huge
gap in direct communication between the local people and the committee chiefs
who were undemocratically imposed on them (Balint & Mashinya, 2006). This
gap consequently resulted into the breaking of participatory system which was
crucial for the success of conservation program. Another study on participa-
tory collective action in the Kafue Flats, Zambia shows the local institutions
regulating the common good were strengthened through discussion among local
stakeholders (Chabwela & Haller, 2010). The basic idea of such discussion is
to empower those who perceive limited role in decision making despite having
differences of opinion about the mechanism.
While, literature on failed community conservation projects frequently at-
tribute lack of communication as the main factor that reduce confidence, suc-
cessful projects clearly indicate the role of open dialogue and communication
(Balint & Mashinya, 2006; Chabwela & Haller, 2010). For example, despite
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local people were not even aware of their rights, and had little confidence in the
government, sitting around the same table with district authorities highly con-
tributed in overcoming the communication barrier between the government and
local people in Northern Pakistan (Khan, 2012). As an important step towards
sustainable collaboration, we present the following proposition:
(5) Coupled with other parallel measures such as government service de-
livery, economic incentives etc, face-to-face meetings of the local community
representatives with government officials or private partner will positively in-
fluence CBTH.
2.4.2 Commitment to Collaboration
The degree of stakeholders’ commitment to the collaborative process can in-
fluence the CBTH through mutual recognition and joint appreciation. In many
cases in developing countries, CBTH or CBNRM starts with the funding from
international organizations through a formal proposal. In some cases such as
the Northern Pakistan, the role of local people in formulating the contents of
CBTH from the beginning is limited due to requirement of funding proposals.
Despite such limitations, local people might still agree on some bounded objects
of negotiation. These include, commitment of delivery of revenues (or benefits)
from trophy hunting to the community welfare works that people expect, becom-
ing part of the implementation mechanism specially when there is employment
opportunities and performance of government authorities.
In Northern Pakistan case, the IUCN and Agha Khan Rural Support Program
(AKRSP) suggested to the government the feasibility of a community-based nat-
ural resource management. Later, after the proposal for project funding submit-
ted by IUCN to Global Environmental Facility (GEF) through United Nations
Development Program (UNDP) got accepted, the local people were invited to
the negotiation process where they cooperated in designing the ground rules for
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setting up objectives of collaboration (GEF, 2011). Analysis of this project docu-
ments reveals a well-designed framework that gives more control to local people
and empower their capacity to conserve natural resource, while equally showing
strong commitment on the continuity of the project. Other studies point to the
weak commitment by the central government agencies in continuing the CBTH
process as a problem (Balint & Mashinya, 2006).
Commitment however depends on existing trust among stakeholders and
transparency in procedures that establish the integrity for negotiation. Initia-
tives that seek increasing involvement of local communities can create a sense of
commitment and ownership among local people that in turn overcome any power
imbalances or differences of perceptions (Andrade & Rhodes, 2012). Ansell and
Gash (2008) argue that despite a collaborative governance is mandated, lack of
incentive to participatemight be translated as lack of real commitment on the part
of stakeholders. In the context of CBTH, a number of studies consider sustained
commitment among stakeholders towards effective implementation of conserva-
tion plans as an important part of the collaborative process (W. B. Adams, 2013;
Frost & Bond, 2008; Nagendra & Ostrom, 2012; Wijnstekers, 2011). Our anal-
ysis of relevant CBTH cases suggest that community’s belief about government
commitments to ensure equitable implementation always matter. For example
in one case, two-thirds of those who knew that the government has passed a new
land law, doubted the government’s commitment in ensuring its equitable imple-
mentation (Soto, Munthali, & Breen, 2001). Although, the consensus- oriented
governance greatly reduces the risks for stakeholders’ commitment, the CBTH
still needs willingness to accept the outcomes of deliberation, even if they do not
go in line with stakeholder’s full interest.
(6) A strong commitment demonstrated by stakeholders specially govern-
ment and NGOs can win the cooperation of local community despite any limi-
tation during the initiation of the CBTH.
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2.4.3 Shared Understanding
With regard to developing a shared understanding, the context of CBTH differs
from other collaborative programs. Ansell and Gash (2008) argue the creation of
shared understanding about collective achievement at some point during collab-
oration. This might happen in those CBTH cases, where community is engaged
from the beginning, however, in general, CBTH programs vary in the level of
understanding between community and government or NGOs. Initially, local
community perceives the outcome of collaboration as economic incentive and
livelihood given the socio-economic conditions of the society and their attach-
ment to natural resource. At the same time, intervention organization or govern-
ments’ aims differ as their primary objective is environmental conservation. A
recent study undertaken in Central Karakoram National Park, Pakistan by Imran
et al. (2014) examined the differences in opinions about environmental objec-
tives among four stakeholders associated with protected area. The study finds
opinions of the stakeholders towards environmental objectives closely linked to
their incentives. This indicates that despite differences in opinions, local com-
munity might develop understanding with government and international orga-
nizations if they agree on collective actions that embody incentives for local
community. Several factors might influence local community perception about
the natural resource conservation. These include, the history of conservation in
the area, awareness of community about environmental concerns and benefits to
the local community (Ormsby & Kaplin, 2005). Moreover, effective communi-
cation among stakeholders may help in developing shared understanding among
stakeholders.
2.4.4 Intermediate Outcomes
Concrete, intermediate, “small wins” from collaboration represent not only tan-
gible outputs, but also critical process outcomes that can feed back into a vir-
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tuous collaborative circle of trust building and commitment (Ansell & Gash,
2008). Intermediate outcomes may not be helpful for trust building where stake-
holders have more ambitious goals that cannot easily be parsed into small wins
(Vangen & Huxham, 2003). Ansell and Gash (2008) even posit that a collabora-
tive path should not be pursued by stakeholders when prior antagonism between
stakeholders is high that requires long-term commitment to trust building and
small wins are not expected. Intermediate outcomes in CBTH cases include local
level development or conservation plans or spending of initial external funding
on conservation related expenditures (Bunge-Vivier & Martínez-Ballesté, 2017;
Shackleton, 2001; Wijnstekers, 2011). Continuity in these small wins are cru-
cial for long term sustainability of the CBTH process. For example, in Northern
Pakistan, the community as well as government anticipated intermediate wins
such as the successful distribution of trophy revenue through village develop-
ment plan and establishment of local monitoring team which looked after the
animals (Khan, 2012). This crucially increased the long term commitment and
cooperation among stakeholders. Despite conservation being main objective of
IUCN, showing positive performance on small wins was necessary for long term
success. We thus conclude that:
(7) Intermediate outcomes that create short-term tangible gains (for commu-
nity) are crucial for building a momentum that can lead to successful CBTH
process.
2.5 Factors Affecting the Outcomes of CBTH Pro-
grams
We extend the Ansell and Gash (2008) model to the next step of what determines
the success or failure of community-based trophy hunting programs in develop-
ing countries. We apply core components of the model from starting conditions
to the process completion in the context of CBTH and further explore condi-
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tions under which a collaborative process may achieve conservation outcomes.
Based on case studies of CBTH, we derive the following key factors influencing
the outcome of CBTH programs.
2.5.1 Inclusiveness of Design
The success of community based conservation initiatives highly depends on the
nature(inclusiveness) of the basic rules and protocols that provide procedural
legitimacy and govern the whole process smoothly (Aheto et al., 2016; Baker,
1997; Bunge-Vivier&Martínez-Ballesté, 2017; Chabwela&Haller, 2010; IUCN,
2012; Khan, 2012; Nagendra &Ostrom, 2012; NASCO, 2010; Newig & Fritsch,
2009; Ostrom, 2009). These basic rules and protocols are collectively referred
to institutional designs that allow (or obstruct) the inclusion of certain members
of community through certain rules.
An inclusive institutional design ensure the opportunity for each stakeholder
to deliberate with others about setting objectives for achieving policy outcomes
through consensus (A. Hoole & Berkes, 2010; Mir, 2006; Shackleton, 2001). In
such deliberative designs, there aremore chances that indigenous knowledge and
skills are incorporated which increases shared understanding of each stakeholder
on the common good use (Natcher & Hickey, 2002; Redpath et al., 2013; Seixas
&Berkes, 2010). Also non-inclusive representation of one or many stakeholders
might lead to vicious cycle by increasing the power imbalance and knowledge
gap (Aheto et al., 2016). Hence, an inclusive institutional designs should fulfill
at least two important requirements. First, it must allow local people to possess
property rights of resource use; secondly, it should enable local people to con-
struct local level institutions that control the use of the resource, distribution of
benefits and redressal of complaints arising during the use of the resources etc.
In a study of five forests in Uganda, Banana and Gombya-Ssembajjwe (2000)
find the condition of forests better in areas where property rights are well known
and enforced than in those areas where national laws lack enforcement.
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We thus argue that if explicit rules are in place which guide the roles and
responsibilities of each stakeholder in a way that is inclusive and does not dis-
criminate (or exclude) one stakeholder, then participatory process of the CBTH
will be more sustainable in terms of participation and outcomes. We thus present
the following proposition:
(8) If the existing institutional structure allows the creation of ground rules
and basic protocols for collaboration that is inclusive and open to change, the
CBTH is likely to be sustainable.
2.5.2 Defined Rules and Procedures
Existence of clearly defined laws, regulations and procedures developed with lo-
cal community inputs and which are periodically reviewed and updated, can in-
fluence the success of CBTH programs. The key principles for successful CBTH
programs as suggested by IUCN include a transparent government framework
characterized by clear allocation of responsibilities, accounting for revenues in
a transparent manner and distribution as per agreements, taking steps to elimi-
nate corruption and ensuring compliance with all national and international re-
quirements and regulations by relevant bodies such as administrators, regulators
and hunters (IUCN, 2012). A case study by Gibson and Becker (2000) reflects
a strong local community in Western Ecuador which failed to protect its for-
est and wild animals from illegal hunting despite the positive valuation of the
tropical forests and secured property rights and a rich history of (other) micro-
institutions. The same study finds that rules have had a direct impact on the
condition of forest degradation and its related resources such as wildlife.
2.5.3 Conflict Resolution Mechanism
Whether CBTH programs result into successful outcomes depends on the way in
which conflicts and deadlocks among the stakeholders are resolved. We find a
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considerable number of cases where conflicting opinions have reduced commit-
ment and hindered the implementation of community-based conservation pro-
grams (Nagendra & Ostrom, 2012; Redpath et al., 2013; Schumann, 2001; Tay-
lor, 2009). A detailed study enlisting numerous failure cases by Chabwela and
Haller (2010) indicates that conflicts between authorities and the local people
over wildlife resource use have exacerbated the differences and resulted into
failure. Studies also show a strong influence of economic incentives on conflict
resolution in community based conservation programs. In Northern Pakistan,
where perceived inadequate opportunities for income generation was observed
as a main reason for lack of participation in environmental protection, local peo-
ple were ready to conserve environment on the condition of incentives provision
(Imran et al., 2014)
2.5.4 Capacity of Government Machinery
We note multiple cases of CBTH programs where uncertain behavior of gov-
ernment authorities and lack of decision making capacity related to community
based conservation influence the morale of community participation that ulti-
mately lead to failure in conservation (Balint & Mashinya, 2006; German &
Keeler, 2009; A. F. Hoole, 2010; Khan, 2012). For example one conservation
study highlights lack of clarity on key decisions among local officials which
resulted into severe limits on benefits to local communities and effectively de-
creased their role in governance (A. Hoole & Berkes, 2010). In a case study
of Central Karakoram National Park Pakistan, one view is quoted as: “We are
ready to manage the pastures to conserve them but we wouldn’t like the govern-
ment to tell us that we have no use rights in the Park” (Imran et al., 2014)[P.296].
CBTH does not necessarily means that the community has been given full de-
cision making power. For example, some community members still perceive
that decision-making powers (other than fund distribution) lie with government-
controlled departments. CBTH programs have been frequently halted due to
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situations where government agency does not have the capacity(e.g knowledge,
training etc), organization(e.g. skilled human resource), status(e.g. legislation),
or resources to participate(e.g to initially finance the project), or to participate
on an equal footing with other stakeholders (Bunge-Vivier &Martínez-Ballesté,
2017; Folke et al., 2005).
2.6 Conclusion
The governance structure of community-based trophy hunting programs can be
framed as a form of collaborative governance that involve multiple stakeholders
in the management of common pool resources. By conducting a detailed review
on 80 published case studies, we develop contingency propositions that help
practitioners and governments to understand and implement projects that seek
environmental conservation in collaboration with local communities.
We identify four factors that may interplay to affect the incentive to par-
ticipate in community based conservation programs particularly CBTH. These
include interdependence of stakeholders, power imbalance, prehistory of antago-
nism (level of distrust), and potential tangible benefits. We argue that for, CBTH
to be considered by government as an alternative mechanism to conventional
top-down, approach, such as strictly protected areas, and proposed to local com-
munities, interdependence between government and local communities should
exit. We also argue that, despite the uncertainty of effectiveness of community-
based conservation from the beginning, due to pre-history of conflicts, govern-
ments rely upon bottom-up approach that utilize the efforts of local communi-
ties in conserving wildlife rather than ineffective command-and-control policies.
On the other hand, local communities cooperate and participate in CBTH due
to power-imbalance between strong governments and weak communities who
neighbor or live closely with wildlife animals.
Drawing on the country specific cases of CBTH programs, we further argue
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that even if there are prehistory of conflict, lack of trust, and power imbalance
between community and government, facilitative third parties, such as local or
international conservation NGOs can play critical roles in initiating and main-
taining CBTH. Since CBTH requires a redefinition of forest, land, and wildlife
use by different stakeholders, therefore it is critical to have participation of a
broad spectrum of stakeholders during collaborative process.
The key components of community based trophy hunting programs include,
face-to-face dialogue between community, governments and international or-
ganizations, mutual trust building, commitment to collaboration, shared under-
standing of the environmental concerns and livelihood goals and achievement of
intermediate outcomes. We finally identify factors affecting CBTH program’s
process that determine the outcomes of CBTH programs. These include, but are
not limited to, inclusiveness of design, clearly defined rules, conflict resolution
mechanisms and capacity building of government authorities.
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APPENDIX B
Community Based Conservation and Trophy Hunting Cases
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GTZ and KWF 
IUCN(2011), A protected area benefitting local 
communities in Benin. 
https://www.iucn.org/ru/node/8509?amp;= 
2 
Pendjari national park (PNP) in 
Benin 
Benin 1993 
Roan Antelope, Western 
Hartebeest, Western Kob, Buffalo 
Government 
(1) Idrissou, L., van Paassen, A., Aarts, N., Vodouhè, 
S., & Leeuwis, C. (2013). Trust and hidden conflict 
in participatory natural resources management: The 
case of the Pendjari national park (PNP) in Benin. 
Forest Policy and Economics, 27, 65-74. 
(2) Vodouhê, F. G., Coulibaly, O., Adégbidi, A., & 
Sinsin, B. (2010). Community perception of 
biodiversity conservation within protected areas in 




Communal Forests Management 
Support Project in Benin 
Benin 2008 







GEFCOM_-_Appraisal_Report.pdf. (Access date: 
August, 2018) 
4 
Governing Biodiversity and 
Livelihoods around the W National 
Parks of Benin and Niger 
Benin  And 
Niger 
1990 
Elephants, Ungulates, Western 
Topi, The Cheetah, West African 
Manatee 
WB & UNDP and 
German Aid(30% 
revenues go to the 
village 
organization) 
Miller, D. C. (2013). Conservation legacies: governing 
biodiversity and livelihoods around the W National 
Parks of Benin and Niger (Doctoral dissertation, 
University of Michigan). 
5 




(Panthera Tigris), Leopards 
(Panthera Pardus), Red Panda 
(Alurus 
Fulgens), Gaur (Bos Gaurus), 
Golden Langur (Presbytis Geei) 
Government 
(1) Wang, S. W., & Macdonald, D. W. (2006). 
Livestock predation by carnivores in Jigme Singye 
Wangchuck National Park, Bhutan. Biological 
Conservation, 129(4), 558-565. 
(2) Wang, S. W., Lassoie, J. P., & Curtis, P. D. (2006). 
Farmer attitudes towards conservation in Jigme 
Singye Wangchuck National Park, 
Bhutan. Environmental Conservation, 33(2), 148-
156. 
6 
Jigme Singye Wangchuck National 
Park, Bhutan 
Bhutan 1996 
Leopard, Tiger, Himalayan Black 
Bear  Dhole 
Government 
Wang, S. W., & Macdonald, D. W. (2006). Livestock 
predation by carnivores in Jigme Singye Wangchuck 





And Tourism: Nata Bird Sanctuary, 
Botswana 
Botswana 1993 
Birds: Kingfishers, Eagles, 
Bustards, Ostriches and 
Numerous Woodland Bird Species 
Mammals: 
Hartebeest, kudu, reedbuck, 
Springbok, springhares, jackals, 
foxes, eland, gemsbok, 
Zebras, monkeys, and squirrels 
Government 
(1) Stone, M. T., & Rogerson, C. M. (2011). 
Community-based natural resource management 
and tourism: Nata bird sanctuary, Botswana. 
Tourism Review International, 15(1-2), 159-169. 
(2) Stone, M. T., & Nyaupane, G. (2014). Rethinking 
community in community-based natural resource 




Resource management Programme 
in Western Botswana(Kalahari and 
Okwa Wildlife management areas) 
Botswana 1986 
Elephant, Giraffe Mountain 
Zebra, Dik-dik, Black-faced 
Impala, 
Government 
Twyman, C. (2000). Participatory conservation? 
Community‐based natural resource management in 




The Chobe Enclave Community 
Trust, a community living 
adjacent to Chobe National Park 
in Botswana 
Botswana 1984 Elephant 
WWF + 
Government 
Stone, M. T. (2015). Community-based ecotourism: A 
collaborative partnerships perspective. Journal of 
Ecotourism, 14(2-3), 166-184. 
10 
Okavango Delta community trust 
based conservation  
Botswana  2014 
Cheetah, White Rhinoceros, Black 
Rhinoceros, African Wild Dog and Lion 
UNESCO  
State Of Conservation Report Okavango Delta Natural World 
Heritage Site, Botswana , 2015 
11 
Case study on the Okavango 
Community Trust(OCT),  
Okavango Kopano Mokoro 
Community Trust(OKMC), and 
Khwai Development Trust(KDT) 






Elephant, African Buffalo, 
Hippopotamus, Lechwe, Topi, Blue 
Wildebeest, Giraffe, Lion, Cheetah, 
Leopard, Sable Antelope, Black 
Rhinoceros, White Rhinoceros,  
Government  
Mbaiwa, J. E. (2005). Wildlife resource utilisation at Moremi 
Game Reserve and Khwai community area in the Okavango 










Oryx Gazelle , Eland 
Taurotragus Oryx  
 
NGO 
Barnett, R., & Patterson, C. (2006). Sport hunting in the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) region: 
an overview. TRAFFIC East/Southern Africa, Johannesburg, 
South Africa. 
13 






Oryx Gazelle , Eland 
Taurotragus Oryx  
 
NGO 
Barnett, R., & Patterson, C. (2006). Sport hunting in the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) region: 
an overview. TRAFFIC East/Southern Africa, Johannesburg, 
South Africa. 
14 






Oryx Gazelle , Eland 
Taurotragus Oryx  
 
NGO 
Barnett, R., & Patterson, C. (2006). Sport hunting in the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) region: 
an overview. TRAFFIC East/Southern Africa, Johannesburg, 
South Africa. 
15 
Conservation and development 
alliances with the Kayapó of 
south-eastern Amazonia, a 
tropical forest indigenous people 
Brazil  1992 
Tayassu Pecari, Pteronura Brasiliensis, 





Zimmerman, B., Peres, C. A., Malcolm, J. R., & Turner, T. 
(2001). Conservation and development alliances with the 
Kayapó of south-eastern Amazonia, a tropical forest 
indigenous people. Environmental Conservation, 28(1), 10-
22. 
16 Kayapo Indigenous Area Brazil  1990 Geochelone Tortoises, A’Ukre Government 
Peres, C. A., & Nascimento, H. S. (2006). Impact of game 
hunting by the Kayapó of south-eastern Amazonia: 
implications for wildlife conservation in tropical forest 
indigenous reserves. Biodiversity & Conservation, 15(8), 
2627-2653. 
17 Lobeke National Park Cameroon 1975 
Elephants, Buffellos, and low land 
Gorillas 
WWF 
Usongo, L., & Nkanje, B. T. (2004). Participatory approaches 
towards forest conservation: the case of Lobéké National 
Park, south east Cameroon. The International Journal of 
Sustainable Development & World Ecology, 11(2), 119-127. 
18 
Participatory Forest Conservation 
and Sustainable Livelihoods: 
Banyang-Mbo Wildlife Sanctuary 
Cameroon 1996 Forest Elephants Government  
Nkembi, L. N. (2003, September). Participatory forest 
conservation and sustainable livelihoods: Banyang-mbo 
wildlife sanctuary. In XII World Forestry Congress (pp. 21-
28).  
19 
The influence of institutions on 
access to forest resources in 
Cameroon: The case of Tofala 
Hill Wildlife Sanctuary 
Cameroon 2014 
Africa’s Most Threatened Great Ape, 





Nkemnyi, M. F., De Herdt, T., Chuyong, G. B., & Vanwing, 
T. (2016). The influence of institutions on access to forest 
resources in Cameroon: The case of Tofala Hill Wildlife 
Sanctuary. Journal for nature conservation, 34, 42-50. 
20 
The case of Lobeke 
National Park, South east 
Cameroon: Participatory 
approaches towards forest 
conservation: 
Cameroon 2006 
Loxodonta Africana Cyclotis , Western 
Lowland 
Bongos and Buffaloes  
WWF  &  
GTZ 
Usongo, L., & Nkanje, B. T. (2004). Participatory approaches 
towards forest conservation: the case of Lobéké National 
Park, south east Cameroon. The International Journal of 
Sustainable Development & World Ecology, 11(2), 119-127. 
21 
Wildlife co-management in the 
Bénoué National Park-Complex, 
Cameroon: A bumpy road to 
institutional development 
Cameroon 1993 
Cameroon Lions, Elephants, Spotted 
Hyena, Water Buck, Warthog  
Government 
& WB   
Mayaka, T. B. (2002). Wildlife co-management in the Bénoué 
National Park-Complex, Cameroon: A bumpy road to 
institutional development. World Development, 30(11), 2001-
2016. 
22 
Local perceptions of Waza 
National Park, northern 
Cameroon 
Cameroon 1993 
Antelope And Monkey 
Species, Elephant 
, Lion , Hyena, and A 
Diverse Avifauna  
IUCN 
Bauer, H. (2003). Local perceptions of Waza National Park, 
northern Cameroon. Environmental Conservation, 30(2), 175-
181. 
23 
Understanding the Links 
Between Conservation and 
Development in the Bamenda 
Highlands, Cameroon 
Cameroon 1987 
The Primate Preuss' Guenon, 
Coopers Mountain Squirrel 
BirdLife 
International 
Abbot, J. I., Thomas, D. H., Gardner, A. A., Neba, S. E., & 
Khen, M. W. (2001). Understanding the links between 
conservation and development in the Bamenda Highlands, 
Cameroon. World Development, 29(7), 1115-1136. 





Blue Duiker Cephalophus 
Monticola And The Bay 
Duiker Cephalopus Dorsalis 
Government  
Noss, A. J. (1998). The impacts of BaAka net hunting on 
rainforest wildlife. Biological conservation, 86(2), 161-167. 
25 
Zones Cynégétiques Villageoises 






Elephants, Old World monkeys, Patas 
monkey, Hominoidea 
Government  
Mbitikon, R. (2004). Village hunting zones: an experiment of 
community-based natural resource management in the 
Central African Republic. Game & Wildlife Science, 21(3), 
217-226. 
26 
A case study of 
Trophy hunting in western china 
 
China 1997 
Argali Ovis Ammon 
 
Government  
Harris, R. B., & Pletscher, D. H. (2002). Incentives toward 
conservation of argali Ovis ammon: a case study of trophy 
hunting in western China. Oryx, 36(4), 373-381. 
27 Xishuangbanna Nature Reserve China 1961 
Asiatic Elephant (Elephas Maximus), 




Albers, H. J., & Grinspoon, E. (1997). A comparison of the 
enforcement of access restrictions between Xishuangbanna 
Nature Reserve (China) and Khao Yai National Park 





Community-based natural resource 
management 
Practice in the Cardamom Mountains, 
Cambodia( Phnom Samkos Wildlife 
Sanctuary  (PSWS)) 
Combodia  2000 Wild Animal(not specified  INGO 
CASCIO, A. L., & Beilin, R. (2010). Of biodiversity and 
boundaries: a case study of community-based natural 
resource management practice in the Cardamom Mountains, 
Cambodia. Environmental Conservation, 37(3), 347-355. 
29 
A case study from the Saint Katherine 
Protectorate, Southern Sinai, Egypt 
Egypt 1996 
Sinai Leopard, Nubian 
Ibex, Dorcas Gazelles  
Global Environmental 
Facility (GEF) 
Grainger, J. (2003). ‘People are living in the park'. Linking 
biodiversity conservation to community development in the 
Middle East region: a case study from the Saint Katherine 
Protectorate, Southern Sinai. Journal of arid environments, 
54(1), 29-38. 
30 St Katherine Protectorate Egypt  1990 
Red Fox, Sinai  Leopard, 
Nubian  Ibex 
Government  
Grainger, J. (2003). ‘People are living in the park'. Linking 
biodiversity conservation to community development in the 
Middle East region: a case study from the Saint Katherine 
Protectorate, Southern Sinai. Journal of arid 
environments, 54(1), 29-38. 
31 
Indigenous Common Property 
Resource System In The Guassa  area  
of  Menz 
 




Ashenafi, Z. T., & Leader-Williams, N. (2005). Indigenous 
common property resource management in the Central 
Highlands of Ethiopia. Human Ecology, 33(4), 539-563. 
32 
Community natural resource 
management: the 
case of woodlots in Northern Ethiopia 
 
Ethiopia 1991 No Specified  Government  
Gebremedhin, B., Pender, J., & Tesfay, G. (2003). 
Community natural resource management: the case of 
woodlots in northern Ethiopia. Environment and 
Development Economics, 8(1), 129-148. 
33 
Law, custom and community-based 
natural resource 
management in Kubulau District (Fiji) 
 
Fiji 2005 
Marine Animals and 
Terrestrial Animals  
Government  
Clarke, P., & Jupiter, S. D. (2010). Law, custom and 
community-based natural resource management in Kubulau 
District (Fiji). Environmental Conservation, 37(1), 98-106. 
34 
Western Community based Natural 
Resource Management in Ghats in 




,Hopea Ponga, Madhuca  
Not specified  
Ormsby, A. A., & Bhagwat, S. A. (2010). Sacred forests of 
India: a strong tradition of community-based natural 
resource management. Environmental Conservation, 37(3), 
320-326. 
35 
Community-based natural resource 
management and power in Mohammed 
Nagar village, Andhra Pradesh, India 
 
India 1990 No Specified  Government  
Saito-Jensen, M., Nathan, I., & Treue, T. (2010). Beyond 
elite capture? Community-based natural resource 
management and power in Mohammed Nagar village, 
Andhra Pradesh, India. Environmental Conservation, 37(3), 
327-335. 
36 Nanda Devi Biosphere Reserve India  1990 
Snow Leopard (Panthera 
Uncia), Brown Bear 
(Ursus Arctosisbellinus 
Government  
Maikhuri, R. K., Nautiyal, S., Rao, K. S., & Saxena, K. G. 
(2001). Conservation policy–people conflicts: a case study 
from Nanda Devi Biosphere Reserve (a world heritage site), 
India. Forest Policy and Economics, 2(3-4), 355-365. 
37 Kalakad Mundanthurai Tiger Reserve India  2000 
Tiger (Panthera Tigris), 
The Asian Elephant 
(Elephas Maximus)  
Government  
Arjunan, M., Holmes, C., Puyravaud, J. P., & Davidar, P. 
(2006). Do developmental initiatives influence local 
attitudes toward conservation? A case study from the 
Kalakad–Mundanthurai Tiger Reserve, India. Journal of 
environmental management, 79(2), 188-197. 
38 Gir National Park India  1992 Asiatic Lions GEF 
Mukherjee, A., & Borad, C. K. (2004). Integrated approach 
towards conservation of Gir National Park: the last refuge 
of Asiatic Lions, India. Biodiversity & 
Conservation, 13(11), 2165-2182. 
39 






Madagascar Serpent Eagle, 
Madagascar Red 
Owl, Helmet Vanga, 
Leaftailed 
Gecko  
Several NGOs  
Ormsby, A., & Kaplin, B. A. (2005). A framework for 
understanding community resident perceptions of Masoala 
National Park, Madagascar. Environmental Conservation, 
32(2), 156-164. 
40 
A Case Study of Batang Ai National 
Park, Sarawak, Malaysia 




Horowitz, L. S. (1998). Integrating indigenous resource 
management with wildlife conservation: a case study of 
Batang Ai National Park, Sarawak, Malaysia. Human 
Ecology, 26(3), 371-403. 
41 
community based 
wildlife hunting management of  
in the Gulzat Local Protected 
Area of northwest Mongolia 




Mitigation of negative human impacts 
on large carnivore populations in  





Lion, Leopard, Spotted 




Begg, C., & Begg, K. (2009). Niassa carnivore 
project. Produced for SRN, Maputo. 
43 
The Koakoveld Community based 
Conservation Project(Kunene region) 
Namibia  1982 
Elephant, Black Rhino, 
Giraffe, Plains And 






Kiss, A. (2004). Is community-based ecotourism a good use 
of biodiversity conservation funds? Trends in ecology & 
evolution, 19(5), 232-237. 
44 
Ehi-rovipuka Conservancy under a 
national Community-Based Natural 
Resource Management Programme 
(CBNRM) that 
Namibia 1990 
Elephant, Springbok, Oryx, 
and Kudu 
government funded 
Hoole, A., & Berkes, F. (2010). Breaking down fences: 
Recoupling social–ecological systems for biodiversity 




Community‐based Natural Resource 
Management project in Kunene Region 
of Namibia 
Namibia  1994 
Hartmann’s Mountain Zebra, 
Black Rhino 
Namibian NGO 
Jones, B. T. (1999). Policy lessons from the evolution 
of a community‐based approach to wildlife 
management, Kunene Region, Namibia. Journal of 
International Development: The Journal of the 
Development Studies Association, 11(2), 295-304. 
46 Caprivi Communal Conservancy Namibia 1980 
Elephant, Black rhino, Giraffe, 
plains and mountain zebra, 
Kudu,  
DFID  
Bandyopadhyay, S., Guzman, J.C. & Lendelvo, S. 
(2010) Communal Conservancies and household 
welfare in Namibia.  Ministry  of Environment and 
Tourism, Windhoek, Namibia 
 
47 
Torra conservancy COmmunity based 
Natural resource Management  
Namibia 1998 
Elephant,  Black  Rhino,  Lion,  
Leopard,  Cheetah,  Hyaena, 
Giraffe, Mountain Zebra, 
Springbok, Oryx and Kudu 
Government +NGO 
Scanlon, L. J., & Kull, C. A. (2009). Untangling the 
links between wildlife benefits and community-based 
conservation at Torra Conservancy, 
Namibia. Development Southern Africa, 26(1), 75-93. 
48 
Conservation activities  
in Kaokoveld Namibia 
 
Namibia 1983 
Elephant,  Black  Rhino,  Lion,  
Leopard,  Cheetah,  Hyaena,  
IRDNC - WWF 
 
Holmes, T. (1992). Conservation activities in 
Kaokoveld (north-west Namibia). Biodiversity & 
Conservation, 1(3), 211-213. 
49 
Communal and freehold rangelands in 
the Waterberg region of north-central 
Namibia  
Namibia 2000 
Oryx Gazelle , Eland 
Taurotragus Oryx  
 
No specified  
Kauffman, M. J., Sanjayan, M., Lowenstein, J., Nelson, 
A., Jeo, R. M., & Crooks, K. R. (2007). Remote 
camera-trap methods and analyses reveal impacts of 
rangeland management on Namibian carnivore 
communities. Oryx, 41(1), 70-78. 
50 
Impacts of community-based 
conservation on local 
communities in the Annapurna 
Conservation Area, 
Nepal 
Nepal  1989 
Rhesus Macaque, 
Himalayan Black Bear, 
Barking Deer, Leopard And 
Porcupine 
King 
Mahendra Trust for 
Nature Conservation 
(KMTNC)--NGO 
Bajracharya, S. B., Furley, P. A., & Newton, A. C. 
(2006). Impacts of community-based conservation on 
local communities in the Annapurna Conservation Area, 
Nepal. Biodiversity & Conservation, 15(8), 2765-2786. 
51 Annapurna Conservation Area (ACA)  Nepal  1996 Not Specified  Government  
Baral, N., & Stern, M. J. (2010). Looking back and 
looking ahead: local empowerment and governance in 
the Annapurna Conservation Area, 
Nepal. Environmental Conservation, 37(1), 54-63. 
52 Annapurna Conservation Area Nepal 1993 Mountain Tigers  Government  
Bajracharya, S. B., Furley, P. A., & Newton, A. C. 
(2006). Impacts of community-based conservation on 
local communities in the Annapurna Conservation Area, 
Nepal. Biodiversity & Conservation, 15(8), 2765-2786. 
53 
Mountain Areas Conservancy Project 
Chitral Region- Pakistan 
Pakistan  1999 Markhor and Ibex trophies UNDP & GEF 
Mir, A. (2006). Impact assessment of community based 
trophy hunting in MACP areas of NWFP and Northern 
Areas. Report for the Mountain Area Conservancy 
Project, IUCN Pakistan. 
54 
The Torghar conservation project: 
management of the livestock, Suleiman 
markhor (Capra falconeri) and Afghan 
urial (Ovis orientalis) in the Torghar 
Hills 
Pakistan  1986 
Suleiman Markhor, Capra 
Falconeri Megaceros, And The 
Afghan Urial, Ovis Orientalis 
Cycloceros, 
Mainly financed by 
the sale of trophies. 
Small grants were 
provided by the World 
Wildlife Fund-
Pakistan, the Houbara 
Foundation, Safari 
Club International and 
the UNDP 
Woodford, M. H., Frisina, M. R., & Awan, G. A. 
(2004). The Torghar conservation project: management 
of the livestock, Suleiman markhor (Capra falconeri) 
and Afghan urial (Ovis orientalis) in the Torghar Hills, 
Pakistan. Game and Wildlife Science, 21(3), 177-187. 
55 
Community based Trophy Hunting 
Program (CTHP)-Northern Areas of 
Pakistan  
Pakistan 1996 Himalayan Ibex, Markhor  
WWF-Pakistan &  
IUCN-Pakistan 
Mir, A. (2006). Impact assessment of community based 
trophy hunting in MACP areas of NWFP and Northern 
Areas. Report for the Mountain Area Conservancy 
Project, IUCN Pakistan. 
56 
Khunjerab village Community based 
Trophy Hunting Organization  
Pakistan  1995 
Marco-Polo Sheep, Ibex, Blue 
Sheep, And Snow Leopard 
IUCN- Pakistan  
Mir, A. (2006). Impact assessment of community based 
trophy hunting in MACP areas of NWFP and Northern 
Areas. Report for the Mountain Area Conservancy 
Project, IUCN Pakistan. 
57 
Community based Conservation and 
Trophy Hunting of Ibex in Khyber 
Valley- Northern Pakistan  




Mir, A. (2006). Impact assessment of community based 
trophy hunting in MACP areas of NWFP and Northern 
Areas. Report for the Mountain Area Conservancy 
Project, IUCN Pakistan. 
58 
Community based Conservation and 
Trophy Hunting of Ibex in Basho 
Valley-Northern Pakistan  
Pakistan  1995 Ibex 
Government Forest 
Department 
Mir, A. (2006). Impact assessment of community based 
trophy hunting in MACP areas of NWFP and Northern 
Areas. Report for the Mountain Area Conservancy 
Project, IUCN Pakistan. 
59 
Community based Conservation and 
Trophy Hunting in Bunji-Northern 
Pakistan  
Pakistan  1996 Markhor IUCN 
Mir, A. (2006). Impact assessment of community based 
trophy hunting in MACP areas of NWFP and Northern 
Areas. Report for the Mountain Area Conservancy 
Project, IUCN Pakistan. 
60 
Community based Conservation and 
Trophy Hunting of Blue Sheep in 
Shimshal Valley 
Pakistan 
Pakistan  1989 Blue Sheep And Ibex Japanese Government  
Mir, A. (2006). Impact assessment of community based 
trophy hunting in MACP areas of NWFP and Northern 
Areas. Report for the Mountain Area Conservancy 
Project, IUCN Pakistan. 
61 
Community based trophy hunting in 
Tooshi-Shasha Conservancy in Pakistan  
Pakistan  1995 Markhor  Government +WWF  
Ali, H., Shafi, M. M., Khan, H., Shah, M., & Khan, M. 
(2018). Socio-economic benefits of community based 




Community based trophy 
hunting in Kaigah valley 
district Kohistan  Pakistan 
Pakistan 2005 Markhor  Government  
Ghafoor, A. (2014). Sustainability of Markhor Trophy 
Hunting Programme in District Kohistan 
Pakistan (Doctoral dissertation, Universiti Sains 
Malaysia). 
63 
The dual nature of parks: 
attitudes of neighboring 
communities towards Kruger 
National Park,  
South Africa 2002 
Lion, Leopard, 
Rhinoceros (Both Black 
And White Species), 
Elephant, And Cape 
Buffalo 
Government 
(1) Anthony, B. (2007). The dual nature of parks: 
attitudes of neighbouring communities towards 
Kruger National Park, South Africa. 
Environmental Conservation, 34(3), 236-245. 
64 
Community based 
conservation of Markhor in 
Hazratishoh and Darvaz 
Ranges of Tajikistan 
Tajikistan  2004 Markhor Community based NGO 
Alidodov, M., et al., 2014. Survey of markhor at the 
Hazratishoh and Darvaz Ranges, Tajikistan. State 
Forestry Agency 
under the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan, 
Dushanbe 
65 
Trophy hunting concessions 
for Argali and ibex in the 





Kachel, S.M. 2014. Evaluating the Efficacy of Wild 
Ungulate Trophy Hunting as a Tool for Snow 
Leopard Conservation in the Pamir Mountains of 
Tajikistan. A thesis submitted to the Faculty 
of the University of Delaware in partial fulfillment of 
the requirements for the degree of Master 
of Science in Wildlife Ecology; 87 pp. 
66 
The Culman Wildlife 
Project(CWP) 
Tanzania  1990 
Wildebeest, Zebra, 
Buffalo and Impala  
INGOs 
Safaris, Tanzania Game Tracker, and Robin Hurt 
Safaris. "The Cullman Reward and Benefits 
Scheme." This volume (1996). 
67 
The Dorobo Tours and Safari 
Projects  
Tanzania  1990 
 Wildebeest, Gazelle, 
Zebra  
Wildlife Department  
Leader Williams, N., Kayera, J. A., & Overton, G. L. 
(1996). Community-based conservation in Tanzania; 
proceedings of a workshop held in February 1994. 
IUCN, Gland (Suiza). Species Survival Commission. 
68 
Oliver’s Camp Community 
Conservation Initiative  
Tanzania  1992 Elephant  Wildlife Department  
Leader Williams, N., Kayera, J. A., & Overton, G. L. 
(1996). Community-based conservation in Tanzania; 
proceedings of a workshop held in February 1994. 




Tanzania  1985 
Zebra, Wildebeest, 
Buffalo And Elephant 
INGO(African Wildlife 
Foundation) 
Kangwana, K., & ole Mako, R. (1998). The impact of 
community conservation initiatives around Tarangire 
National Park (1992-1997). Institute for Development 
Policy and Management, University of Manchester. 
70 






Taurotragus Oryx And 
Zebra Equus Burchellii 
Government  
Infield, M., & Namara, A. (2001). Community 
attitudes and behaviour towards conservation: an 
assessment of a community conservation programme 
around Lake Mburo National Park, 
Uganda. Oryx, 35(1), 48-60. 
71 





Variety of Primates and 
Birds 
Government  
Lepp, A. (2007). Residents’ attitudes towards tourism 
in Bigodi village, Uganda. Tourism 





Uganda 1991 Mountain Gorillas Government  
Hamilton, A., Cunningham, A., Byarugaba, D., & 
Kayanja, F. (2000). Conservation in a region of 
political instability: Bwindi Impenetrable Forest, 
Uganda. Conservation Biology, 14(6), 1722-1725. 
73 
A comparison of attitudes 
toward state-led conservation 
and community-based 
conservation in the 
village of Bigodi 
Uganda 1990 
Baboons, Buffalos and 
Elephants 
Government 
Lepp, A., & Holland, S. (2006). A comparison of 
attitudes toward state-led conservation and 
community-based conservation in the village of 
Bigodi, Uganda. Society and Natural 
Resources, 19(7), 609-623. 
74 
Luangua Integrated Resource 
Development Project(LIRDP 




40%: Management Cost 
35%: Local Community  
25%: Government ) 
Leader Williams, N., Kayera, J. A., & Overton, G. L. 
(1996). Community-based conservation in Tanzania; 
proceedings of a workshop held in February 1994. 
IUCN, Gland (Suiza). Species Survival Commission 
75 Zambia Wetland Project  Zambia 1986 Elephant Ivory WWF/IUCN  
Chabwela, H., & Haller, T. (2010). Governance 
issues, potentials and failures of participative 
collective action in the Kafue Flats, 
Zambia. International Journal of the Commons, 4(2). 
76 
Communal Area Management 
Program for Indigenous 
Resources (CAMPFIRE) 
Zimbabwe 1988 
Elephant Ivory, Zebra, 
Lion,  
Government + INGOs 
(Revenue Distribution 
benefits to Wards: 50% 
local community, 15 % 
government levy & 35% 
Project Maintenance and 
promotion) 
Child, B. (1996). The practice and principles of 
community-based wildlife management in Zimbabwe: 
the CAMPFIRE programme. Biodiversity & 
Conservation, 5(3), 369-398. 
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Savé Valley Conservancy 
(SVC) 
Zimbabwe  1990 
Elephants, Rhinos, 
Buffalo And Lions 
Government 
Lindsey, P.A., et. al. 2008. Savé Valley Conservancy: 
a large scale African experiment in cooperative 
wildlife management. Pages 163-184  
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Bubye Valley Conservancy 
(BVC) 
Zimbabwe 1996 
Lions, African Elephants,  
African Buffalo, Rhinos  
Government  




The Cawston Game Ranch in 
Zimbabwe 
Zimbabwe 1990 
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Communal Lands in Zambezi 
Valley of Zimbabwe 
Zimbabwe 1991 Guineafowl or Duike Government 
Byers, B. A., Cunliffe, R. N., & Hudak, A. T. (2001). 
Linking the conservation of culture and nature: a case 
study of sacred forests in Zimbabwe. Human 




TEACHERS’ MONITORING AND SCHOOLS’
PERFORMANCE: EVIDENCE FROM PUBLIC SCHOOLS
IN PAKISTAN
3.1 Introduction
The recently developed “Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)” emphasize
the need for more rigorous efforts through empirical findings that suggest feasi-
ble courses of actions to improve teaching quality and children learning achieve-
ment (UN, 2018). Despite some success in children enrollment, the overall qual-
ity of education especially at primary and secondary levels has remained the low-
est in South Asian countries such as Pakistan, India and Bangladesh. Recently,
a countrywide survey on educational attainment in India finds 44 percent of the
children aged 7–12 years unable to read a basic paragraph, and 50 percent can-
not do simple subtraction despite increased school enrollment (A. V. Banerjee,
Cole, Duflo, & Linden, 2007). According to Annual Status of Education Re-
port (ASER-Pakistan) which reveals important trends each year covering over
255,000 children from 144 districts, Pakistan continues to be in a state of ed-
ucation emergency and learning lies at the heart of it (ASER, 2016). This is
evident from its recent reports showing 52% surveyed children in grade 5 could
read at story level dipping from 55% in 2015. Similarly, for English it was 46%
(49% in 2015) and for arithmetic, it was 48% in 2016 compared to 50% in 2015.
Also, variation in learning level coincides with a shift from government to pri-
84
vate sector and vice versa across different provinces in the country . In similar
circumstances, as A. V. Banerjee et al. (2007) suggest, policies that only increase
school enrollment may not guarantee learning outcomes. Recent evidence also
support the idea that interventions that only focus on school participation might
not improve test scores for the average student (Abdulkadiroğlu, Pathak, &Wal-
ters, 2018; Burde & Linden, 2013; Duflo, Glennerster, & Kremer, 2007; Malik
et al., 2015; Munene, 2015).
One important component of school environment is the presence of teachers
that influence overall performance of children (A. V. Banerjee & Duflo, 2009;
Glewwe & Kremer, 2006). Teachers’ absence has been a widespread problem
in developing countries particularly in far-flung rural areas. Recent studies in
education research document evidence that increased absence rate of teachers
is strongly related with school and children performance (A. Banerjee & Duflo,
2006; Banerji, Bhattacharjea, & Wadhwa, 2013; Chaudhury, Hammer, Kremer,
Muralidharan, & Rogers, 2006; Duflo & Hanna, 2005).
A number of factors can be found responsible for increased absenteeism
such as distance from school, lack of appropriate incentives (Scott & Wimbush,
1991), ineffective monitoring (Duflo & Hanna, 2005) and other socio-economic
factors (Alcázar et al., 2006). One of the important sources of differential teach-
ers and schools performance is the type of monitoring and administrative over-
sight of schools and the resulting reward and penalty system. For example re-
sources may be spent on hiring and payment to teachers who are absent from
their schools such as the presence of ghost schools (Glewwe & Kremer, 2006).
According to ASER (2015), teachers’ presence was one of the main factors to
account for differences in learning outcomes across public and private schools
in Pakistan. Also, there has been increasing focus by practitioners and develop-
ment researchers on teaching quality and punctuality that has significant direct
and indirect effects on children performance (Duflo et al., 2007; Munene, 2015).
Literature on teacher’s performance indicates that teacher incentives and other
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interventions have larger impact in low performance settings (Murnane, Gan-
imian, et al., 2014). However, considering the high absenteeism in developing
countries, incentives alone may not work unless coupled with effective supervi-
sion of teaching staff particularly in rural areas. In Pakistan’s Punjab province,
a public-private partnership program that offered bonuses for teachers, had lim-
ited effect on children’s test score because such incentives were not effectively
linked with students performance (Barrera-Osorio & Raju, 2015). Similarly,
incentivizing administrative staff such as headmasters in schools without effec-
tive monitoring mechanism may not improve teachers attendance and children
learning (Habib, 2015; Kremer & Chen, 2001). With regard to effectiveness of
monitoringmethods, previous studies suggest different ways of supervision such
as strengthening administrative oversight and community-based supervision to
ensure better teachers’ attendance (Alcázar et al., 2006; Habib, 2015).
Teachers failure to attend schools is mainly due to the lack of capacity of
administration(e.g principle) and the beneficiary(children or local community)
to monitor and penalize absence (Duflo & Hanna, 2005). Although, the head-
masters have power to penalize absence by rules, nevertheless, by virtue of their
close relationships with teachers (who generally belong to local community),
they are unable to enforce penalty or report absence to higher authorities. Re-
sultantly, higher authorities in governments who are responsible for decision
making, lack the real reporting of data from far-flung rural areas or get manipu-
lated records about schools and teachers presence.
A number of reforms initiatives have been proposed for developing countries
that can maximize the quality of learning of enrolled children, reduce dropout
ratio and attract out-of-school children (Hathaway, 2005). The main focus of
these studies remains both on the demand and supply side of education such as
provision of educational facilities, widening access to education and increasing
enrollment in schools etc. (A. V. Banerjee &Duflo, 2009; Jones, Schipper, Ruto,
& Rajani, 2014; Raikes, 2016). With regard to teachers’ availability in schools
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in developing countries, few studies have attempted to investigate the effective-
ness of different policies that are targeted at schools or teachers’ supervision.
These include teachers’ incentive programs such as providing incentives based
on exam score of children, direct monitoring of teachers performance through
camera coupled with high-powered incentives and community-controlled inter-
ventions etc. (Alcázar et al., 2006; Duflo & Hanna, 2005; Scott & Wimbush,
1991). TheWorld Development Report suggests expansion of community-based
monitoring of schools that might strengthen the flow of information between
community and school administration and effectively involving community in
hiring, firing and payment or transfer of teachers (WB, 2018). However, con-
textual evidence on community-based monitoring reflect less effectiveness of
such programs particularly in rural areas (A. Banerjee & Duflo, 2006; Kremer
& Vermeersch, 2005). One important factor is the awareness of local commu-
nity or average education level that might influence the community response to
teachers’ unavailability. In other words, given the overall low education level
in community (more often in developing countries), it is less likely that local
people will realize the consequences of teachers’ absence and its effect on chil-
dren learning. While much has been researched about significance of teacher’s
availability and school facilities, less is known about how to increase teacher’s
attendance especially in rural and remote areas in an effective and cost efficient
way.
This paper takes advantage of data collected by the Annual Status of Educa-
tion Report (ASER)-which is similar to ASER-India and Uwezo in Africa-, to
attempt a natural experiment on a recently introduced government-schools mon-
itoring project by the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa government in Pakistan. We attempt
to find a comparable administrative unit that has not been affected by the policy
yet shares similar socio-economic and demographic characteristics across the
border with the treated administrative unit.
The results discussed in this chapter suggest a number of practical insights.
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First, school performance in terms of teacher’s attendance and availability of fa-
cilities can be increased by increasingmonitoring of schools using professionally
trained monitors and adaptation of latest technology. Second, evidence support
the idea that improving schools performance affect parents and children behav-
ior in terms of sending children to schools and attending schools respectively.
Earlier studies based on natural experiments and randomized evaluations find
mixed results on the effect of monitoring on children’s learning outcomes in
developing countries vis-à-vis indirect incentives and rewards systems. Third,
given the weak public education system in developing countries, monitoring of
schools and teachers should be coupled with appropriate incentive/punishment
mechanism in order to have a lasting impact on children performance. Finally,
we argue that there is scope for the use of nationally representative surveys in
conducting natural experiments for assessing the impact of education programs
carried out by sub-national governments in developing countries.
The following section gives a brief account of the education system in Pak-
istan, its short history and major problems that hinder the road to achieving qual-
ity education. The 3rd section provides a detailed description of the monitoring
program and its implementation procedure. Section 4 outlines theoretical frame-
work in the light of previous works. Experimental design and its key conditions
are discussed in section 5. Section 6 describes the data, section 7 details the em-
pirical strategy followed by results and discussion in section 8. The last section
concludes.
3.2 Gaps in Pakistan’s Education System
Being the sixth largest country in the World, Pakistan inhabits population of
around 210 million of which 64% is below the age of 30 (UNDP, 2018). De-
spite significant decline in fertility level in recent years, Pakistan’s population is
still growing at a rate of 2% per year, highest in South Asia (WB, 2018). Ac-
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cording to Burki (2005), those less than 18 years old will account for about 50%
of total population in 2030. This represents a big challenge as a significant pro-
portion of young people will be poorly educated and inadequately skilled in case
the successive governments fail to launch and implement ambitious education
reforms.
To understand the structure of education system in Pakistan, it is important
to dig into its history that started in the late 1940s. For the first 25 years (1947 to
1970), Pakistan’s education system was relatively efficient, not much different
from its neighboring India. Dominated by public sector, education departments
in provinces were responsible for administering primary and secondary schools
and colleges with a public sector teachers training schools and colleges. For
several decades, the number of private schools was small within the system of
education. However, after the denationalization in 1990s, the private schooling
became another major source of education at the lower level particularly for the
elite class of society.
Currently, the large public education system starts with primary schools at
the lower level (0 to 5 grades), then secondary and high schools, and autonomous
public funded universities at the highest level. Over the years, the amount of bud-
get spent on public education has been one the lowest compared to other coun-
tries for various reasons. The World Bank’s latest estimates show Pakistan’s
spending on education nearly 4.9% of its GDP with about 30% spending on pri-
mary education. According to Pakistan’s Economic Survey, the overall literacy
rate is 58%with male 70% and female 48% (MOF, 2017). In other words, nearly
one-half of the women cannot read or write while this gap is much higher in rural
areas. Solutions proposed for reforming the public education include incentives
for parents and children, increasing the proportion of public resources going into
education sector, diversion of more funds towards primary schooling and invest-
ment in teachers’ training and improving the quality of schools and curriculum
(Hathaway, 2005).
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Pakistan continues to suffer from slower growth in key socio-economic indi-
cators reflected by the human development report as compared to its neighboring
countries such as India and Bangladesh (UNDP, 2016). Low education quality,
both at primary and secondary level is at the centre of many problems that the
country face in almost all regions. According to a study by International growth
Centre (ICG), in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa(KP) province (the focus of this paper)
in 2012-13, only 63% of 4-9 years old children were enrolled in schools with
a much lower (56%) female enrollment (Habib, 2015). For higher grades, the
net enrollment is even worst. For example, for middle schools, the net enroll-
ment was hardly 40% reflecting a significant dropout or no-enrollment during
the middle school age group (11 to 15 years). Similarly, teacher’s absenteeism
rate was 16% for primary, 21% for middle, and 17% for high schools indicating
unavailability of teaching service at a critical school age. With regard to learn-
ing achievements, the entire country including KP province faces alarmingly
low performance. Out of surveyed enrolled children, only 40% of grade-5 chil-
dren could answer the second-grade level mathematics and language questions.
From the supply side of education, the KP province employs nearly 55% of the
civil servants in education department with a significant number of teachers. In
other words, teachers make up at around 75% of the 180,000 employees overall
in elementary and secondary education department. To what extent this chunk of
employment has been effective is the policy question that motivates this study.
Recently, as part of the constitutional amendments, Pakistan has devolved
most of administrative and fiscal decision making to the provinces. In this
devolved setting, provinces are autonomous in reforming their education sec-
tors to improve the dismal conditions of schools and teachers quality and chil-
dren learning. The establishment of an Independent Monitoring Unit (IMU) is
one such initiative taken by the provincial government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
(KP) province that aims at monitoring teachers and schools performance through
trained monitors equipped with smart-phone aided facility(section 3 provide
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more details on IMU). According to ICG’s analysis on the IMU school level
data in 2014, there was significant variation in teacher’s attendance and student
attendance rates at the primary and secondary level (Habib, 2015). Also, large
variation in school sizemeasured as enrollment of children and teachers-students
ratio were identified. Exploiting this variation, the same study by applying a
statistical model, finds significantly positive effect of teachers attendance and
school infrastructure on the children enrollment rates.
With the exception of seven districts-in hard areas7 - where additional in-
centives are offered, the KP government has a uniform incentive structure for
teachers similar to other provinces of Pakistan. Moreover, to improve girl’s ed-
ucation, the KP government gives additional allowances for female education
supervisors to increase their inspections to schools. Similarly, to attract girls en-
rollment, the KP government offers stipend program for secondary students for
selected districts with low enrollment. Also, in two districts, special scholarships
are offered for girls for their enrollment in schools (e.g Kohistan and Torghar).
A detailed review of the KP government civil service rules carried out by ICG’s
research shows the presence of a number of direct and indirect incentives for
improvement in teacher’s attendance and students learning (Habib, 2015). How-
ever, these incentives were not properly linked with government objectives of
improving education outcomes. The review further finds that promotion and
up-gradation procedures, performance evaluation and transfer policies were not
realistically linked with teacher’s attendance measurements or student perfor-
mance in exams, suggesting the need for a more objective criteria for measuring
teacher’s performance.
7Currently, seven districts i.e., Kohistan, Battagram, Tor Ghar, Dir Lower, Dir Upper,
Shangla and Tank have been identified as “hard areas” for girls’ schools (Habib, 2015)
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3.3 Program Description
In struggle for quality improvement in education sector, in 2014, the Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa (KP) provincial government took an important initiative of estab-
lishing a landmark project, Independent Monitoring Unit (IMU), for monitoring
teachers and schools performance through trainedmonitors equippedwith smart-
phone aided facility. The project was aimed at monitoring and data collection for
over 28,000 public sector primary and secondary schools in the province. The
basic objective of the IMU was to ensure presence of teachers through effective
monitoring besides collection and compilation of data on basic schools facili-
ties such as electricity, boundary wall, toilets, and furniture etc. The specific
objectives of the project included, collection of data on the presence of teachers
in school, number of children enrolled, schools facilities, availability of school
administration and other school related information.
Lunched formally in April 2014, the IMU’s mandate was to monitor over
28,000 schools with over 121,618 government appointed teachers across the
province. The implementation of IMU project needed quite laborious work as
the KP province is geographically characterized with rugged terrain and dis-
persed population in rural areas(figure 3.1). Also, over the last 18 years, the ed-
ucation sectors in KP province and it’s neighboring federally administered tribal
areas, have been a direct target of terrorism resulting into destruction of hundreds
of schools particularly girls school and killing of several teachers including fe-
male teachers. The IMU program conducts monitoring using both human efforts
and technology for keeping external control while dealing with shirking teachers
and school administration.
The IMU hired 550 Data Collection and Monitoring Assistants (DCMAs or
monitors) and subsequently appointed them in every district of KP province.
Their job is to visit randomly to government schools located within assigned ad-
ministrative clusters (at least one time each month to each school). The assign-
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ment of clusters rotate clock-wise on monthly basis to minimize the possibility
of relationship-bias. For example, the monitor who inspected cluster-A in Jan-
uary, will inspect cluster-B in February and so on. Each DCMA is required to
visit at least 3 to 4 schools every day in schooling-hour to collect data. They
are not allowed to share any prior information with schools or teachers about
their scheduled visits. Upon inspection of the school, DCMAs are required to
send attendance status of teachers (confirmed with their thumb-impression) to
the central office through GPRS system installed in their smart-phone. The per-
formance of DCMAs is in turn supervised by the District Monitoring Officers
(DMOs) appointed one for each district across the province (H. Altaf8 , inter-
view, October 2018).
The IMU operation is based on IT application by trained monitors follow-
ing a structured protocol provided by the provincial independent monitoring au-
thority. The DCMAs collect data by physically verifying various school-based
indicators after visiting the school in his/her designated area. The DCMAs then
upload information directly to the database of IMU using a prescribed question-
naire designed by the Elementary and Secondary Education Department (E&
SED) of the KP province. The DCMAs use a special android application for
conducting various checks and filtering techniques to ensure provision of accu-
rate data. The data sent by DCMAs to the database is further analyzed by IMU’s
IT team using various statistical tools to help make incentive (reward and pun-
ishment) decisions and take other necessary actions. So far, according to IMU
officials, prizes worth 220million Rupees have been distributed under the Teach-
ers Incentive Program (TIP) among teachers that have higher attendance record.
The IMU data was utilized in deciding on TIP criteria. However, with regard
to penalty of low performing teachers, there is no such record of punishment or
any decision whatsoever.
8A personal Interview was conducted online with Mr. Ataf Hussain, IMU official at Dis-
trict Shangla of KP Province to obtain information about the organizational structure and job
description of IMU monitors and their appointment methodology.
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So far, the government reports suggests that teachers attendance and punc-
tuality have improved significantly ever-since the launch of the IMU, however,
there is no empirical evidence about the impact of the extent to which the IMU
has increased teachers attendance and students’ academic performance. This
proposed research therefore will be a significant contribution towards genuine
evaluation of this project.
 
Figure 3.1: District wise Map of KP and FATA
3.4 Theoretical Framework
Analogous to the famous production function in economics which is used to
model how inputs are transformed into output by a firm, an education produc-
tion function can be designed to reflect how specific inputs into a child’s envi-
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ronment affect learning achievements (Koedel, Betts, et al., 2007). Literature
in education research divides inputs of education production function into three
types; individual child-related inputs, household-related and school-related in-
puts. From the individual child perspective, factors such as natural aptitude,
motivation and vigor to work, maturity, gender and physiological characteris-
tics etc. may affect his/her learning achievement (Todd & Wolpin, 2003). From
the household perspective, factors that affect child’s education include, parents-
related characteristics such as education, health and motivation etc., household
socio-economic conditions and environment for learning. The third (probably
more important) type of inputs is the school quality that greatly influence chil-
dren learning and educational attainment. A combination of school-related fac-
tors such as teachers’ quality, school environment and size, infrastructure, peer
groups, distance from home etc. may have direct or indirect effect on child’s
performance.
To understand the impact of certain education policy on learning outcomes,
Glewwe and Kremer (2006) suggest the use of household(the parents of child)
utility function, subject to certain constraints. The main arguments of this utility
function are the consumption of goods and services at different points in time
(including leisure), and each child’s years of school and learning. The constraints
faced by household are the production function for learning, the impact of years
of schooling and learning capacity on the future labor income of a child, life-
cycle budget constraint, and some other constraints for which child labor is one
of the possible input.
The production function for learning is hence a structural relationship repre-
sented as the following:
A = α(S,Q,C,H, I) (3.1)
Where A represent skills learned(achievement), S shows the years of schooling,
Q represents a vector of school-related characteristics or quality, C is a vector
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of child-related characteristics (e.g age, gender etc.), H represents a vector of
household characteristics, I is a vector of educational inputs by parents such as
spending on text books and private tuition etc. For simplicity purpose, let’s as-
sume that only one school is available to each household and that parents cannot
change the characteristics of that school. In other words, Q is exogenous to the
household. Given this condition, household (parents) can maximize utility by
choosing years of school S and educational inputs I. This implies that S and I
can be considered as a function of four exogenous variables. This relationship
is represented by the following equations:
S = f(Q,C,H) (3.2)
I = g(Q,C,H) (3.3)
We insert (3.2) and (3.3) into (3.1) to get the reduced form of the production
function for learning :
A = h(Q,C,H) (3.4)
Education policy makers are primarily interested in evaluating the impact of ed-
ucation policies on academic achievement A. In doing so, consider a change in
one element of school quality such as a policy that increase teachers presence in
school (the focus of this study), equation (3.1) shows how such changes in school
quality might affect children learning skills when all other explanatory variables
are held constant. In other words, such an effect is termed partial derivative
of A with respect to Q. However, equation (3.4) will give us the total deriva-
tive of A with respect to Q, because it allows for changes in S and I (and may
be other factors) in response to change in Q. For example parents may respond
to increase in teachers’ punctuality by increasing their spending on children or
changing decisions on dropout. Alternatively, parents might reduce their spend-
ing or attention if they think better school quality is a substitute for their input.
For example Das, Dercon, Habyarimana, and Krishnan (2004) find that parents
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cut back their expenditures when schools were provided grants by government.
While examining education policies, whether estimation of total or partial rela-
tionship is useful is an important question. Glewwe and Kremer (2006) suggest
the use of equation (3.4) because it shows what will actually happen to A after
a change in one or more component in school quality or prices. Using equation
(3.1) would be inefficient for it does not account for changes in factors such as
years of schooling and parent’s input decisions. Nevertheless, the use of partial
derivative through (3.1) is also of interest for it enables us to capture the overall
welfare effects. For example, if parents reduce spending in response to school
quality, they might raise their spending on any other consumer good. In this sce-
nario, equation (3.4) might not capture increase in household welfare. Glewwe
(2004) argues that any potential factors that have opposing effects on household
welfare would cancel each other out, and hence change in learning skills A using
equation (3.1) can enable us to reasonably approximate overall welfare effect.
In this study, we extend the framework suggested by Glewwe and Kremer
(2006), to examine the schools monitoring program(the main focus of which is
teachers’ attendance) that affects the schooling outcomes. School quality can be
measured by a number of school-related indicators. Policy changes into those
indicators can bring about significant differences in school quality if carefully
designed and implemented. Our main premise is that increasing external over-
sight of teachers and administration through monitoring program (MP) is likely
to change the behavior of teachers (as a core component of Q).We further assume
that such a large scale program might interact with local community character-
istics (denoted by L) to determine the quality of schools in the form of equation
(3.5).
Q = q(L,MP ) (3.5)
Our first research questions is related to one of the key indicators of school qual-
ity e.g teacher’s attendance. Lack of effective supervision of school-staff and
relevant facilities often lead to negative consequences in the form of children
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enrollment, attendance, dropout and parents’ behaviors associated with school-
aged children. Some studies indicate, grade repetition and leaving school at an
early age are common due to teachers unavailability in the schools (Glewwe &
Kremer, 2006). Subsequently, we substitute equation (3.5) into (3.4) to obtain
the reduced form relationship as the following:
A = h(C,H,L,MP ) (3.6)
Equation (3.6) enables us to estimate the functional relationship of monitoring
program with the outcome variables of our interests (e.g. learning). Given the
limited resources spent on education in developing countries such as Pakistan,
availability of teachers in schools affect the availability of other schools’ re-
sources. For example, teachers’ availability leads to children availability and
other staff presence which helps ensuring the availability and maintenance of
facilities at the school. Similarly, unavailability of schools facilities such as text-
books, blackboards, furniture’s, boundary wall and library etc. may affect par-
ents and children attitude towards school’s environment. For example, in rural
and far-flung desserts such as Tharparker region in Sindh and South Punjab, and
mountainous regions of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Pakistan, lack of proper physical
facilities, poor construction or no availability of school building and furniture
are commonly reported problems that lead to low enrollment and high dropout
ratio (Hathaway, 2005). In some parts of Pakistan, survey reports reveal cases
where teachers may be paid but nonetheless they are absent from their schools
(Hathaway, 2005; Malik et al., 2015). Also, funds allocated for certain facilities
such as books and furniture never get utilized in reality leading to inefficient
allocation of budget spent on education.
If teachers input and school environment is critical for children performance,
then understanding the functional relationship in equation (3.6) is important.
Thus our second research question is related to examining how inputs such as
school and teachers’ quality affect a child’s learning achievement as measured
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by a standard ability test.
From a general equilibrium view point, increase in human capital is the ob-
vious output of an education production function. Economists measure such an
output in the form ofwage returns, contribution to economy through skilled labor
and rate of returns etc. in the long run (Bukowitz, Williams, & Mactas, 2004).
However, in the short run, since the child is still in school, the output could be
measured as cognitive achievement through ability tests in different subjects of
interests which could be used as important antecedents for all such attributes of
individual that may contribute to the productivity of students once they join the
labor force.
3.5 Experimental Design
This study aims at estimating the effect of the IMU program introduced by the
KP provincial government in Pakistan on school quality measured in the form of
teacher’s attendance on one hand, and on children learning outcomes measured
through ability tests in three subjects e.g reading, math and english, on the other
hand. To do so, it is important to use a model that truly identifies the causal effect
of the IMU program. Literature on impact evaluation methodologies suggests
several tools to estimate the impact of a policy intervention in education sector
on student’s achievement and school quality (Abdulkadiroğlu et al., 2018; Alcott
& Rose, 2015; Burde & Linden, 2013; Card & Krueger, 2000; Croke, 2014; Du-
flo et al., 2007; Malik et al., 2015; Munene, 2015). The focus of these studies is
to know the likely impacts of various policy interventions on students’ academic
achievements. Recently, randomized control trials (RCTs) have been considered
the most effective design to find causal effect particularly in developing coun-
tries. For example incentive program linked with teachers presence measured
through camera photograph with children in randomly selected schools in India
byDuflo andHanna (2005) reduced teachers absence significantly and improved
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test score. Similarly, in a randomized trial in Nicaragua, radio instructions had
significant impacts on pupils’ math score (Jamison, Searle, Galda, & Heyne-
man, 1981). In Kenya, randomized experiment of provision of school meals
was found to have positive impact on test score as long as teachers were well
trained (Kremer&Vermeersch, 2005). In a remedial education program in urban
India that focused on improving learning environment in government schools,
increased test scores was observed at a reasonably low cost (A. V. Banerjee et al.,
2007). Also in India, a computer-assisted learning program suggests potential
positive impact on students’ learning achievement (A. V. Banerjee et al., 2007).
However, besides other challenges such as implementation etc., one of the big
limitations associated with such experiments is their high cost of implementa-
tion.
The second most credible design in recent impact evaluation literature is nat-
ural experiment. In the absence of random assignment of subjects, one can ex-
ploit variation caused by any policy change that is exogenous in nature. In such
cases, the simplest way of calculating the causal effect is using “difference-in-
difference” (DiD) method, by comparing pre-program difference with the post-
program difference between treated and untreated groups. Evidence from recent
natural experiments in low and middle income countries suggests a positive im-
pact of increasing school quality on students’ academic performance, despite
extensive variation in different contexts. These experiments include(but are
not limited to) impact evaluation of primary school environments on secondary
school outcomes using data on Ethiopian Jews by Gould, Lavy, and Paserman
(2004) and impact of class size on student academic performance in Israel us-
ing Maimonides’ Rule by J. D. Angrist and Lavy (1999) etc. Results of natural
experiments vary by context and by subjects owing to a number of reasons. For
example, a natural experiment using Israeli data shows reducing class size raises
reading score but not math score, while providing computers has no effect on
academic performance (J. Angrist, Bettinger, Bloom, King, & Kremer, 2002).
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One big challenge of such experimental designs is the availability of control (un-
treated) group that satisfies all conditions for an ideal comparison. For example,
in the context of school’ monitoring program, one needs to have schools that
are not directly or indirectly affected by the policy targeted for treated schools.
Another challenge is to find schools that share similar characteristics with the
treated schools before the intervention. In cases where the outcome variables
between the treated and untreated subjects vary before the interventions, stud-
ies attempt to mitigate this challenge by adopting the common trend assumption
conditional with availability of data.
Recently, the two stage least square (2SLS) or instrumental variables (IV) is
adopted as an alternative approach to estimating the impact of education policy
interventions. According to this approach, a variable is used as an instrument
which may or may not arise from natural experiment, but is correlated with the
endogenous variable and uncorrelated with the unobserved factors that might
affect the outcome variable (e.g child’s learning). In IV estimation, the common
variation between the instrument and the endogenous variable is exploited in
estimating the effect of certain variable of interest (Wooldridge, 2013). Despite
its convincing power in explaining education production function, finding a good
instrument is often a challenge.
While natural experiments (and randomized trails) are meant to create a pool
of such results that are less likely to suffer from estimation problems, devel-
opment economists stress the need for a much larger set of results on a more
representative sample of population before reaching a general conclusion. Nev-
ertheless, in many developing countries, natural experiments and randomized
control tails are considered the most effective means for improving school qual-
ity through addressing the problems associated with teachers’ behavior (Glewwe
& Kremer, 2006).
Understanding the impact of policies that affect teachers’ behaviors is crit-
ical particularly in the context of developing countries that suffer from higher
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absenteeism. Considering the exogenous nature of IMU program introduction
in KP province Pakistan, we attempt to exploit an annually representative sur-
vey data produced by the Annual Status of Education Report (ASER) to conduct
a natural experiment. It is known that the purpose of ASER data collection is
unrelated with the IMU program in all aspects whatsoever. We attempt to find a
comparable administrative unit that has not been affected by the policy yet shares
similar socio-economic and demographic characteristics across the border with
the treated administrative unit. We test this by conducting a pre-program trend
analysis on all variables used in our estimations.
3.6 Data
Out main data source is the 5 years country wide Annual Status of Education
Report (ASER) Pakistan survey, from 2012 to 2016. The ASER9 is frequently
cited in reference to teachers attendance, children enrollment and attendance,
learning ability, private school enrollment, and other key education indicators
by renowned researchers (Banerji et al., 2013; French, Kingdon, et al., 2010;
Jones et al., 2014; Zaka, 2018). ASER is the large scale citizen-led, household
based initiative managed by Idara-e-Taleem-Aagahi (ITA)-Pakistan in partner-
ship with a number of governmental and non-governmental organizations, to
provide reliable data on the status of primary and secondary education in all rural
and few urban districts of Pakistan. Each year, ASER conducts a comprehensive
assessment on the state of learning, school performance, and other indicators of
primary and secondary education throughout rural Pakistan. Mobilizing more
than 10,000 volunteers each year, the survey covers 600 household in each of
Pakistan’s 136 districts yielding a large national dataset of 81600 households
and around 286,000 children per year. Table 3.1 provides year wise coverage
of ASER data for KP and FATA (the target of our study). The ASER household
survey include learning tests performed by children at home while a separate
9ASER-Pakistan survey is similar to ASER-India(Pratham) and the Uwezo surveys in Africa.
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survey of government and private schools is conducted in sample villages.
The ASER sampling framework is systematic and well designed. For ex-
ample, each district is provided with a village list with population information
given by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). In view of variability in key
variables, population distribution and field resources, ASER selects a sample of
600 households from each district. Each district is further divided into 30 vil-
lages whereas 20 household are selected from each village. The ASER adopts
two stage sampling design. In the first stage 30 villages are selected using prob-
ability proportional to size (PPS) method. In the second stage, 20 household10
are selected from each of the 30 selected villages. Village is considered as the
primary sampling unit, while household is treated as secondary sampling unit.
Every year, the ASER survey retains 20 villages from previous year, 10 new
villages are added and 10 villages are dropped from the previous year. With re-
gard to schools selection, ASER choose at least one government school which is
mandatory (could be more than one) and one private school form each selected
village. (ASER, 2015, 2016).
Table 3.1: ASER Survey Coverage (2012 to 2016) for KP and FATA
Survey Coverage  2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
  KP FATA KP FATA KP FATA KP FATA KP FATA  
No. of Districts  23 9 25 9 27 9 26 11 24 9 
No. of Villages  688 270 763 265 789 270 769 330 704 270 
No. of Households  13,702 5,375 15,144 5,271 15,663 5,369 15,032 6,544 13,807 5,390 
No. of Children  41,003 18,529 46,877 18,722 49,473 18,743 46,045 22,890 41,804 17,753 
Notes: The number of districts covered each year in KP and FATA are not equal because of two reasons. First, coverage in 
districts which were affected by military operation against extremist groups such as Mohmand Agency was skipped in 2012. 
Secondly, districts where the ASER team couldn’t reach due to other administrative difficulties such as district Kohistan were 
also skipped. However, the number of missing district each year ranges between 1 and 4.   
 
The primary strength of ASER dataset is its enormous sample size of chil-
dren aged 5 to 16 years, households, government schools and private school
related information across all districts in rural Pakistan that provides a clear pic-
ture of the state of schooling across the country. Secondly, the ASER learning
tests which are well organized and carefully designed and conducted at home
10ASER divides each selected village into four parts: Surveyors are required to start from the
central location and pick every 5th household in a circular fashion till 5 households are selected
from each part (ASER, 2016).
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provide an opportunity to analyze children’s ability without any potential school
bias. Testing at school often carries a potential bias when teachers push more
competent students forward during the survey. This feature of ASER testing al-
lows us to be more confident about the validity and findings on learning tests.
Moreover, ASER household survey collects data on all potential child-related
and household related socio-economic variables that might affect learning abil-
ity such as age, gender, enrollment status, school status(government or private),
current grade, tuition facility, house-condition and ownership and parents’ edu-
cation etc. Table 3.2 and 3.3 show the summary statistics of the 5 years ASER
surveys annual data pooled form 2012 to 2016. The third important feature of
ASER survey is its systematic coding of districts, villages, households, and chil-
dren identification (IDs) that allows us to apply fixed effect models to control for
any group-specific unobserved characteristics. Finally, the ASER provides suf-
ficient baseline datasets that enable us to conduct pre-treatment and falsification
test on all relevant factors affecting school based and children related outcome.
3.7 Empirical Strategy
The unique setting of the study area, the launching of monitoring program and
ASER survey give us an opportunity to conduct a form of natural experiment.
It is known that the monitoring project, IMU, was launched in the middle of
April, 2014 across all districts of KP province. In Pakistan, two months summer
vacations are observed every year from mid-June to mid-August. During the
vacations, teachers are not required to attend schools. The ASER collects data
in September each year. In this way, considering the starting date of the program
and summer vacations, it is less likely that theASER data collected in September,
2014 has captured the program impact for two months. During the first two
months at the outset of the program (from mid-April to mid-June), a large scale
program is less likely to be fully operationalized.
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Table 3.2: Government and Private Schools Summary (2012-16) pooled
  Government Schools   Private Schools 
Variables  KP FATA   KP FATA  
Primary School(1 to 5) 0.655 0.789  0.272 0.208 
Middle School Type A(1 to 8) 0.048 0.093  0.286 0.283 
Middle School Type B(6 to 8) 0.095 0.003  - - 
High School Type A(1 to 10) 0.089 0.107  0.397 0.487 
High School Type B(6-to-10) 0.157 0.005  - - 
All other school types 0.006 0.004  0.042 0.021 
Average Enrollment of Children  230.755 155.404  293.698 386.779 
Average Children Attendance  153.279 131.903  261.715 342.863 
Average No. of Teachers Appointed 7.724 5.019  12.885 11.696 
Average No. of Teachers Present 6.687 4.477  11.145 10.788 
Student teacher ratio 38.468 39.145  25.434 33.56 
Teachers-Attendance Ratio 0.875 0.897  0.919 0.906 
Children Attendance Ratio 0.844 0.826  0.867 0.889 
Laboratory Available(yes=1) 0.208 0.086  0.405 0.346 
Compute Lab Available(Yes=1) 0.065 0.035  0.263 0.096 
Internet Availability  0.03 0.007  0.19 0.05 
      
N  (No. of Schools surveyed)  3618 1386  1718 240 
Notes: Table 3.2 reports data from ASER government and private school surveys (pooled from 2012 to 2016).  
Values on school types and facilities represent the mean percentage of the surveyed schools. Student-teachers 
ratio, teacher’s attendance ratio and children attendance ratio represents average ratio on corresponding 
variables. E.g. Teachers Attendance Ratio is calculated as no. of teachers present/total appointed teachers. 
Similarly, Children-Attendance Ratio is calculated as no. of children present/total enrollment in the surveyed 
school. KP stands for Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province representing the treatment group while and FATA 
represents the control group called Federally Administered Tribal Areas. Middle schools type B and Higher 
schools type B do not apply for private schools.  
 
Table 3.3: Children Related Summary-2012-16(Pooled)
 Variables  KP FATA 
Demographic Characteristics   
Child Age 9.038 8.438 
Gender(Female=1)  0.397 0.37 
Child Enrollment Status   
Child Enrollment Status(Yes=1) 0.755 0.675 
Child Dropped Out(Yes=1) 0.034 0.033 
Child School Type    
Child Enrolled in Government School(Yes=1) 0.518 0.481 
Child Enrolled in Private School(Yes=1) 0.218 0.168 
Child Enrolled in Other Schools(Yes=1) 0.014 0.024 
Household Socio-Economic Conditions    
Private Tutoring(Yes=1) 0.072 0.05 
House Ownership(Yes=1) 0.896 0.917 
House Construction Weak(Yes=1) 0.348 0.544 
House Construction Semi-Strong(Yes=1) 0.329 0.297 
House Construction Strong(Yes=1) 0.323 0.158 
Electricity Connection Available(Yes=1) 0.892 0.882 
Mobile service Available(Yes=1) 0.841 0.687 
TV Available(Yes=1) 0.512 0.406 
Parents Information    
Father Age 41.004 39.38 
Father Ever Attended the School 0.585 0.51 
Father Years of Education  5.847 4.57 
Mother Age 35.635 35.252 
Mother Ever  Attended the School 0.274 0.117 
Mother Years of Education  2.202 0.77 
   
N    (No. of Children surveyed aged 3-16 years) 225202 96637 
Notes: Table 3.3 reports summary of the main variables from ASER- household survey (pooled from 2012-
to-2016). Age-related variables and years of education represent average years while all other variables are 
dummies representing the average percentages of the surveyed units.  KP stands for Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 
Province representing the treatment group while and FATA represents the control group called Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas.  
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Figure 3.2 shows the time-line and ASER data collection from 2012 to 2016.
Given this context, we do not have reason to consider year 2014 as a post-
program period and expect the effect to take place in 2015. Our treatment period
therefore consists of two years (2015 till 2016) in the selected districts. By the
same token, considering 2014 as pre-program period is also likely to bias our
estimate, given the launch of the program in April, 2014. Although, we present
results of 2014 as pre-program (in Appendix C) for checking any possible dif-
ference, we rely on 2012 to 2013 as pre-program in our main results.
Apr Aug Dec Apr Aug Dec Apr Aug Dec Apr Aug Dec Apr Aug Dec
ASER-1 ASER-2 ASER-3 ASER-4 ASER-5
2013 2014 2015 2016
IMU
Pre Program Post Program
Vacation
2012
Figure 3.2: Time line of ASER Data Collection and the Launch of IMU
3.7.1 The Model
Our main outcome variable in the first place is whether the intervention program
has increased teacher’s attendance in government schools in KP province.
We hold the following assumptions to carry out diff-in-diff analysis in the
given settings:
• The primary, and secondary education system in FATA is same as the
KP due to the Examination Systems conducted by designated Education
Boards11.
• There is no significant difference in teacher’s attendance and children per-
formance between KP and FATA before the IMU introduction.
11Education boards are constitutional bodies responsible for implementing school curriculum,
conducting and supervising annual examinations and declaring results of government and private
schools under their jurisdiction. All boards are located in KP province but consists of districts
under its jurisdiction both in KP and FATA. In total, there are 8 Education Boards in KP province.
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• FATA and KP share similar characteristics in terms of social, economic,
geographic, and cultural conditions and population density etc.
• Our treatment period consists of two years (2015 till 2016) in the KPwhile
the Pre-Treatment period consists of two years from 2012 to 2013. Year
2014 in our main analysis is considered as period of implementation.
We estimate the effect of monitoring program on school outcomes using the
following equation:
Yidt = β0 + β1Monitoringidt + β2Xidt + αd + Tt + ϵidt (3.7)
Where,
Yidt represents outcome on surveyed government school i in district d in time t.
Monitoringidt is an interaction of treatment districts and post-year t.
e.g. Monitoringidt=1 if school i belongs to district d of KP province & t = 2015
or 2016 (School is exposed to monitoring program) and 0 otherwise
Xidt is a vector of school level controls.
αd is the district fixed effect.
Tt is year fixed effect.
ϵidt is error term clustered at village(=school) level
In a similar fashion the children test performance is estimated by the follow-
ing equation:
Yigdt = β0 + β1Monitoringigdt + β2Xigdt + αd + Tt +Gg + ϵigdt (3.8)
Where,
Yigdt represents normalized test score of surveyed child i in district d in grade g
at time t.
Monitoringigdt is an interaction of treatment districts and post-year t.
e.g. Monitoringigdt=1 if Child i of grade g belongs to district d of of KP
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Province & t = 2015 or 2016 (Child is exposed to monitoring program) and
0 otherwise.
Xidt is a vector of child related and household related controls.
αd is the district fixed effect.
Tt is the year fixed effect.
Gg individual grades’ fixed effect.
ϵidt is error term clustered at village(=school) level.
3.7.2 Pre-Program Trend in KP and FATA
We take advantage of the pre-program data to test the common trend assump-
tion - the outcome in treatment and control group would follow the same trend
in the absence of the treatment. The results suggest that teacher’s attendance
on average did not vary significantly between treatment and control before the
policy was introduced. The same is true for children test performance. Table 3.4
and 3.5 present the pre-program trends between KP and FATA on our main out-
come variables, teacher’s attendance and children standardized test scores re-
spectively. The coefficient of the interaction term(pre-program diff) shows that
after controlling for observed factors such as schools’ existing teaching quality,
training quality, school age and size, the difference between KP and FATA in
terms of teachers attendance ratio is not statistically significant in 2013 as well
as in 2014. A similar common trend was observed between KP and FATA on
normalized test score of children as shown in table 3.5. We observe that, on aver-
age, coefficient of the interaction term of the normalized score for reading, math
and english in lower grades (0 to 5) is not statistically significant indicating sim-
ilar performance of KP children with FATA children in terms of these subjects.
This is in line with previous studies that indicated lower performance of both KP
province and FATA compared to the country-average in terms of basic reading
ability at lower grades. With regard to education sector reforms, a close analysis
of the recent government decisions in KP and FATA shows that during these five
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years period, there was no significant policy intervention other than education
reforms that mainly focused on teachers attendance, school infrastructure and
oversight (Habib, 2015; Zaka, 2018).
Table 3.4: Pre-Program Trend, Teachers Attendance Ratio
Dep. Var:  Teachers Attendance Ratio  Year=2013 Year=2014 
   
Pre-Program Diff (Treatment*Post) 0.0264 -0.0201 
 (0.0230) (0.0173) 
School Teaching Quality 0.0359 0.0327** 
 (0.0225) (0.0166) 
School Training Quality 0.00330 0.0223 
 (0.0268) (0.0185) 
Urban 0.160*** 0.0953* 
 (0.0587) (0.0554) 
Old schools 0.00565 -0.00121 
 (0.0138) (0.0103) 
School Size 0.0861 0.128*** 
 (0.0579) (0.0423) 
School Facilities  YES YES 
District FE YES YES 
Year FE YES YES 
   
Constant 0.706*** 0.745*** 
 (0.0510) (0.0426) 
   
Observations 1,933 2,967 
Adj. R-squared 0.074 0.060 
Notes: The table reports Pre-Program difference between KP province (treatment) and FATA 
(control) on teacher’s attendance. Column (1) represent year=2013 vs Pre=2012 while column (2) 
represent Post=2014 vs Pre=2012-13.  The outcome variable is the ratio of teachers present in 
school to the total appointed teachers. Variable Pre-Program Diff is a typical diff-in-diff interaction 
of to-be-treated province (KP) and Post (year =2013 in column (1) and year=2014 in column (2)). 
Due to District and year fixed effect applied in each regression, we do not include variables for 
treatment and posts. Variables School Teaching Quality and School Training Quality are 
continuous variables showing the ratio of teachers with master’s degree and specific training level 
to the total appointed teachers in each school.  School Facilities controls include availability of 
water, boundary, toilet, library, playground, laboratory, computer and internet. School Size is a 
continuous variable representing the ratio of children enrolled in surveyed school to the school 
with highest number of enrolled children.  The data is taken from the ASER-Pakistan School 
Survey.  Standard errors clustered at village level are shown in parentheses. The unit of observation 
is the surveyed government school. Statistical significance at the 1, 5, 10% levels are indicated by 
***, **, and *, respectively.     
 
In conducting pre-program analysis of children test performance, we control
for all possible observed child-specific characteristics such as age, gender, par-
ents education, household size and dummies for house ownership and facilities.
We also conduct a pre-treatment analysis on upper grade children and including
2014 as pre-program (see Appendix C for results). Overall, the trend is similar
in all subjects except lower performance in normalized english score of children
belonging to treatment province in upper grades.
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Table 3.5: Pre-Program Trend, Normalized Test Score
 Normalized Test Score  
  Lower Grades-(0-to -5) 
 Reading Math English 
    
Pre-Prog Diff (KP*Year13) -0.0354 -0.0442 -0.0435 
 (0.148) (0.148) (0.155) 
    
Child -Related Controls  Yes Yes Yes 
Parents Education Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Household Characteristics Dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
    
District FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Grade FE Yes Yes Yes 
       
Constant -0.662*** -0.562*** -0.452*** 
 (0.119) (0.125) (0.130) 
    
Observations 19,757 19,659 19,608 
Adj. R-squared 0.023 0.022 0.019 
Notes: Table 3.5 reports the pre-program difference using diff-in-diff estimates on the children test performance for Post=2013 
vs Pre=2012 using the ASER Household Survey data. Standard errors clustered at village level are shown in parentheses. The 
unit of observation is surveyed 3 to 16 year’s old child enrolled in government school from Grade-0 to grade-5. The dependent 
variable is the test score normalized by grade. The pre-program difference is a typical diff-in-diff interaction of to-be-treated 
province (KP) and Year 2013. Fixed Effect on individual grade, District and year applied in each regression. Child-related 
controls include age, private tuition; parent’s education controls include, mother and father highest education in years; household 
characteristics include ownership, house condition, and availability of electricity, mobile and television facilities. Statistical 
significance at the 1, 5, 10% levels are indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
 
3.8 Results
3.8.1 Program Impact on Government Schools Outcomes
Table 3.6 reports the main results of the monitoring program on the ratio of
present teachers to total appointed teachers using basic OLS model in equation
(3.7). We check the program effect using different post and pre-program-years
to see any difference during post-program two years. Since most of the KP
province and FATA contains rural areas, time-invariant district-specific factors
such as school density (schools per km2) and location of district administration
offices etc., might affect the outcome variable(see Appendix table C.9 for list
of districts in KP and FATA). To overcome any time-invariant district-specific
unobserved characteristics and time trend, we use district fixed effect and year
fixed effect respectively throughout our regressions. Also considering the po-
tential variation in teacher’s behaviors, we control for schools teaching and train-
ing quality, urban districts, history, size and a vector of school-related facilities.
School teaching and training quality is measured as a ratio of teachers with mas-
ter’s degree and professional training certificate to the total appointed teachers
in the surveyed school. We represent schools’ history as a dummy of old schools
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with more than 50 years of establishment equals to one. As suggested by previ-
ous studies, enrollment of children in schools might affect teachers attendance
behavior (Koedel et al., 2007), we therefore control for school-size represented
by enrollment. The role of school infrastructure in creating better teaching envi-
ronment is well documented in education literature (A. Banerjee & Duflo, 2006;
Hathaway, 2005). We control for all school-related facilities surveyed by ASER
(e.g. availability of water, boundary wall, toilet, library, playground, laboratory,
computer and internet).
Table 3.6: Teachers Attendance Ratio
Dep. Var: Teachers Attendance  (1) (2) 
   
Monitoring (Treatment*Post) 0.0665*** 0.0256 
 (0.0172) (0.0162) 
School Teaching Quality 0.0375** 0.0301** 
 (0.0150) (0.0127) 
School Training Quality -0.00375 0.00607 
 (0.0182) (0.0147) 
Urban 0.0620 0.0159 
 (0.0408) (0.0346) 
Old-school 0.000548 -0.00469 
 (0.00919) (0.00863) 
School Size(enrollment) 0.0460 0.0368 
 (0.0448) (0.0433) 
Schools Facilities Controls  YES YES 
District FE YES YES 
Year FE YES YES 
   
Constant 0.880*** 0.839*** 
 (0.0302) (0.0350) 
   
Observations 3,019 3,919 
Adj. R-squared 0.075 0.055 
Mean of the dep. Var:  .886 .883 
Notes: Table-3.6 shows the main effect of the monitoring program on teacher’s attendance. Column 
(1) represent Post=2015 and Pre=2012-2013. Column (2) represent Post=2015-2016 while Pre=2012-
13. The outcome variable is the ratio of teachers present in school to the total appointed teachers. 
Variable Monitoring is a typical diff-in-diff interaction of treatment (KP) and Post (for corresponding 
year). Due to District and year fixed effect applied in each regression, we do not include variables for 
treatment and posts. Variables School Teaching Quality and School Training Quality are continuous 
variables showing the ratio of teachers with master’s degree and specific training level to the total 
appointed teachers in each school. School Facilities dummies include availability of water, boundary, 
toilet, library, playground, laboratory, computer and internet. School Size is a continuous variable 
representing the ratio of children enrolled in surveyed school to the school with highest number of 
enrolled children. The data is taken from the ASER-Pakistan School Survey. Standard errors clustered 
at village level are shown in parentheses. The unit of observation is the surveyed government school. 
Statistical significance at the 1, 5, 10% levels are indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
 
 
Table 3.6 column (1) shows a significantly positive effect of the program on
teachers’ attendance ratio in the year(2015) immediately following the program.
Controlling for observable covariates such as existing school teaching and train-
ing quality, location, history, school size, and a vector of school facilities, the
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coefficient of the interaction term shows an increase of .067 percentage points
in teachers’ attendance ratio in the KP province as compared to FATA. In other
words, being exposed to the monitoring program, on average, teacher’s atten-
dance in government schools is likely to increase by nearly 8% in the first year
of program implementation. This effect is larger given the mean value of the de-
pendent variable (.881). In table 3.6, we do not include 2014 data, considering
it a transition period. Column (2) adds year 2016 as post-program period into
our analysis. It can be observed that the program effect is not significant and
has been decreased by nearly half after two years of program implementation.
The effect is however statistically significant at 5% when we include year 2014
in our analysis. Appendix table C.4 reports results after including year 2014 as
post-program period.
There could be several reasons for decreasing effect of the program. First,
the expected penalty (or reward) as a result of IMU may not have been strictly
observed despite absenteeism reports by IMU. Secondly, as other studies ob-
serve, there could be “learning effect” from the perspective of teachers as they
might have learnt sources of shirking by establishing contacts with people who
might observe visiting monitors on their way to schools (A. Banerjee & Du-
flo, 2006). This can happen more likely in far-flung rural areas, where distance
between schools and monitors’ place of residence is large. In their paper on
addressing absence in India using a camera photograph, A. Banerjee and Duflo
(2006) contend external control of monitoring by someone within the institu-
tional hierarchy such as headmaster or principle due to possible collusion with
teachers. Although the case of KP monitoring program does not have this prob-
lem of external control (e.g. monitors do not belong to schools, rather they are
externally appointed and their jobs are rotated), yet we cannot rule out the pos-
sibility of shirking by teachers in areas where teachers’ distance from school is
small.
Although, the effect decreased in the second year, the overall impact of IMU
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program appears to bring immediate improvement in teacher’s attendance over
a large area. We check the robustness of our model [equation (3.7)] on vari-
ous sub-samples of school levels such as primary schools (0-to-5 grades) and
high schools (6-to-10 grades) and a reduced sample of districts bordering12 with
FATA. The results (shown in section 3.8.4) are similar and follow the same pat-
tern as observed in table 3.6. Also, we conduct a falsification test using the
private schools data on post-program period by running the same regression as
table 3.6. Results of falsification test (shown in Appendix table C.1) reflect no
systematic difference in teacher’s attendance pattern in private schools suggest-
ing evidence in favor of IMU effect on government schools.
3.8.2 Learning Achievements
Even ifmonitoring increased teacher’s presence in schools, it is not clear whether
increased teachers presence affect learning achievements. In other words, whether
teachers teach once they decide to be in school, is the question of our inter-
est in this section. Several factors can be considered in explaining the mech-
anism through which any potential impact of increased oversight of teachers
and schools might influence the learning capacity of children. The basic theory
behind hypothesizing the direct effect of teachers monitoring on children per-
formance is the marginal cost of teaching after a teacher is present in school.
Especially at lower level, such as primary schools where the subject contents
are not much difficult, and, where few teachers are appointed per school. We as-
sume that after being present in school, at lower level, teachers generally tend to
teach (they don’t want to shirk), hence children get benefited of their increased
presence (Duflo & Hanna, 2005). In other words, getting teachers to schools
may work effectively at the lower level schools. At higher level however, the
marginal cost of teachers after being present in school might be higher given the
subject contents difficulty at higher grades such as maths, english and science
12There are sixteen districts in KP province which share border with districts (agency) in
FATA.
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subjects of 9th or 10th grade. Previous studies support the idea that develop-
ing countries such as Pakistan and India, are suffering from the low teachers’
capacity at higher level (Hathaway, 2005).
Secondly, parents might positively respond to a large scale oversight pro-
gram in rural areas in terms of sending children to schools. Although, in many
poor societies the opportunity cost of sending children to school is greater than
the benefits of educating them, however, recent evidence on education status in
South Asia confirm the slackness of parents towards sending children to school
due to school quality or teachers absence rather than economic reasons (A. Baner-
jee & Duflo, 2006; Glewwe & Kremer, 2006). At higher grade level such as
grade 9th and 10th, teachers’ absence from schools might affect parent’s re-
sponse. For example the potential financial incentives for teachers when they
(deliberately) avoid teaching at schools in order to increase the chances of pri-
vate tutoring, might pose a financial challenge for parents (Glewwe & Kremer,
2006).
The third source of monitoring effect on children performance might be the
link between teacher’s attendance and children attendance. We check the pro-
gram impact on children attendance measured as number of present children on
the day of survey to the total enrollment in the school. Results shown in Ap-
pendix table C.2 suggest a slight increase (1.7% with 10% significance level) in
children attendance in year 2015, however, the magnitude is small indicating a
subtle effect on children attendance. The program effect on children attendance
is not significant when we add 2016 as a post-program year. In either of our
specifications, children attendance appears to be less affected (or unaffected)
during the year immediately after the program. This is surprising as a number
of studies document a strong association of teachers attendance with school par-
ticipation and hence children academic performance. However, Glewwe and
Kremer (2006) differentiate school participation from children attendance and
argue that increasing teachers attendance and school quality might increase par-
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ticipation which means giving more time to school related tasks rather than mere
attendance.
Finally, governance reforms such as monitoring that target school quality ap-
pears to hold more promise than simply providing monetary incentives to teach-
ers based on test scores. For example, threat of a top-down audit significantly re-
duces corruption (Olken, 2007) and teachers at schools that were inspected more
often resulted in reduced absence (Chaudhury et al., 2006). However, there are
limited evidence that externally controlled monitoring when coupled with clear
and credible threat of punishment induces “good” teaching behavior at school.
We turn to our second outcome of interest, children test performance to see
the direct effect of the monitoring program on the test performed by enrolled
children at home. We follow (Glewwe & Kremer, 2006) to obtain the reduced
form relationship using model (3.8) [equation (3.6)] in estimating normalized
test performance in three different subjects e.g reading, mathematics and english.
With regard to the level of difficulty, the ASER test questions13 for each subject
are designed to measure the very basic learning, english and math ability in view
of achieving SDG indicator 4.2.1 (ASER, 2016). According to ASER reports,
the survey is pitched to grades 2 and 3 competencies only, corresponding with
the SDG indicators for tracking learning at the lower primary level. The survey
procedure in ASER annual publications also confirms the low difficulty levels
of tests. In addition to that, ASER data survey also include three additional
questions(called bonus questions) for reading, two bonus questions related to
math and one additional question related to english.
Although, these additional questions might still be easier, we attempt to uti-
lize them to construct normalized test variable for upper grade children (See Ap-
pendix figure C.1 for details on the procedure of ASER test questionnaire). In
their paper on ASER-India, Banerji et al. (2013) describe that children of grade 3
13The ASER HH survey contains five basic questions ranging from low difficulty to higher
difficulty. For example, for reading, five test dummies are whether the surveyed child is at
beginners level, can read letters, can read words can read sentence, can read story. Similar
procedure is adopted for mathematics and English questions.
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onwards have no difficulties in completing all questions asked by ASER survey.
Nevertheless, in view of the extremely discouraging learning status in Pakistan
reported by different organizations over the last few years, we rely on ASER’s
basic test questionnaires (five questions each subject) for lower grade children
to gauge the ability level of enrolled children. We aggregate the individual dum-
mies for each of five questions in each subject to construct a raw score for each
surveyed child and subsequently normalize14 by individual grades to obtain a re-
liable measure of test score. A similar procedure was adopted for ASER bonus
questions to create normalized test score for children enrolled in higher grade
children (see Appendix table C.5 and C.6 for results on upper grade children
and including year 2014 as pre-treatment.)
Table 3.7: Program Effect, Normalized Test Score (Grade 0 to 5 )
 Normalized Test Score  
  Post=2015  Post=2015+16 
 Reading Math English  Reading Math English 
        
Monitoring (KP*Post) 0.0722 0.137** 0.119** 
 
-0.010 0.014 0.021 
 (0.0624) (0.0538) (0.0588) 
 (0.0591) (0.0504) (0.0556) 
        
Child -Related Controls  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Parents Education Controls Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Household Characteristics Dummies  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
        
District FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Grade FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
        
Constant -0.390*** -0.358*** -0.151  -0.233*** -0.264*** -0.431*** 
 (0.0934) (0.0866) (0.0932)  (0.0793) (0.0780) -0.0779 
        
Observations 41,142 40,923 40,922  58,678 58,476 58,475 
Adj. R-squared 0.096 0.097 0.093  0.065 0.078 0.081 
Notes: Table 3.7 reports the Post-program difference using diff-in-diff estimates on the children test performance for Post=2015 and 
Post=2015+2016(pooled) vs Pre=12-to-2013(pooled). The data is from the ASER Household Survey. Standard errors clustered at village level are shown in 
parentheses. The unit of observation is surveyed 3 to 16 year’s old child enrolled in government school from Grade-0 to grade-5. The dependent variable is 
the test score normalized by grade. Variable Monitoring is an interaction of treated province (KP) and Post. Fixed Effect on individual grade, District and 
year applied in each regression. Child-related controls include age, private tuition; parent’s education controls include, mother and father highest education 
in years; household characteristics include ownership, house condition, and availability of electricity, mobile and television facilities. Statistical significance 
at the 1, 5, 10% levels are indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
 
Table 3.7 reports the direct program effect on normalized test scores for lower
grade (0 to 5) enrolled children using 2012 and 2013 as Pre-Program. For sim-
plicity purpose, we only report coefficients of the interaction term of KP and
post-program year to show the differential effect of the treatment after the pro-
gram. Previous literature on learning outcomes documents effects of factors
14After constructing the raw score, we standardize the score as:
z = (x− x¯)/σ (3.9)
where x¯ and σ are the mean and standard deviation of the test score respectively by individual
grade
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such as individual characteristics, parent’s education and household characteris-
tics on the learning performance of children (Abdulkadiroğlu et al., 2018; Azam,
Kingdon, & Wu, 2016; A. V. Banerjee et al., 2007; Croke, 2014; Jackson, 2009;
Raikes, 2016). We therefore control for individual child-specific characteristics,
parents education and household characteristics along with district fixed effect
and year fixed effect. The first three columns report the program effect on read-
ing, maths and english test scores normalized by individual grade for year 2015
as post-program. The last three columns report the two years (2015 & 2016)
program effect on normalized test score of lower grade children.
We observe a significantly positive effect of the IMU program on enrolled
children performance in maths and English while positive (but not significant)
effect on reading. Conditional on child-specific controls, parent’s education
and household characteristics, on average, being in the KP province increases
a child’s normalized test performance by 0.07 standard deviations (SD) points
in reading, 0.13 SD points in maths and 0.11 SD points in english. Adding 2016
as post-program year into analysis shows that there is no significant direct effect
of IMU on children test performance. We also check the direct effect of the pro-
gram on higher grade (6 to 10) children. The results are reported in Appendix
table C.5 and C.6. Since data on the higher grade related questions was not avail-
able in year 2012, therefore, we report the results of higher grade children which
include 2014 as pre-program period. Though significant at 10% level, the pro-
gram effect is positive for higher grade children in reading bonus question and
english bonus questions. This decreasing effect of program on higher grade chil-
dren is consistent with earlier findings by Banerji et al. (2013) on the difficulty
level of the ASER-India test questions. In estimating results for table C.5 and
C.6, we only include children that are currently enrolled in government schools
and for whom information on covariates were available.
After adding 2016 as post-program year, the direct program effect on lower
grade children normalized test score is positive, but not significant indicating a
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decrease in the program effect during the year 2016. Nevertheless, for higher
grade children, the program effect persisted, though slightly reduced. Control-
ling for child-specific factors, parents and household characteristics, and the dis-
trict and year fixed effects, the IMU increases the ability of higher grade children
to answer bonus-test questions by 0.127 SD points for reading, 0.136 for english
at 5% significance level. This decrease in effect of children test performance co-
incides with the decrease in teachers’ attendance in 2016 as reflected in table 3.6
giving more weight to the possibility of direct effect of the monitoring program
on children test performance. One way of linking the decreasing effect on chil-
dren performance might be the reducing efforts of teachers even though they are
present in school. Previous evidence also does not rule out this possibility. In
estimating the effect of teacher’s incentive program in Kenya, Kremer and Chen
(2001) find a short run increase in learning score and argue that gains in learning
were only temporary and were not accompanied by increases in teaching efforts.
Our results on the children test score provide evidence in support of the idea
that absence of teachers at lower grades schools causes low learning achieve-
ments in developing countries. Thus addressing teacher’s absence at lower level
could be a key policy direction that can positively affect learning achievements
of lower grade children. Such a policy direction might combine external control
monitoring tools such as IMU with appropriate incentive mechanisms to main-
tain the quality of schools on sustainable basis. With regard to higher grade chil-
dren, besides increased oversight, teacher’s education or training quality may be
coupled with efforts of increasing their attendance to ensure learning achieve-
ments.
3.8.3 Enrollment Status
Enrollment has been widely used as a key indicator for achieving sustainable
development goals particularly children of age 5 to 16 in developing countries.
A large number of out-of-school children in rural areas of Pakistan has been
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a persisting issue that requires effective solution. According to recent reports,
Pakistan continue to suffer from low enrollment and high dropout rate at pri-
mary and middle level schooling (Gouleta, 2015). A review by the International
Growth Centre (ICG), in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa(KP) province in 2012-13 shows
only 63% of 4-9 years old children were enrolled in schools with a much lower
(56%) female enrollment (Habib, 2015). For higher grades, the net enrollment
is even worst. For example, for middle schools, the net enrollment was hardly
40% reflecting a significant dropout or no-enrollment during the middle school
age group (11 to 15 years).
Table 3.8: Program Effect, Children Enrollment Status
 Dep. Var: Enrollment Status[0,1] Post=2015  Post=2016 & 2016 
OLS Probit  OLS  Probit 
Monitoring(treatment*Post) 0.0317** 0.040*  0.00105 0.004 
 (0.0152) (0.017)  (0.0133) (0.015) 
Child Age 0.0352*** 0.039**  0.0363*** 0.040** 
 (0.000610) (0.001)  (0.000547) (0.001) 
Gender(Female=1)  -0.196*** -0.217**  -0.191*** -0.212** 
 (0.00494) (0.005)  (0.00427) (0.005) 
Mother Highest Education -0.00161*** -0.002**  -0.00189*** -0.002** 
 (0.000555) (0.001)  (0.000501) (0.001) 
Father Highest Education 0.00553*** 0.007**  0.00587*** 0.007** 
 (0.000414) (0.000)  (0.000366) (0.000) 
House-ownership 0.0134* 0.016  0.00772 0.010 
 (0.00805) (0.009)  (0.00735) (0.008) 
HH- Size  -0.00161*** -0.002**  -0.00175*** -0.002 
 (0.000498) (0.001)  (0.000487) (0.001)** 
Urban Districts 0.0751** 0.095*  0.0655* 0.083 
 (0.0355) (0.044)  (0.0352) (0.044) 
      
HH-Facilities Controls Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  
District FE Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  
Year FE Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  
      
Constant 0.506***   0.517***  
 (0.0212)   (0.0179)  
      
Observations 144,988 144,988  188,579 188,579 
Adj. R-squared 0.195   0.190  
Notes: Table 3.8 reports the Post-program difference using diff-in-diff OLS coefficients and Probit marginal 
effects on the enrollment status of surveyed children. The first two columns reports results on the 2015 as post-
program only while the last two columns reports post-program period as 2015 & 2016. The pre-program period 
in all columns is 2012 and 2013(pooled). The dependent variable is a binary which child is enrolled in 
government school and zero otherwise. The sample does not include children that are enrolled in private or other 
schools. Variable Monitoring is an interaction of treated province (KP) and Post-program period. District and 
year fixed effect are applied throughout regression while controls for household facilities are also included. The 
data is from the ASER Household Survey.  Standard errors clustered at village level are shown in parentheses. 
The unit of observation is surveyed 3 to 16 year’s old child. Statistical significance at the 1, 5, 10% levels are 
indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively 
 
To investigate the overall effect of the monitoring program on the enroll-
ment status of children surveyed at home, we analyze ASER household survey
data from 2012 to 2016. The ASER household survey include a variable on the
status of children of age 5 to 16 asking whether they are enrolled in schools or
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not. We drop all those children enrolled in private school, madrassas15 or any
other school to obtain reduced sample of children either enrolled in government
schools or not enrolled. We attempt our diff-in-diff model for post-program year
as 2015 only and 2015 and 2016 together to see the two years post program ef-
fect. Results reported in table 3.8 are suggestive of the positive direct effect of
monitoring program on gross government school enrollment. Since enrollment
status is a binary variable, in addition to simple OLS, we also compare probit
model while controlling for all household and child related characteristic. The
OLS estimates show that conditional on household characteristics, compared to
FATA, the probability of a schooling age child to be enrolled in government
school increases in the KP province by 3.1% in 2015 while this effect is not sig-
nificant in 2016. The probit marginal effects imply that children in KP province
have a 4% higher probability of getting enrolled in government schools com-
pared to FATA.
Both OLS and probit results point to a similar drop in the gross enrollment of
children in 2016 consistent with a similar trend in children’s test outcomes and
teachers attendance. However this effect should be interpreted carefully due to
two reasons. First, children enrollment mainly depends on school density. In
other words, if the government schools (e.g per village) increases, it might in-
crease the gross enrollment per village. Secondly, each year, there might be a
linear trend in population growth coupled with increasing awareness campaigns
by government and non-government organizations. While we are applying dis-
trict fixed effect and year fixed effect which control for any district specific char-
acteristics and time trend respectively, we believe this effect may come through
parents whose behavior might be affected by the government’s monitoring pro-
gram. Earlier studies also support the idea that parents positively respond to in-
creasing school quality in terms of enrolling their children in schools (Glewwe
& Kremer, 2006; Jones et al., 2014). Although these effects seem to be small,
15Madrassas are religious institutions where basic learning courses are taught besides religious
literature.
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considering the status of out-of-school children in developing countries particu-
larly Pakistan, the implication of these results is worth noticing. If a government
policy targeted at one aspect of schooling such as teachers’ attendance, affect
children enrollment into government schools and test performance simultane-
ously besides increasing school quality, then the cost of such policies should
be evaluated in terms all three outcomes of education; school quality, learning
outcomes and enrollment.
3.8.4 Robustness Check
Table 3.9: Program Effect on Only Primary Schools[grade0 to 5]
Table -5 : Program Effect on Only Primary Schools[ grade0 to 5 ] 
Dep. Var: Teachers Attendance  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Monitoring (Treatment*Post) 0.0657*** 0.0567*** 0.0243 0.0141 
 (0.0182) (0.0209) (0.0165) (0.0194) 
School Teaching Quality 0.0384** 0.0396** 0.0298** 0.0316** 
 (0.0162) (0.0194) (0.0140) (0.0160) 
School Training Quality 0.0243 0.00995 0.0263* 0.0175 
 (0.0165) (0.0208) (0.0147) (0.0172) 
urban -0.0164 -0.0244 -0.0521 -0.0255 
 (0.0379) (0.0640) (0.0440) (0.0393) 
old-school -0.00946 0.000805 -0.0104 -0.00386 
 (0.00986) (0.0115) (0.00936) (0.0107) 
School Size(enrollment) 0.199*** 0.159** 0.145*** 0.105 
 (0.0550) (0.0693) (0.0549) (0.0683) 
Schools Facilities Controls  YES YES YES YES 
District FE YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
     
Constant 0.785*** 0.764*** 0.827*** 0.819*** 
 (0.0355) (0.0405) (0.0307) (0.0342) 
     
Observations 2,765 2,087 3,429 2,751 
Adj. R-squared 0.082 0.090 0.066 0.065 
Mean of the dep. Var:  0.887 0.887 0.887 0.887 
Notes: 3.9 shows the main effect of the monitoring program on teacher’s attendance in government 
run primary schools only. Column (1) & (2) represent Post=2015 while Pre=2012-2014 & Pre=2012-
2013 respectively. Similarly Column (3) & (4) represent Post=2015-2016 while Pre=2012-14(1) & 
Pre=2012-13 (2) respectively.  The outcome variable is the ratio of teachers present in school to the 
total appointed teachers. Variable Monitoring is a typical diff-in-diff interaction of treatment (KP) and 
Post (for corresponding year). Due to District and year fixed effect applied in each regression, we do 
not include variables for treatment and posts. Variables School Teaching Quality and School Training 
Quality are continuous variables showing the ratio of teachers with master’s degree and specific 
training level to the total appointed teachers in each school.  School Facilities dummies include 
availability of water, boundary, toilet, library, playground, laboratory, computer and internet. School 
Size is a continuous variable representing the ratio of children enrolled in surveyed school to the school 
with highest number of enrolled children.  The data is taken from the ASER-Pakistan School Survey.  
Standard errors clustered at village level are shown in parentheses. The unit of observation is the 
surveyed government primary school where children from grade0 to 5 are taught. Statistical 
significance at the 1, 5, 10% levels are indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.     
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Table 3.10: Effect on Reduced Sample of Bordering Districts
Dep. Var: Teachers Attendance  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Monitoring (Treatment*Post) 0.0800*** 0.0779*** -0.00384 -0.000501 
 (0.0176) (0.0178) (0.0220) (0.0230) 
School Teaching Quality 0.0462** 0.0313 0.0356** 0.0257 
 (0.0218) (0.0255) (0.0178) (0.0199) 
School Training Quality 0.0127 0.000746 0.0123 0.00587 
 (0.0252) (0.0322) (0.0217) (0.0255) 
urban -0.0478 0.0393 -0.0905** -0.0637 
 (0.0481) (0.0456) (0.0454) (0.0497) 
old-school -0.00143 0.00716 -0.00723 -0.00390 
 (0.0130) (0.0151) (0.0122) (0.0140) 
School Size(enrollment) 0.127** 0.0733 0.138** 0.100 
 (0.0556) (0.0634) (0.0542) (0.0627) 
Schools Facilities Controls  YES YES YES YES 
District FE YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
     
Constant 0.759*** 0.738*** 0.789*** 0.775*** 
 (0.0385) (0.0427) (0.0348) (0.0378) 
     
Observations 1,515 1,123 1,845 1,453 
Adj. R-squared 0.056 0.070 0.050 0.056 
Mean of the dep. Var:  0.871 0.871 0.871 0.871 
Notes: Table-3.10 shows the main effect of the monitoring program on teacher’s attendance in 
government run schools using the reduced sample of districts bordering with FATA and FATA. 
Column (1) & (2) represent Post=2015 while Pre=2012-2014 & Pre=2012-2013 respectively. 
Similarly Column (3) & (4) represent Post=2015-2016 while Pre=2012-14(3) & Pre=2012-13 (4) 
respectively.  The outcome variable is the ratio of teachers present in school to the total appointed 
teachers. Variable Monitoring is a typical diff-in-diff interaction of treatment (KP) and Post (for 
corresponding year). Due to District and year fixed effect applied in each regression, we do not 
include variables for treatment and posts. Variables School Teaching Quality and School Training 
Quality are continuous variables showing the ratio of teachers with master’s degree and specific 
training level to the total appointed teachers in each school.  School Facilities dummies include 
availability of water, boundary, toilet, library, playground, laboratory, computer and internet. 
School Size is a continuous variable representing the ratio of children enrolled in surveyed school 
to the school with highest number of enrolled children.  The data is taken from the ASER-Pakistan 
School Survey.  Standard errors clustered at village level are shown in parentheses. The unit of 
observation is the surveyed government school. Statistical significance at the 1, 5, 10% levels are 
indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.     
 
3.9 Conclusion
Initiatives to reduce teachers’ absenteeism in public schools range from offer-
ing incentives to instituting school committees to decentralizing of education
to local government to externally controlled monitoring etc., however, to what
extent such initiatives persist their effect and how much they affect children
learning performance is rarely understood. In this paper, we examine the effect
of a large scale public schools monitoring program featured by the use of smart-
phone aided facility through professionally trained monitors in the KP province
of Pakistan. We use five years data from a country wide annually representative
survey to compare treated region with a neighboring untreated region that share
similar characteristics in all aspects except the program. Our data consists a rich
122
set of variables that allow estimation of education production function in the con-
text of a purely exogenous intervention. Our findings suggest that monitoring of
government schools through trained monitors equipped with smart-phone-aided
biometric facility improved teacher’s attendance by nearly 8% in the year im-
mediately following the program. However, this effect decreases by nearly half
after two years of the program introduction.
We also find the program’s direct effect on the enrolled children’s test per-
formance at home. Enrolled children’s standardized reading, math and english
ability in monitored schools has improved significantly by 0.07, 0.13 and 0.11
standard deviation points respectively at the lower (0-5) grades. There is slight
improvement in standardized test performance of higher grade children. We also
find a positive immediate effect of the program on the likelihood of school-aged
children enrollment into government schools suggesting responsiveness of par-
ents towards a large scale program.
Our results on the children performance provide evidence in support of the
idea that absence of teachers at lower grade schools causes low learning achieve-
ments in developing countries. Thus addressing teacher’s absence at lower level
could be a key policy direction that can positively affect learning achievements
of lower grade children. Such a policy direction might be combined with ex-
ternal control monitoring tools such as IMU with appropriate incentive mech-
anisms to maintain the quality of schools on sustainable basis. With regard to
higher grade children, besides increased oversight, teacher’s education or train-
ing quality may be coupled with efforts for increasing their attendance to ensure
learning achievements.
Two broad implications can be derived from our results. First, incorporation
of advanced technology in schools monitoring has a stronger effect on teach-
ers and children performance simultaneously. Such initiatives might have wide
range effects than the targeted outcomes. Secondly, how long such effects sus-
tain, depends on complementary measures that links teachers performance with
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children performance.
3.10 Limitations and Future Research Directions
Despite having a clear identification strategy, our work is subject to certain lim-
itations. First, we use survey data that is collected on annual basis, and only
captures the yearly inspections of schools. Using monthly data on teacher’s at-
tendance might be more useful in evaluating any differential effect between KP
and FATA schools performance. Secondly, we couldn’t access more detailed ad-
ministrative data on the characteristics of monitors employed by IMU for more
in-depth analysis of the program. Data collected by IMU staff on teacher’s at-
tendance and school performance might be useful for comparison of ASER data
and IMUdata. Thirdly, the test questions for higher-grade childrenmight weakly
represent their performance because of low standard of questions designed by
ASER. ASER’s test questions mainly target low grade children as shown in Ap-
pendix. Although we utilize the bonus questions to create normalize test score
for higher grade children, a more standardized design of tests taken at home for
higher grade children would be more useful in gauging children performance.
Finally, establishing a systematic channel between teacher’s attendance and chil-
dren performance is important despite our findings that monitoring program has
directly affected children test score. Given the differential effect in 2015, future
research might utilize two stage least square (2SLS) approach for establishing a
clear link between teacher’s attendance and children test score.
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Table C.1: Falsification Test on Private Schools Data
Dep. Var: Teachers Attendance Ratio Post=2015(a) Post=2015(b) Post(a) Post(b) 
     
Monitoring (Treatment*Post) 0.000348 -0.0196 -0.0244 -0.0473 
 (0.0335) (0.0375) (0.0257) (0.0298) 
School Teaching Quality 0.0348* 0.0239 0.0364* 0.0292 
 (0.0190) (0.0225) (0.0198) (0.0234) 
School Training Quality -0.00510 0.00115 -0.00739 -0.00506 
 (0.0244) (0.0322) (0.0239) (0.0304) 
urban 0.0166 0.0408 0.00401 -0.0332 
 (0.0297) (0.0311) (0.0276) (0.0407) 
old schools -0.0232 -0.0260 -0.0262 -0.0276 
 (0.0198) (0.0220) (0.0193) (0.0214) 
enrollment 0.0768* 0.0530 0.0874** 0.0718 
 (0.0402) (0.0507) (0.0395) (0.0488) 
Schools Facilities Controls  YES YES YES YES 
District FE YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
     
Constant 0.511*** 0.576*** 0.776*** 0.545*** 
 (0.0267) (0.189) (0.0346) (0.0297) 
     
Observations 1,674 1,292 1,944 1,562 
Adj. R-squared 0.064 0.100 0.057 0.081 
Notes: This table reports the falsification test of the monitoring program on teacher’s attendance using 
private school data.  We run the same specification of our main effect on the private school data to 
see any systematic trend in the teacher’s attendance of private school data. Column (1) & (2) represent 
Post=2015 while Pre=2012-2014(1) & Pre=2012-2013 respectively. Similarly column (3) & (4) 
represent Post=2015-2016 while Pre=2012-14(1) & Pre=2012-13(2) respectively.  The outcome 
variable is the ratio of teachers present in school to the total appointed teachers. Variable Monitoring 
is an interaction of treatment (KP) and Post (for corresponding year).  Due to District and year fixed 
effect applied in each regression, we do not include variables for treatment and posts. Variables 
School Teaching Quality and School Training Quality are continuous variables which show the ratio 
of teachers with master’s degree and specific training level to the total appointed teachers in each 
school.  School Facilities controls include availability of water, boundary, toilet, library, playground, 
laboratory, computer and internet. Enrollment is a continuous variable representing the ratio of 
children enrolled in surveyed school to the school with highest number of enrolled children.  The 
data is taken from the ASER-Pakistan School Survey.  Standard errors clustered at village level are 
shown in parentheses. The unit of observation is the surveyed private school. Statistical significance 
at the 1, 5, 10% levels are indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.     
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Table C.2: Children Attendance in Government Schools
Dep. Var: Children Attendance Ratio Post=2015(a) Post1=2015(b) Post(a) Post(b) 
     
Monitoring (Treatment*Post) 0.0177* -0.00579 0.00873 -0.0168 
 (0.00973) (0.0116) (0.0103) (0.0121) 
School Teaching Quality 0.0104 0.0166* -0.000394 0.00357 
 (0.00817) (0.00959) (0.00800) (0.00912) 
School Training Quality -0.00269 0.00140 0.00139 0.00773 
 (0.00952) (0.0112) (0.00897) (0.0103) 
urban 0.00428 -0.0510* -0.0215 -0.0434 
 (0.0258) (0.0293) (0.0229) (0.0276) 
Old schools -0.00862 -0.00905 -0.00790 -0.00865 
 
(0.00534) (0.00620) (0.00528) (0.00606) 
     
Schools Facilities Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Constant 0.802*** 0.800*** 0.792*** 0.790*** 
 (0.0186) (0.0214) (0.0170) (0.0190) 
     
Observations 4,053 3,019 4,953 3,919 
Adj. R-squared 0.095 0.125 0.092 0.112 
Notes: This table shows main effect of the monitoring program on children attendance. Column (1) & 
(2) represent Post=2015 while Pre=2012-2014(1) & Pre=2012-2013 respectively. Similarly column (3) 
& (4) represent Post=2015-2016 while Pre=2012-14(1) & Pre=2012-13(2) respectively.  The outcome 
variable is the ratio of children present in school to the total enrollment. Variable Monitoring is an 
interaction of treatment (KP) and Post (for corresponding year).  Due to District and year fixed effect 
applied in each regression, we do not include variables for treatment and posts. Variables School 
Teaching Quality and School Training Quality are continuous variables which show the ratio of teachers 
with master’s degree and specific training level to the total appointed teachers in each school.  School 
Facilities controls include availability of water, boundary, toilet, library, playground, laboratory, 
computer and internet. The data is taken from the ASER-Pakistan School Survey.  Standard errors 
clustered at village level are shown in parentheses. The unit of observation is the surveyed government 
school. Statistical significance at the 1, 5, 10% levels are indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.     
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Table C.3: Pre-Program Difference, Normalized Test Score
 
 Normalized Test Score 
  Lower Grades-(0-to -5)  Upper Grade (6 -10) 
 Reading Math English  Reading Math English 
        
Pre-Program Difference (KP*Post) -0.150** -0.0112 -0.0657  0.0218 0.0783 -0.334*** 
 (0.0633) (0.0571) (0.0601)  (0.0622) (0.0590) (0.0917) 
        
Child -Related Controls  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Parents Education Controls Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Household Characteristics Dummies  Yes Yes Yes     
        
District FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Grade FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
        
Constant -0.443*** -0.00221 -0.0470  1.211*** 0.685*** 0.257 
 (0.0927) (0.0846) (0.0906)  (0.134) (0.161) (0.186) 
        
Observations 38,923 38,818 38,762  11,054 11,054 10,942 
Adj. R-squared 0.068 0.062 0.069  0.115 0.111 0.116 
Notes: This table reports the pre-program difference using diff-in-diff estimates on the children test performance for Post=2014 vs Pre=2012 & 
2013 using the ASER Household Survey data.  Standard errors clustered at village level are shown in parentheses. The unit of observation is 
surveyed 3 to 16 year’s old child enrolled in government school from Grade-0 to grade-5(first three columns) and grade-6 to 10(last three columns). 
The dependent variable is the test score normalized by grade. The pre-program difference is a typical diff-in-diff interaction of to-be-treated 
province (KP) and Post (which is equal to 1 if year==2014 and 0 if year=2012 or 2013). Fixed Effect on individual grade, District and year applied 
in each regression. Child-related controls include age, private tuition; parent’s education controls include, mother and father highest education in 
years; household characteristics include ownership, house condition, and availability of electricity, mobile and television facilities. Statistical 
significance at the 1, 5, 10% levels are indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.     
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Table C.4: Teachers Attendance (Different Pre-Program Periods)
Dep. Var: Teachers Attendance  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Monitoring (Treatment*Post) 0.0756*** 0.0665*** 0.0344** 0.0256 
 (0.0151) (0.0172) (0.0140) (0.0162) 
School Teaching Quality 0.0344*** 0.0375** 0.0278** 0.0301** 
 (0.0125) (0.0150) (0.0111) (0.0127) 
School Training Quality 0.0129 -0.00375 0.0167 0.00607 
 (0.0143) (0.0182) (0.0125) (0.0147) 
urban -0.0303 0.0620 0.00645 0.0159 
 (0.0469) (0.0408) (0.0310) (0.0346) 
old-school -0.00379 0.000548 -0.00650 -0.00469 
 (0.00785) (0.00919) (0.00751) (0.00863) 
School Size(enrollment) 0.0945*** 0.0460 0.0789** 0.0368 
 (0.0357) (0.0448) (0.0351) (0.0433) 
Schools Facilities Controls  YES YES YES YES 
District FE YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
     
Constant 0.884*** 0.880*** 0.846*** 0.839*** 
 (0.0295) (0.0302) (0.0344) (0.0350) 
     
Observations 4,053 3,019 4,953 3,919 
Adj. R-squared 0.066 0.075 0.054 0.055 
Mean of the dep. Var:  .883 .886 .881 .883 
Notes: This table shows the main effect of the monitoring program on teacher’s attendance. Column 
(1) & (2) represent Post=2015 while Pre=2012-2014 & Pre=2012-2013 respectively. Similarly 
Column (3) & (4) represent Post=2015-2016 while Pre=2012-14(1) & Pre=2012-13 (2) respectively.  
The outcome variable is the ratio of teachers present in school to the total appointed teachers. Variable 
Monitoring is a typical diff-in-diff interaction of treatment (KP) and Post (for corresponding year). 
Due to District and year fixed effect applied in each regression, we do not include variables for 
treatment and posts. Variables School Teaching Quality and School Training Quality are continuous 
variables showing the ratio of teachers with master’s degree and specific training level to the total 
appointed teachers in each school.  School Facilities dummies include availability of water, boundary, 
toilet, library, playground, laboratory, computer and internet. School Size is a continuous variable 
representing the ratio of children enrolled in surveyed school to the school with highest number of 
enrolled children.  The data is taken from the ASER-Pakistan School Survey.  Standard errors 
clustered at village level are shown in parentheses. The unit of observation is the surveyed 
government school. Statistical significance at the 1, 5, 10% levels are indicated by ***, **, and *, 
respectively.     
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Table C.5: Program Effect, Test Score(Post=2015 and Pre=2012 to 2014))
 Normalized Test Score  
  Lower Grades-(0-to -5)  Upper Grade (6 -10) 
 Reading Math English  Reading Math English 
        
Monitoring (KP*Post) 0.130** 0.140*** 0.150***  0.100* 0.0307 0.121* 
 (0.0524) (0.0478) (0.0508) 
 
(0.0594) (0.0561) (0.0707) 
        
Child -Related Controls  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Parents Education Controls Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Household Characteristics Dummies  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
        
District FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Grade FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
        
Constant -0.431*** -0.0736 -0.0709  1.439*** 1.017*** 0.710*** 
 -0.0779 -0.0703 -0.0751  (-0.124) (-0.13) (-0.149) 
        
Observations 60,308 60,082 60,076  17156 17156 17059 
Adj. R-squared 0.067 0.067 0.070  0.147 0.160 0.143 
Notes: This table reports the Post-program difference using diff-in-diff estimates on the children test performance for Post=2015 vs Pre=12-to-2014(pooled). The 
data is from the ASER Household Survey.  Standard errors clustered at village level are shown in parentheses. The unit of observation is surveyed 3 to 16 year’s 
old child enrolled in government school from Grade-0 to grade-5(first three columns) and grade-6 to 10(last three columns). The dependent variable is the test 
score normalized by grade. Variable Monitoring is an interaction of treated province (KP) and Post (which is equal to 1 if year==2015 and 0 if year=2012 or 
2014). Fixed Effect on individual grade, District and year applied in each regression. Child-related controls include age, private tuition; parents education controls 
include, mother and father highest education in years; household characteristics include ownership, house condition, and availability if electricity, mobile and 
television facilities. Statistical significance at the 1, 5, 10% levels are indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.  (See Appendix table A4 (b) for complete regression 
results.) 
 
Table C.6: Program Effect, Test Score (Post=2015+2016 and Pre=2012 to 2014)
 Normalized Test Score  
  Lower Grades-(0-to -5)  Upper Grade (6 -10) 
 Reading Math English  Reading Math English 
        
Monitoring (KP*Post) 0.0730 0.0221 0.0657  0.127** 0.0198 0.136** 
 (0.0474) (0.0440) (0.0461) 
 (0.0506) (0.0490) (0.0618) 
        
Child -Related Controls  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Parents Education Controls Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Household Characteristics Dummies  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
        
District FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Grade FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
        
Constant -0.355*** -0.0691 -0.0226  1.435*** 0.963*** 0.814*** 
 -0.0724 -0.0672 -0.071  (0.107) (0.114) (0.129) 
        
Observations 77724 77515 77509  21,744 21,744 21,373 
Adj. R-squared 0.053 0.064 0.067  0.128 0.147 0.113 
Notes: This table reports the Post-program difference using diff-in-diff estimates on the children test performance for Post=2015 & 2016 vs Pre=12-to-2014 
(pooled). The data is from the ASER Household Survey.  Standard errors clustered at village level are shown in parentheses. The unit of observation is surveyed 
3 to 16 year’s old child enrolled in government school from Grade-0 to grade-5(first three columns) and grade-6 to 10(last three columns). The dependent 
variable is the test score normalized by grade. Variable Monitoring is an interaction of treated province (KP) and Post (which is equal to 1 if year==2015 & 
2016 and 0 if year=2012 or 2014). Fixed Effect on individual grade, District and year applied in each regression. Child-related controls include age, private 
tuition; parents education controls include, mother and father highest education in years; household characteristics include ownership, size, house condition, and 
dummies for availability if electricity, mobile and television facilities. Statistical significance at the 1, 5, 10% levels are indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.     
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Table C.7: Estimates of Test Performance(Post=2015, Pre=2012-to-14)
 Grade-0 to Grade-5  Grade-5 to Grade-10 
  Reading Math English  Reading Math English 
DiD(treatment*Post) 0.130** 0.140*** 0.150***  0.100* 0.0307 0.121* 
 (0.0524) (0.0478) (0.0508)  (0.0594) (0.0561) (0.0707) 
Post(=2015, Pre=2012-14) 0.0310 -0.00182 0.00452  -0.246*** -0.119** -0.222*** 
 (0.0478) (0.0418) (0.0450)  (0.0496) (0.0494) (0.0630) 
Treatment(KP) -0.169** -0.395*** -0.275***  -0.543*** -0.404*** -0.844*** 
 (0.0850) (0.0787) (0.0819)  (0.130) (0.117) (0.132) 
Child Age 0.0847*** 0.0722*** 0.0674***  -0.00800 -0.0109 0.0157 
 (0.00814) (0.00749) (0.00737)  (0.00828) (0.00854) (0.00969) 
Mother Highest Education -0.00139 -0.00102 0.000449  -0.00220 0.000379 0.00317 
 (0.00238) (0.00214) (0.00229)  (0.00296) (0.00258) (0.00311) 
Father Highest Education 0.00103 0.00150 0.00161  0.00512*** 0.00410** -0.000725 
 (0.00157) (0.00155) (0.00158)  (0.00177) (0.00176) (0.00221) 
House-ownership 0.0737*** 0.0367 0.0219  0.0295 0.0228 0.0492 
 (0.0256) (0.0242) (0.0261)  (0.0321) (0.0304) (0.0385) 
Private Tutoring 0.196*** 0.154*** 0.160***  -0.00228 -0.0585 0.160*** 
 (0.0407) (0.0380) (0.0426)  (0.0428) (0.0451) (0.0435) 
Electricity Availability  0.0136 -0.0412 -0.0542  -0.0325 0.0168 0.0892* 
 (0.0454) (0.0405) (0.0430)  (0.0419) (0.0427) (0.0514) 
Mobile service Availability  0.0848*** 0.0543** 0.0889***  0.0975*** 0.0510 0.0840** 
 (0.0255) (0.0233) (0.0254)  (0.0363) (0.0340) (0.0390) 
TV availability  0.0241 0.0158 0.00277  -0.0299 -0.0432** 0.0207 
 (0.0191) (0.0184) (0.0186)  (0.0221) (0.0210) (0.0240) 
House condition 0.0375 0.0436 0.0497  0.0297 -0.0135 0.0581 
 (0.0331) (0.0320) (0.0321)  (0.0412) (0.0381) (0.0456) 
HH- Size  -0.000153 0.00184 0.000509  9.57e-05 0.00170 0.00136 
 (0.00145) (0.00138) (0.00148)  (0.00135) (0.00135) (0.00152) 
District FE YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Grade FE YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
        
Constant -0.431*** -0.0736 -0.0709  1.439*** 1.017*** 0.710*** 
 -0.0779 -0.0703 -0.0751  (-0.124) (-0.13) (-0.149) 
        
Observations 60,308 60,082 60,076  17156 17156 17059 
Adj. R-squared 0.067 0.067 0.070  0.147 0.160 0.143 
Notes: This table reports the Post-program difference using diff-in-diff estimates on the children test performance for 
Post=2015 vs Pre=12-to-2014(pooled). The data is from the ASER Household Survey.  Standard errors clustered at village 
level are shown in parentheses. The unit of observation is surveyed 3 to 16 year’s old child enrolled in government school. 
The dependent variable is the test score normalized by grade. Variable Monitoring is an interaction of treated province 
(KP) and Post (which is equal to 1 if year==2015 and 0 if year=2012 or 2014). Fixed Effect on individual grade, District 




Table C.8: Estimates of Test Performance(Post=2015+2016, Pre=2012-to-14)
 Grade-0 to Grade-5  Grade-5 to Grade-10 
  Reading Math English  Reading Math English 
DiD(treatment*Post) 0.0730 0.0221 0.0657  0.127** 0.0198 0.136** 
 (0.0474) (0.0440) (0.0461)  (0.0506) (0.0490) (0.0618) 
Post(=2015, Pre=2012-14) -0.108** -0.256*** -0.235***  -0.119** -0.0562 0.126** 
 (0.0477) (0.0424) (0.0450)  (0.0488) (0.0488) (0.0596) 
Treatment(KP) -0.0447 -0.263*** -0.115  -0.418*** -0.215** -0.591*** 
 (0.0755) (0.0735) (0.0750)  (0.101) (0.0923) (0.102) 
Child Age 0.0802*** 0.0673*** 0.0623***  -0.00715 -0.0115 0.00688 
 (0.00685) (0.00660) (0.00618)  (0.00719) (0.00742) (0.00825) 
Mother Highest Education 0.00250 0.000588 0.00310  -0.00231 -0.00128 0.00413 
 (0.00216) (0.00210) (0.00215)  (0.00252) (0.00232) (0.00269) 
Father Highest Education 0.00378*** 0.00419*** 0.00340**  0.00410*** 0.00342** -0.00337* 
 (0.00140) (0.00145) (0.00142)  (0.00154) (0.00154) (0.00191) 
House-ownership 0.0468** 0.0381* 0.00586  0.0230 0.0454 0.0613* 
 (0.0226) (0.0223) (0.0243)  (0.0281) (0.0301) (0.0331) 
Private Tutoring 0.277*** 0.249*** 0.266***  0.0151 -0.0589 0.112*** 
 (0.0371) (0.0397) (0.0399)  (0.0345) (0.0402) (0.0382) 
Electricity Availability  0.0166 -0.00693 -0.0377  -0.0308 0.0510 0.0587 
 (0.0374) (0.0340) (0.0359)  (0.0380) (0.0422) (0.0439) 
Mobile service 
Availability  0.0333 0.00955 0.0560** 
 
0.0712*** 0.0277 0.0395 
 (0.0217) (0.0204) (0.0222)  (0.0272) (0.0261) (0.0301) 
TV availability  0.0205 0.0180 0.0189  -0.0140 -0.0524*** 0.0408* 
 (0.0169) (0.0169) (0.0169)  (0.0195) (0.0186) (0.0209) 
House_condition 0.0282 0.0302 0.0302  0.0453 0.0550 0.0655* 
 (0.0299) (0.0304) (0.0299)  (0.0361) (0.0348) (0.0391) 
HH- Size  -0.00129 0.00193 0.000142  -0.000398 5.15e-05 -0.000119 
 (0.00146) (0.00140) (0.00148)     
District FE YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Grade FE YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
        
Constant -0.355*** -0.0691 -0.0226  1.435*** 0.963*** 0.814*** 
 -0.0724 -0.0672 -0.071  (0.107) (0.114) (0.129) 
        
Observations 77724 77515 77509  21,744 21,744 21,373 
Adj. R-squared 0.053 0.064 0.067  0.128 0.147 0.113 
Notes: This table reports the Post-program difference using diff-in-diff estimates on the children test performance for 
Post=2015 & 2016(pooled) vs Pre=12-to-2014(pooled). The data is from the ASER Household Survey.  Standard errors 
clustered at village level are shown in parentheses. The unit of observation is surveyed 3 to 16 year’s old child enrolled in 
government school. The dependent variable is the test score normalized by grade. Variable Monitoring is an interaction of 
treated province (KP) and Post (which is equal to 1 if year==2015 or 2016 and 0 if year=2012 to 2014). Fixed Effect on 
individual grade, District and year applied in each regression. Statistical significance at the 1, 5, 10% levels are indicated by 
***, **, and *, respectively 
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Table C.9: List of Districts in Khyber Pakhtunkwha and FATA
Federally Administered Tribal 
Areas(FATA) 
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) Bordering   
 FATA-Bannu Abbottabad No  
FATA-Lakki Marwat Bannu YES  
 FATA-Peshawar Battagram No 
FATA-Tank Buner No 
Khyber Agency Charsadda YES 
Mohmand Agency Chitral No 
Orakzai Agency D.I.Khan YES 
Bajaur Agency Hangu YES 
FATA-Kohat Haripur No 
Kurram Agency Karak YES 
FATA-DIKhan Kohat YES  
Kohistan No 
 Lakki Marwat YES 
 Lower Dir YES 
 Malakand YES 
  Mansehra No 
 Mardan YES 
 Mardan-Urban YES 
  Nowshera YES 
  Peshawar YES 
  Peshawar - Urban YES 
  Shangla No 
  Swabi No 
  Swat No 
  Swat-Urban No 
  Tank YES 
  Tor Ghar No 
  Upper Dir YES 
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 Figure C.1: ASER-Pakistan(2016) Children Test Procedure(Math Test)
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